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Special Volume:

The Image of Hungary and Hungarians

From the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century

edited by
Nándor Dreisziger

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Articles by

GEORGE BISZTRAY
ZOLTÁN FEJŐS
KENNETH MCROBBIE
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and
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László Móholy-Nagy: Translating Utopia Into Action

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Preface:

Perceptions of Hungary and Hungarians Throughout the Centuries

Nándor Dreisziger

2006 is a special year in the evolution of the Hungarian communities of North America, and especially, Canada. It marks the fiftieth anniversary of the coming of the refugees of the 1956 anti-Soviet revolution in Hungary. With the arrival of those refugees, the writer of these lines included, the life of Canada's Magyar colonies was revitalized. With over 38,000 additional Hungarians settling in Canada, a new era began in the Magyar neighbourhoods of metropolitan centres such as Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Winnipeg, Calgary, Edmonton, as well as smaller settlements. With this event commenced what has been called the "golden age" of the Hungarian ethnic group in this country.[1]

To celebrate this anniversary we plan to publish two volumes of our journal, both of them bulkier than has been our tradition in the past. For the first of our "1956" commemorative issues we present a volume of essays that, on first impression, contains a selection of articles on an assortment of subjects with no manifest correlation to each other. Nevertheless, the papers have one over-riding theme, since to a greater or lesser degree all of them deal with the image Hungary and/or Hungarians at home or abroad projected to the outside world. For this reason we feel entitled to call the volume "The Image of Hungary and Hungarians."

The very first essay in the collection, by George Bisztray, our journal's former co-editor, treats the subject of what impression Hungary made on foreign visitors from late medieval times to the middle of the nineteenth century. The following paper, that of Zoltán Fejős, the C.E.O. of Hungary's Museum of Ethnography, examines the evolution of "mother tongue" education in early Hungarian-American communities and concludes that, among other things, the ethnic schools Magyar immigrants established at the turn of the last century, bolstered above all their self-image — and by doing so contributed to the preservation of their ethnic consciousness.

The next study, by Canadian literary historian Kenneth McRobbie, tells the story that post-1914 Hungary's most prominent female revolutionary figure, Ilona Duczynska never managed to narrate in a comprehensive auto-biography. The article explains how this rebellious young woman of noble background managed to form an image of Hungary's Prime Minister István Tisza as war-mongering anti-democrat, insensitive to the sufferings of his people — an image that many inside and outside of Hungary shared at the time. She convinced herself that only the elimination of Tisza would free her nation from its torments and tormentors. She was ready to sacrifice herself for her cause, but fate intervened at the last moment and the planned assassination became unnecessary.

The next paper, by University of Sherbrooke political scientist Dany Deschênes, deals directly with the evolving image of Austria-Hungary — and within it, the historic Kingdom of Hungary — in the decades before (and also during) the First World War. He explains how the erosion of the largely positive image that Hungary had in France from 1848 to the 1870s contributed to the rise of a political atmosphere in which Hungary's dismemberment in the post-World War I peace settlement became possible and, in fact, a probable development.

The following essay, by the Canadian-trained historian Béla Bodó, explains how the maraudings of the "White" officers' detachments during the chaos after a lost war, two unsuccessful revolutions, and foreign occupation, were perceived by Hungary's rulers as impacting negatively on the country's image, and — after many delays and some difficulties — reined them in. The next two papers, by American scholars Thomas Sakmyster and Marguerite DeHuszar Allen respectively, also touch on the issue of the image Hungarian right-wing leaders projected, for Hungary and for her politics, during the interwar and the World War II years. Finally, in her essay, Emese Ivan of the University of Western Ontario deals with the image people in charge of Hungary's sports policies project for their country and its sports establishment in the post-communist era.

* * *

We hope to mark the 50th anniversary of 1956 further by publishing in a supplemental 2006 volume a collection of essays pertaining directly to some of the antecedents as well as the aftermath of that important event in Hungarian history. We also plan to include papers as well as documents in this anthology that deal with the coming of the 1956 refugees to Canada, their reception here and their adjustment to Canadian life.

Our 2006 output represents a departure from our traditions not only in the publication of two bulky volumes in a single year but also in the authorship of their contents. Unlike other volumes over the years whose articles were produced by a combination of American, Hungarian, and Canadian authors, these volumes, in particular the first one, have been written mainly by Canadian academics. The fact that several scholars in Canada are active in the field of Hungarian studies is to some extent an indication of the continued vitality of Hungarian culture in Canada, a vitality that had been reinvigorated as a result of the coming of the refugees of 1956 to this country in that year and in 1957 — and to a lesser degree even thereafter in the case of refugees whose first destination had been a country other than Canada.

Our present volume, the 2006 "official" double-issue, represents a departure from our traditions in one other way as well. Some academic journals occasionally publish essays by graduate students. Our journal has resisted this idea. This time we made an exception and we included a paper by Dany Deschênes in our collection. Although Dr. Deschênes is a full-time academic now, at the time he wrote his paper and presented it at the annual meeting of the Hungarian Studies Association of Canada that was held at Laval University in Quebec City in 2001, he was a graduate student. His paper, explaining some of the background to the dismemberment of the historic Kingdom of Hungary in the wake of World War I, will no doubt interest Hungarians and Hungarian specialists in Canada and elsewhere.[2] Furthermore, we have not published an article dealing with French attitudes to Hungary for decades, and we have never published a work by a French-Canadian author. Because of problems and delays with the translation of this work from French into English, it sat on my editorial desk for several years. I apologize for this and also for the fact that by now the paper is missing references to some pertinent new research.[3]

In 2007 we'll return to our time-honoured practice of publishing "only" about 150 pages per year, usually in one combined volume. We already have a volume waiting to be finalized on a subject of art history, and another one on the planning board, on the theme of Transylvania in the 20th century. Of course, we also hope to produce at least one "regular" issue or volume of our journal during the last few years of this decade.

NOTES

[1] N. F. Dreisziger *et al.*, *Struggle and Hope: The Hungarian-Canadian Experience* (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1982), see the Chapter entitled

"Towards a Golden Age: The 1950s" especially pp. 203-219, as well as the book's conclusions, pp. 220-31 *in passim*.

[2] About the decline of Hungary's reputation in the years before 1914 in Great Britain see Géza Jeszenszky, *Az elvesztett presztízs: Magyarország megítélésének megváltozása Nagy-Britanniában (1894-1918)* [The lost prestige: the transformation of Hungary's image in Great Britain] (Budapest: Magvető, 1986); as well as Tibor Frank's recent book, *Picturing Austria-Hungary: The British Perception of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Wayne, N.J.: Center for Hungarian Studies and Publications, 2005; distributed by Columbia University Press, New York).

[3] Such as the article of Lajos Kövér, "A 18. századi Franciaország magyarságképének gyökerei" [The origins of the image of Hungary in 18th century France], *AETAS,* 20, 3 (fall, 2005): 69-86. (Incidentally, this study also comments on the image Hungary presented to French travellers in the country [pp. 77-81]). Another work that Professor Deschênes might have mentioned had his paper been written more recently is the biography of Leopold I of Austria by the noted French student of Habsburg history Jean Bérenger: *Leopold 1er (1640-1705): fondateur de la puissance autrichienne* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2004).

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The World Visits Hungary: Reflections of Foreign Travellers, 1433-1842

George Bisztray

In the Hungarian language, slightly more than in English, there is a difference between the words tourist and traveller. Traditionally, tourists were people who liked to take long excursions in nature. Nowadays, recreational mass travel is so-called tourism. A traveller is a different person: an educated lady or gentleman who savours the foreign places that she or he visits, compares experiences and learns from them.

Considering those travellers who visited Hungary, first of all we find intellectuals and scholars among the visitors (Quad, Brown, Townson, and Ackersdijck). Besides, or through, their professional interest, they also formed a general view of Hungary. Then there were the officials, emissaries, and escorts of dignitaries. Next came those who actually never planned to see Hungary, but the country was on their way to some destination. An interesting group, particularly familiar in England, were the globetrotters who made sport of visiting as many countries as they could in their lifetime (like Tafur or Pinxner). Finally, emotional considerations also motivated certain people, notably John Paget (and many others since...).

It should be understood that there is no such thing as an objective travel report. There can be a lot of reasons why somebody learns to dislike a country: a dishonest inn-keeper, an infested bed, indigestion caused by the local food, or other complaints. On the other hand, good weather and friendly hosts make the traveller happy. Therefore, reports are never conclusive. Lady Wortley Montagu was satisfied with Hungarian hotels, while a hundred years later the Dutch traveller Ackersdijck was not. External influence in the form of socio-political biases can form an opinion in advance (nowadays we would call it brainwashing). We shall see how eagerly the Austrians tried to dissuade Western European travel-

lers in the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries to continue their trip to Hungary. "Truth" is, to a great degree, in the eye of the beholder. It is easy to criticize. We can assume that there were more irresponsible or tendentiously negative reports about Hungary than critically sympathetic ones. It is true everywhere. In his pioneering book *The Italians* (1964), Luigi Barzini devoted pages to quoting the most outrageously biased opinions of eighteenth-century travellers (almost all Englishmen) about Italy. Such opinionated travel literature is counterproductive, possibly comical, and it may have been Barzini's aim to demonstrate this.

Another matter that should be understood is that some travel reports on Hungary are quite voluminous: Paget's consists of two, Miss Pardoe's of three, volumes. Also in shorter works, there is much information conveyed about a wide variety of experiences. The selection of our references has to be limited to observations that are comparable to those of several travellers. The discourse will be organized thematically, which may seem like a positivistic approach, yet the comparison of various observations will eventually point to certain shared dominant views. My thematic survey will, hopefully, complement the thus far only comprehensive survey of the subject: Gyula Antalffy's *A Thousand Years of Travel in Old Hungary*,[1] which offers a chronological presentation. As so many cultural histories written by Hungarians, Antalffy's book also provides a wide ramification of the subject, describing not only impressions of travellers but also the means of transportation, road conditions, and the like. At the same time, it is a useful guide for readers unfamiliar with Hungarian history, inasmuch as it discusses major turns of events before dealing with their impact on travel.

Other than Antalffy's survey, only publications on travellers from one country, in one period, are available. Arguably, there are exceptions, such as J. E. Horvath's selective, short summary: *Hungary Through Western Eyes*.[2] Two volumes (*Régi utazások Magyarországon és a Balkánfélszigeten*, edited by István Szamota,[3] and *Régi hírünk a világban*, edited by Lajos Tardi),[4] provide indispensable source materials: excerpts from travel reports by foreign travellers in Hungarian translation.

* * *

Until recently, Hungary was regarded as a primarily agricultural country, yet the cities and towns were among the first attractions that travellers

commented on. (In parentheses: is this not a cue to re-evaluate the still standing judgment of historians about the supposedly underdeveloped Hungarian urban civilization?) Understandably, the royal capital of Buda attracted the most attention throughout the centuries, both in its glorious years and in sad times. In 1433, Bertrandon de la Brocquière travelled home to France from the Holy Land through the Balkan and Hungary. Impressed by king Sigismund's Buda, he mentioned the town and palace briefly but appreciatively in his travel report.[5] In 1502 Pierre Choque, member of a royal escort, still witnessed king Matthias' fabulous Renaissance castle, characterizing it thus: "The palace is magnificently situated and is the most beautiful royal residence that I ever saw."[6] This remark comes from a Frenchman, at a time when some of the castles of the Loire Valley (e.g. Amboise and Chaumont) were standing already. Even during the Turkish occupation, Buda impressed Edward Brown, an English physician who studied the mines of Northern Hungary, sufficiently to call it "a large city, and of a pleasant situation," although he qualified this statement by adding: "but much abating of its ancient glory."[7] Unfortunately, the ravages of the 1686 siege were visible even decades later, as the distinguished Lady Montagu's regretful reference from 1717 shows: "[the] Palace was reckon'd one of the most beautiful Buildings of the Age, now wholly destroy'd."[8] (Those of us who remember the state of Buda after the 1945 siege cannot help but reminisce upon reading this description.)

While the Habsburg empire did its best to keep Hungary and its royal capital a godforsaken place, the gradually rebuilt capital of Buda still had its fans during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, among them numerous Germans, formally subjects of the same Habsburgs. With the slow but steady development of the urban middle class, however, also Pest, the ugly duckling hardly ever mentioned in travel reports before the nineteenth century, started to attract visitors. In 1835 John Paget (who will be repeatedly mentioned later), and in 1839 the English writer and traveller Julia Pardoe, may have been the first travellers to appreciate the shops and the commercial spirit of Pest. The general set-up of the city also pleased Miss Pardoe: "Many of the streets are as handsome as in Vienna, and most of them considerably wider; the blocks of building are solid and regular, and the shops handsome and well-fitted-up."[9] A year later, the Italian traveller Tullio Dandolo praised Pest thus: "[it] seems to have developed its line of mansions along the Danube embankment only to offer the visitors a pleasant experience on their arri-

val. [...] Its streets have been broadened, and it has developed into a huge trade centre and the heart of Hungarian culture."[10] The most exuberant and detailed description came from the great storyteller and traveller Hans Christian Andersen. On a Danubian boat trip that started at the Bosporus and ended in Vienna, he visited Pest-Buda (as the twin cities were usually called before their 1873 unification) in 1841 at the time of the famous Whitsun fair. "It is a remarkable view — but how does one paint it — and the sunlight in which it appeared — in words? The buildings along the river in Pest looked like a series of palaces. What life and traffic there was! Hungarian dandies, merchants — both Jews and Greeks — soldiers and peasants all mingle together."[11] Two decades earlier the Dutch traveller (later professor) Jan Ackersdijck also witnessed a seasonal fair in Pest, and was amazed at the variety of objects on sale, calling the sight colourful.[12] Buda also impressed Andersen, and he wouldn't have been the world's greatest tale-teller if he had not referred to a superstitious tale that he heard there about the ghost of a huge Turkish warrior who haunted the slopes of the castle hill shortly before midnight.[13]

Another, almost unconditional, admirer of Hungary was the English physician John Paget who met a young Hungarian aristocrat, the baroness Polixena Wesselényi, in Rome in 1835. Determined to marry her, Paget travelled to Hungary in the same year to meet her family and get acquainted with her country. After the baroness, he also fell in love with the country. Among others, he, too, loved Pest-Buda. Beyond the pleasant sights that affected most travellers, however, Paget was also a keen observer (and later participant) of Hungarian civilization. It is interesting to consider his comparison of local transportation in Pest-Buda with the same in other European capitals:

> Please notice the fiacre: none of the dirty, heavy, shabby, slow coaches, found on the stands in London; but a very clean, smart, open calèche, with two high-bred little horses which whisk along at a famous rate; and the driver as far superior in sharpness and wit to his wooden-shod confrere of Paris as the equipage is to that of London. In winter, instead of the open calèche, a neat close chariot takes its place, for he is a very poor fiacre in Pest who has not a winter and a summer carriage.[14]

Pest and Buda were not the only cities that pleased foreign visitors. Towns that had been taken from Hungary by the 1920 peace

treaty of Versailles-Trianon were mentioned more or less in the same proportion as towns that still belong to Hungary. Most travellers entered the country from the west (coming from Vienna), and their fist stop was Pozsony or Pressburg (now Bratislava, Slovakia), site of the Hungarian parliament between 1531 and 1848. Brown calls Pozsony "pleasant, [its] castle is stately,"[15] Ackersdijck calls it "beautiful."[16] The other charming historical towns of the Upland (Felvidék, now coinciding with the Slovak Republic) also received enthusiastic reviews. According to Pierre Lescalopier, a French lawyer who visited Transylvania in 1574 to strike up an engagement between the ruling prince and a French princess, Kassa was "one of the most beautiful cities of Hungary."[17] The same traveller had kind words about Eperjes and Lőcse as well.[18]

Beautiful and romantic Transylvania (now part of Romania) was also regarded with admiration. The same Lescalopier called Kolozsvár a "beautiful, fortified city,"[19] and the respected high-ranking Austrian official and scholar, Transylvanian-born Ignaz von Born was not alone with his opinion that Kolozsvár was one of Transylvania's most illustrious cities.[20] One cannot help but be moved by the enthusiastic references to other Northern towns such as Besztercebánya, Trencsén, or Munkács (whose "majestic fort" the Swedish diplomat Pal Strassburg mentions),[21] or, among the Transylvanian ones, Brassó, Nagyszeben, or Nagyvárad (which Robert Townson called "one of Hungary's most beautiful cities."[22]

Towns and areas that remained within the present Hungarian borders were equally appreciated. The route along the Danube was a popular and scenic one between Vienna and Pest-Buda, whether travelled by ship or stagecoach. After Pozsony, the travellers could visit Győr, Komárom, Esztergom, Visegrád and Vác. Elsewhere in the country Gödöllő, Székesfehérvár and Pécs were mentioned with praise, as well as Mosonmagyaróvár, the lovely town that most foreign and Hungarian tourists ignore now as they rush on to Vienna or Budapest.

From the travel reports on Hungarian cities and towns we can learn two lessons so far. One: the travellers quoted came from some of the culturally richest countries of Europe — England, France, Germany — yet, they found a lot to praise in Hungarian urban culture. Two: while many Hungarians cannot forget the injustice done to their country in 1920, when they lost two-thirds of their historical territories, references to beautiful places within the present borders testify that Hungary is still a rewarding destination for modern travellers (as we shall see from statistics quoted later).

Our travellers paid little attention to rural Hungary: the villages and their dwellers. Only Ackersdijck named a number of villages he had passed through — most of them he called "neat." The landscape of different parts of the country received much more attention, and some were lavishly praised. Considering once again the direction of the travellers' arrival, the Danube-bend was the first majestic natural sight. Townson described Visegrád in superlatives: "I crossed the Danube[...]. Seen from hence, I hardly know a more beautiful landscape than what these ruins and rocks, with the addition of some hills covered with wood which now rise behind them, form.[...] This castle, now in ruins, was once the Windsor of several kings of Hungary[...]."[23] Buda's location and the surrounding mountains were also a great experience. Johan von Hoffmansegg, a German scientist who sojourned in Hungary in 1793-1794, spent a whole week in the Buda hills, notably in the Inn of the Pretty Shepherdess (Szépjuhászné fogadó), whose memory has been preserved by a mountain road. He wrote that every Sunday the mountains were swarming with tourists[24] — just like nowadays. More mixed were the opinions about Lake Balaton, which was at that time largely undeveloped, and even Hungarians did not appreciate it as a recreational area. Richard Bright, an English physician who was the guest of count György Festetics in Keszthely in the 1810s, at least called it a "fine lake,"[25] while the Hungarophile Paget praised it with reservations: "It is difficult for an Englishman to imagine a fine inland lake of this kind, totally useless for the purposes of commerce or pleasure. I believe there is not a single trading barge, and certainly not one sailing-boat on the whole lake!"[26] It was tamed and civilized nature that Paget, in line with his age, expected. Is the conflict between undisturbed preservation and recreational use not with us still?

Even more divided were the opinions about one area that modern Hungary has been promoting as a major tourist attraction. It was the Great Plain (Nagyalföld), including the famous Hortobágy. For Townson, the Plain was "an immense and boundless waste."[27] Writing about Debrecen, the largest town of the Plain, he could not understand why its dwellers selected "a country destitute of springs, rivers, building materials, fuel, and the heart-cheering wine, for their residence.[28] Townson was not alone with his view. A dissenting voice was John Paget's, who liked even the "Pusta" already in 1835. He felt "a real delight in traversing it, and never for a moment experienced the weariness of monotony."[29] He also loved the sunsets and mirages.[30]

In the past, as much as now, voyagers liked to travel comfortably. While Hungary's roads left much to be desired, the hospitality of the people and the excellent opportunities to eat well and sample delicious wines were as much appreciated by our travellers as they are by modern tourists. Almost everybody mentioned the abundance of the country's agriculture, although their reference sometimes had a critical edge — or a covetous one? According to Pierre Choque, "all that the Hungarians know is to till the land and produce wine; they enjoy living well."[31] The result of the good life was visible on the consumers. As the Spanish traveller Pedro Tafur who travelled in Hungary between 1435-39 characterized Buda's dwellers, they are "slightly overweight, which they attribute to their richness."[32] Perhaps the most detailed summary of Hungary's consumable goods comes from Edward Brown.[33] Almost everybody praised the wines, except those served in taverns. Townson detected the reason: in the cities the aldermen, in the country the landlords paid a set amount (a kind of salary) to the innkeeper, and kept the balance of the income. Thus, innkeepers were not interested in providing quality goods, nor service, as the inadequate comfort and cleanness of country inns proved.[34] The travellers soon found out that it was smarter to appeal to the hospitality of people. Not only well-off gentlefolk but even people from more humble ranks were found to be exceedingly hearty. Lady Montagu describes how her husband surprised village people when he paid them for their generous hospitality. While they accepted the money, at departure they presented the distinguished British travelling company with gifts: on one occasion with "a dozen of fat pheasants."[35] Once Paget's companion and friend, the British artist Hering, found lodging with a carpenter in Tihany who refused the payment he offered next morning.[36]

There were numerous inns in Pest-Buda that served food, and most of them also offered lodging. In 1720, there were only twenty-four, by 1830 some eight-hundred. However, few of them impressed the travellers. Especially the finicky Ackersdijck's judgment of the establishments was devastating. "We found each of them pretty bad, especially the dining rooms, which were dirty and full of tobacco smoke. We were wondering why a capital city did not offer better dining facilities. The probable reason is that higher civilization and refined taste have not conquered Hungary yet."[37] So much for ethnocentrism.

One social gathering place where also food and drinks were consumed was the coffee house, of which travellers were pleased to find

a good number in the twin cities. H. C. Andersen described a famous one with the attractive exaltation characteristic of him: "[The sign on a coffee house] has in gilded letters Kave Haz and underneath is a picture showing 'The heavenly coffee-spring.' Angels are sitting at a table drinking coffee: one of the prettiest angels is taking coffee from a spring where, dark brown, it gushes out among the flowers."[38]

Historians of Pest-Buda recognized from this description the renowned Legrand's Coffee Source. Andersen probably didn't know that "the loveliest angel" in the picture was the owner Ernő Kammer's wife, born Katica Kerner, whose stunning beauty certainly contributed to the brisk business of the café. (Had Andersen known this, the whole world would know it now.)

Decades before Andersen, in 1793, Townson already characterized another café as one unmatched anywhere in Europe. Differently from the apolitical Andersen, however, Townson made a brief but significant observation about the social function of the coffee houses: "... here, according to the continental custom, all ranks and both sexes may come; hair-dressers in their powdered coats, and old market-women come here and take their coffee [...] as well as counts and barons."[39] In other words, coffee houses were democratic institutions — at a time when democracy in its modern meaning was nowhere to be found in the world.

Country inns got better reviews than those of the twin cities. It appears that western European travellers heard a lot of discouraging tales, if not horror stories, in Austria about conditions in Hungary. The more pleasantly they were surprised to find a civilized and hospitable country where Lady Montagu "found [such] tolerable accommodation everywhere that I can hardly forbear laughing when I recollect all the frightful ideas that were given me of this journey."[40] Paget, perhaps the greatest fan of Hungary, ridiculed the (tendentious rather than uninformed) Austrian rumours:

> The reader would certainly laugh, as I have often done since, did I tell him one half the foolish tales the good Viennese told us of the country we were about to visit. No roads! no inns! no police! we must sleep on the ground, eat where we could, and be ready to defend our purses and our lives at every moment![41]

Paget found that "travelling in Hungary was just as safe as travelling in England."[42] He also described country inns favourably. The

guestrooms "have boarded floors, thickly strewn over with sand; and are furnished each with two beds, a table, and three or four wooden chairs."[43]

On the other hand, we can surmise whether Ackersdijck had the misfortune of eating and sleeping in the country's worst inns; or, whether the problem was with him. We have learned his opinion about the inns of Pest, and he was just as dissatisfied with the country inns, which he found unpleasant: cold, unwelcoming, dirty rooms, uncomfortable beds and bad food awaited the demanding traveller like him.[44] The saying that one cannot please everybody was as true in those days as it is now: conditions that suited the wife of the British ambassador in Turkey did not please the Dutch professor.

Not as if travel had been easy in Hungary. Many travellers complained about the abysmal condition of the roads, the uncomfortable carriages, the mud covering not only highways but also village streets. Ackersdijck was surprised that Hungarian women wore boots but, seeing the muddy streets, he thought he understood why.[45] Medical care must have been unsatisfactory. Even Robert Townson, who praised many things in Hungary, warned travellers not to get sick in Pest-Buda, where conditions in the city hospital were, in his opinion, probably the worst in Europe. "The building, the equipment, the personnel were equally unfriendly, stinky and dirty."[46]

Yet, there was something rewarding in the spirit of the country. The learned young Aleksander Ivanovich Turgenev, later respected historian and diplomat (who was not related to the writer I. S. Turgenev), thought it was the spirit of freedom granted to foreigners. Based on his travel experience in Germany, he appreciated that various Hungarian officials did not pester the travellers, checking their identity and the contents of their luggage again and again. "It is not for nothing that Hungarians call their country the land of freedom," he concluded.[47] In the same vein, Paget described his crossing of the Hungarian border thus:

> I proffered my passport, as usual, to the guard who opened the barrier; but it was declined with a polite bow, and an assurance that I was in Hungary and had no longer need of it. I appeal to those who have travelled in Italy and Germany for sympathy with my delight at being once more free from the annoyance of passports. [...] I blessed the land where some trace of personal liberty still existed.[48]

Aside from this, several travellers (even Turgenev!) made disapproving remarks about the Hungarian social class hierarchy and the lowly place of the serfs, something that they must have known from second-hand information, hardly from personal experience.

Recreational activities are a part of travel. Hungary was always famous for its horses and baths. From de la Brocquière's report it seems that in his time (1433) Szeged was the centre of horse breeding. He was told that in that town he could buy thousands of horses any time.[49] As for the famous hot springs of Buda, they were developed mainly by the Turks, and Edward Brown was the first one to provide a detailed report about them.[50] (In pre-Turkish times, de la Brocquière also mentioned the hot springs.) The maintenance of the baths had to be a costly job. It almost sounds like a complaint of today how the health commissioner of Buda lamented to Dandolo about the expenses.[51] Some travellers also visited the Northern Hungarian and Transylvanian baths.

The appearance, social life and customs of the Hungarians drew slightly more attention than their culture. It must have fascinated Ackersdijck that Hungarian men wore moustaches, as he mentioned this repeatedly in his short travel report, adding that it lent them a warrior-like national character.[52] According to Brown, Hungarian clothing was designed for riding and fighting, and was so practical for these purposes that both the peoples of the Balkan and the Turks adopted their design. He also added that Hungarians liked colourful clothing.[53]

The social events of the upper classes were described as dignified and measured (by Pal Strassburg[54] and A.I. Turgenev, among others). More mixed was the company, and more lively the mood, of the Annaday Ball of Balatonfüred that Paget attended on his first trip.[55]

Rich Hungarian folklore always interested the travellers. Brown witnessed and briefly described the *hajdu* (heyduk) dance, a provocative dance the steps of which imitated a man-to-man fight. He called it "a pyrrhic [dance]," comparing it by this term to a soldierly dance of the ancient Greeks.[56] As for Townson, he wrote with delight about the games of a group of teenage country girls on a Transdanubian Sunday.[57]

Since most travellers were men, and all lived before political correctness hit our planet, reflections on Hungarian women are parts of numerous travel reports. Especially the two Russian travellers, Turgenev and Glinka, praised their beauty. The former attended the Palatine's ball and concluded that aside from Vienna, no other city could show up as many beauties as Pest-Buda. The latter, a great Romantic composer,

wrote about Hungarian women in superlatives: "One should think one sees the nymphs of the hills! Imagine: a perfect and proportioned posture, long black curls covering the shoulders casually, a charming face and deep red lips, like a rose in May."[58] We should add: the Slavophile (that is, populist) romantic Glinka described the idealized beauty of peasant girls, suspecting that those who lived in the cities did not preserve their virtue, which enhanced the beauty of country girls.

Relatively few travellers were seriously interested in Hungarian education and scholarship. Ackersdijck found much pleasure in visiting the National Museum[59] and the university library.[60] Especially the numismatic collection impressed him. "One cannot praise such initiatives enough," he wrote. Indeed! Almost two centuries earlier Edward Brown wrote that the most valuable coins had been found in many parts of the country, but since no systematic collection and depository existed, the local peasants usually picked up these treasures.[61] Ackersdijck also visited the new observatory on the Gellért Hill[62] and the university that moved from Buda to Pest in 1784.[63] He described his meetings with some professors and his attendance of their lectures without qualifying these, but emphasized the large number and enthusiastic attention of the students. Not indicating his source, he gave an unflattering report on elementary education, characterizing it as scholastic and of low quality, and attributing the problem to censorship and the many checks on education.

Briefer than Ackersdijck, Townson also wrote about the university and its library collections. In addition, he dealt with the situation of theatre life in Hungary. At the time of his visit, there was one theatre in each of the twin cities, both performing usually in German, but exceptionally also in Hungarian.[64] (The theatre in Buda was the Palace Theatre [Várszinház], founded in 1790, closing in 1796; the one in Pest was the so-called Rondella.) In 1841 H.C. Andersen could already visit the still young National Theatre, which was also used as a concert hall, and he heard Mendelssohn's *Saint Paul* oratorio performed there.[65] While he noted that the German-language City Theatre was larger than the National Theatre, he didn't like the performance he saw there; it was one of the many obscure German plays. He thought it was ranting.

Our survey of the travellers' impressions would not be complete without their reflections on the Hungarian language. Its unusual character fascinated them, which just proves that they considered the country an organic part of Europe. Before the modern historical interest in the native

tongue had started in Hungary, in the late sixteenth century, the Dutch geographer and traveller Matthias Quad let the world know that Hungarians spoke the Scythian language (whatever that was), but had borrowed many words from their neighbours.[66] Two seventeenth-century voyagers, the Scottish William Lithgow[67] and Edward Brown,[68] no longer speculated about the Hungarian language but simply reported that it was unlike any other. Brown presented a sample: the beginning of the Lord's Prayer in Hungarian. Almost two centuries later, Glinka had more information on hand. He proudly reported that the Hungarians had once lived in Siberia, but in the ninth century they had started moving westward. However, "even now" (in Glinka's time) in the land of the Ostyaks, people in several settlements spoke an "almost Hungarian" language.[69] Almost on the mark. And there seems to be an implication hinted, whether naive, unintentional or early pan-Slavic, that maybe-maybe Hungarians were also the natives of Mother Russia.

* * *

The author of this paper regards positivism: the collection of facts, as the basis of knowledge. However, one should ask: facts to what avail? Why do we pursue lengthy, meticulous studies if we don't compare facts, can't achieve a synthesis, and don't ask how our acquired knowledge has enriched us?

The first thing we have learned is that practically all travellers gave signs of sympathy toward, and at least some appreciation of, Hungary. Maybe the sources that I worked with did not want to print blatantly hostile travel reports, which would be understandable. The fatal turn of the world's sympathy for Hungary from positive to negative happened decades after our time frame. In a sense, we can call the voyagers discussed "friends of Hungary."

Secondly, we can find an interesting analogy between what travellers of past centuries and modern day tourists appreciate most about Hungary: beautiful towns, lovely landscape, tasty (although rich) cuisine, excellent wines, inspiring coffee houses, colourful (now waning) folklore, and a lively mood, a *joi de vivre*. Beautiful girls and women too. Let us leave aside the shadier aspects of the modern entertainment industry. (There is nothing new about that either: in 1822 a Russian traveller, Pyotr Ivanovich Keppen, gave a fairly detailed account of prostitution in Pest-

Buda.[70] Just like in any other big city of the world, we may add.) Let us not forget the ancient recreational activities: spas and horseback riding. Can we feel safe to add hospitality to the list of living traditions? Even this situation has been improving though, after decades of the "winter of our discontent" when sales-people in the shops were often grumpy, bus drivers rude, waiters indifferent.

It would be interesting to compare similar experiences of other countries past and present, whether what they had to offer to travellers has been similarly unchanging. Whatever the findings would be, it appears that Hungary itself, with the relics of its past and the continuity of its best features, is a large treasure-chest. In 1995 it was the fifth, in 1996 the eights most frequented tourist destination world-wide. And it is up to its ten million inhabitants to keep it that way. Tourism is less elegant than travelling, yet it is a multi-billion dollar business. All three dimensions of time are needed to shape a positive image of the country. We read the two or three century-old travel reports through the eyes of an entirely different age: ours. It is easy to point out inconsistencies and critical fallacies retrospectively. However, without the appreciation of what the world said about Hungary between 1433 and 1842, our image of ourselves would be less complete.

NOTES

This paper is an enhanced and documented version of the one that I read at Oriel College, Oxford University on February 21, 2002. I am indebted to Dr. Brigitta Bali for assisting me in my research at the National Széchényi Library, Budapest.

[1] Budapest: Corvina, 1980. For a very recent, large collection of essays on travel by Europeans in Europe (and elsewhere) from the sixteenth to the twentieth century see Hagen Schulz-Forberg, ed., *Unravelling Civilisation: European Travel and Travel Writing* (Brussels, Bern, Berlin, Frankfurt am Main, etc.: Peter Lang, 2005).

[2] Toronto: Hungarian Studies Association of Canada, 1991.

[3] Budapest: Franklin, 1891.

[4] Budapest: Gondolat, 1979.

[5] *Le Voyage de l'Outremer* (Paris: Leroux, 1892), 234.

[6] Published in French by Henrik Marczali, "Közlemények a párizsi nemzeti könyvtárból," *Magyar Történelmi Tár*, XXIII, pp. 83-122; the quote is from p. 110.

[7] *A brief account of some Travels in diverse parts of Europe...* (London: Sawbridge, 1687), 20.

[8] Mary Wortley Montagu was an English aristocrat who accompanied her husband, ambassador to Turkey, on his cross-continental trip that included Hungary. *Letters of the Lady M-y W-y, written during her Travels* (Paris, 1799). Our source: *The Complete Letters*, ed. R. Halsband, 2 vols. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1966). Vol. 1, p. 299.

[9] *The City of the Magyar, or Hungary and her Institutions in 1839-40*, 3 vols. (London: Virtue, 1840), Vol. 2, pp. 175-76.

[10] *Reminiscenze e fantasie*. 3 vols. (Torino: Fontana, 1841), Vol. 3, p. 75.

[11] *En digters bazar* (Copenhagen, 1842). Our source: English translation by Grace Thornton, *A Poet's Bazaar* (New York: M. Kesend Publishing, 1988), 187.

[12] The manuscript of Ackersdijck's travel diary is deposited in the university library of Utrecht. Its Hungarian translation appeared in print in 1987: *Jan Ackersdijck magyarországi útinaplója 1823-ból* (Budapest: Helikon. 1987); on Pest fair: pp. 42-44.

[13] Andersen, p. 188.

[14] John Paget, *Hungary and Transylvania, with Remarks on their Condition, Social, Political and Economical*, 2 vols. (London, 1839). Our source: the 1855 ed. (London: Murray), Vol. I, p. 230.

[15] J. Brown, *A brief account...*, p. 16.

[16] *Magyarországi útinapló....* p. 18.

[17] Lescalopier's travel diary is deposited in the library of the University of Montpellier; it appeared in Hungarian translation in 1982: *Pierre Lescalopier utazása Erdélybe* (Budapest: Európa/Helikon, 1982), 94-95.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 89.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 49.

[20] Inigo Born, *Travels through the Banat of Temeswar, Transylvania, and Hungary...* (London, 1777), 146.

[21] "Strassburg Pál 1631-1633-iki követsége...", in *Monumenta Historica Hungariae*, ed. Sándor Szilágyi (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1882), 92.

[22] Robert Townson was an English geologist who spent five months in Hungary in 1793. *Travels in Hungary* (London: Robinson, 1797), 250.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 68.

[24] *Reise des Grafen von Hoffmansegg in einigen Gegenden von Ungarn...* (Görlitz: Anton, 1800), 33-34.

[25] *Travels from Vienna through lower Hungary...* (Edinburgh: Constable, 1818), 427.

[26] *Hungary and Transylvania...*,Vol. 1, p. 263.

[27] *Travels in Hungary*, p. 235.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 238.

[29] *Hungary and Transylvania...*, Vol. 1, p. 488.

[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 491-93.

[31] *Közlemények...*, p. 110.

[32] *Andances e viajes de Pedro Tafur...*, ed. M. Jimenez de la Espada (Barcelona: Albir, 1982; first ed. 1874), 284.

[33] *A brief account...*, pp. 6-7.

[34] *Travels in Hungary...*, pp. 224-25.

[35] *Letters....* Vol. 1. p. 301.

[36] *Hungary and Transylvania...*, Vol. 1, pp. 269-70.

[37] *Magyarországi útinapló*, p. 51.

[38] *A Poet's Bazaar*, pp. 187-88.

[39] *Travels in Hungary...*, p. 82.

[40] Letters.... Vol. 1, p. 297.

[41] *Hungary and Transylvania...*, Vol. 1, p. 2.

[42] *Ibid.*

[43] *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 256.

[44] *Magyarországi útinapló*, p. 68.

[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 21, 37.

[46] *Travels in Hungary*, p. 78.

[47] *Polnoye sobranie sochineniy* (Moscow-Leningrad. 1961), Vol. 1, pp. 17-18.

[48] *Hungary and Transylvania*, Vol. 1, p. 4.

[49] *Le voyage de l'Outremer*, p. 233.

[50] *A brief account...*, pp. 21-22.

[51] *Reminiscenze...*, Vol. 3. p. 81.

[52] Magyarországi útinapló, pp. 44, 61, 64.

[53] *A brief account...*, p. 12.

[54] "Strassburg Pál 1631-1633-iki követsége...," p. 99.

[55] *Hungary and Transylvania...*, Vol. 1, pp. 265-69.

[56] *A brief account...*, p. 10,

[58] *Travels in Hungary*, p. 44.

[58] *Pis'ma russkogo ofitsera. 1815.* Our source: *Izbrannye proizvedeniya* (Leningrad, 1957), p. 112.

[59] *Magyarországi útinapló*, pp. 45-47.

[60] *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52.

[61] *A brief account...*, p. 11.

[62] *Magyarországi útinapló*, p. 50.

[63] *Ibid.*, pp. 59-61.

[64] *Travels in Hungary*, p. 79.

[65] *A Poet's Bazaar*, p. 188.

[66] *Geographisch Handtbuch* (Cologne: Buxemacher, 1600), p. 69 a.

[67] *The Rare Adventures and Paineful Peregrations of...* (Glasgow: MacLehose, 1906), 364.

[68] *A brief account...*, p. 7.

[69] *Pis'ma...*, p. 112.

[70] The manuscript of Keppen's travel diary is deposited in the St. Petersburg archives of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Excerpts in Hungarian translation were printed in Lajos Tari's *Régi hírünk a világban*, pp. 225-29.

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Education in the Mother Tongue: The Perpetuation of Ethnic Consciousness among Hungarian-Americans, 1890–1920

Zoltán Fejős

A century ago, Hungarian immigrants to the United States could send their children to Catholic elementary schools in Cleveland and Toledo, Ohio, and South Bend, Indiana, where they were taught for a part of the school-day *in* Hungarian. The schools established in these cities by Hungarian communities prove the parents' ambition, but they primarily fulfilled the requirements of Church authorities. The American Catholic Church laid stress on the founding of Catholic parochial schools by its parishes — especially after the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore in 1884.[1] The parishioners were strictly ordered by their bishops to open schools soon after the establishment of a church. The intent was to fortify the institutions of the Catholic Church, which was in a minority in the United States, and to spread the education based on Catholic values in opposition to the predominantly Protestant public schools.

The Church could not deal consistently with the question of the "new immigrants" and their place in the education system. The "liberal" bishops wished to save the Catholic faith and morals through Americanizing the immigrants, while the "conservatives" believed that accelerating the natural speed of the immigrants' assimilation process could be dangerous, and were more tolerant toward the idea of education in native languages. The German Catholics viewed the parish schools as a channel for transmitting the language and the culture in addition to being the means of furthering religious education. Czech and Polish immigrants also built their school network in a similar spirit.[2] The small groups which joined the immigration wave later intended to do the same but lacked the financial resources. In any case by the time of their arrival in large numbers,

both American society and the whole immigration process had changed totally.

The First Hungarian Schools in America

This was especially true in the case of Hungarian (Magyar) immigrants who, amongst other peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, came in large numbers only in the first decade of the 20th century.[3] The short period of time at their disposal, about two decades before World War I, was just one explanation for the underdeveloped state of their educational structure. Similarly, the relatively small number of Hungarian immigrants is only one of the arguments in explaining their relatively feeble efforts to keep the native language alive.

The three parish schools mentioned above represent a very early stage of the Hungarian-American educational system. The first was opened in Cleveland (1893) in a single-story building with wooden walls with a single class and a teacher. It would be expanded during the next couple of years, and in 1900 more than 350 students were taught in a two-story brick building. In Toledo and South Bend the schools were consecrated together with the churches in 1899 and 1900 respectively. The language of instruction was *English* in all the three schools, with Hungarian reading, writing, and history being taught. usually an hour a day, by the parish priests.[4] In addition to the slow structural development, the Hungarian immigrants' schools also suffered from a lack of support from the congregations. In South Bend a debate started three years after the opening of the schools mainly because of the extra costs that the language instruction for immigrant children entailed.[5]

In Bridgeport, Connecticut, another kind of school was tried out. A day school was opened during the summer vacation of 1897. In it, Hungarian geography, history, writing, reading, and religious courses were taught in Hungarian for a couple of weeks. At the end of the session, the examinations were open to the public. The experiment was so successful that the congregation started to collect money to establish a permanent Hungarian school. The school was started and the Hungarian Government sent the textbooks for the first four grades. Yet the experiment failed, and the school was closed in 1899. From that time on only summer schools provided an opportunity for learning in Hungarian. Such schools were then organized by the Reformed congregations of Cleveland and South

Norwalk, Connecticut. During the school year just the religious education was offered in Hungarian, in the Sunday schools.[6]

The development progressed in one of two ways: 1) establishing parochial schools that always intended to teach subjects in Hungarian, or 2) organizing regular Saturday or Sunday and summer courses. Hungarian (Hungarian-English) day schools paralleling the public schools could not be maintained permanently even though they were deemed to be feasible both by immigrant community leaders and the government back in Hungary. The *Szabadság* (Liberty), a daily Hungarian-language newspaper in Cleveland, pressed the Hungarian Government to support the establishment of Hungarian schools independent of the Church because, as the editor put it, "the Hungarians [here] are not and will not be able to establish and maintain such schools."[7]

The Attitude of the Hungarian Government

In the beginning the Hungarian Government supported the establishment of Hungarian day schools (though religious ones only) after the program known as "American Action" started in 1903 to support the emigrants. What the Hungarian authorities wanted to achieve through their "Action" was to help the migrants to return to their homeland.[8] In order to do this — as the plan, presented to His Majesty the Emperor-King Francis-Joseph, stipulated — "we need to keep the national consciousness awake which most surely can be done by ecclesiastical organization, the setting up of schools, and the supporting of the patriotic newspapers."[9] A lack of schools teaching in Hungarian would keep many of the parents from coming home because of the children's questionable future, the plan stated. As the support was understood in the plan, the Hungarian communities that were willing to provide the salary of the English teacher prescribed by American legislation would be provided with a Hungarian teacher sent to America *and* paid by the Hungarian Government. The already established practice of the Hungarian state-financed elementary schools in Bukovina, Rumania, and in Croatia was to be transplanted into the totally different American environment. Thus, theoretically, the Hungarian authorities stood for the concept of the nationality schools teaching in the mother tongue. They were ready to accept the idea that half the subjects, mainly those "indifferent... from the national viewpoint," should be taught in English.[10] In short, the Hungarian Government

intended to set up Hungarian schools in the United States similar to the ones existing in Hungary at that time.

The Schools of the Protestant Congregations

As a first step of the "American Action" program, in 1904 the Reformed Church of Hungary sent one of its officials, Count Dégenfeld, to the United States to survey the Hungarian Protestant congregations there.[11] Dégenfeld found hardly anything encouraging about the education of the children of Hungarian immigrants. He visited twenty congregations. Most of these had religious instruction for the members of the second generation, but only one of them had a modest-sized Hungarian day school — this was in Johnstown, Pennsylvania.[12]

Dégenfeld's suggestion that congregations should sponsor Magyar day schools in the United States, was received with little enthusiasm. While ten of the congregations he visited decided to join the Reformed Church of Hungary, only those in Cleveland, Bridgeport, and New York seemed to be willing to establish regular Magyar day schools. Furthermore, only the one in Bridgeport offered to pay the minimal teachers' allowance ($250 a year) to a Hungarian-speaking teacher, but promised nothing to the English teachers at all who would had to be hired by the school also.

What was behind this indifferent attitude? In his report Dégenfeld listed most of the reasons, though he did not analyze them. He considered the question of the schools to be one of the most important, and he was convinced that "ordinary Hungarian ecclesiastical schools should be set up even at major financial cost."[13] The relative weakness and poverty of the churches was a great problem. Seven congregations had no church buildings of their own, thus these could not have schools either — classes were often held in church basements in those days. In many cases the members of the congregation did not live near the church, but were spread out over a large area. Furthermore, the size of many immigrant congregations fluctuated greatly as their members kept relocating to distant places in search of employment. All these factors contributed to these churches' financial troubles, in Dégenfeld's opinion.

The issue of the schools was also complicated in some places by the presence of bilingual Slovak members in the otherwise Hungarian Protestant congregations. (This problem was even more true of the

Catholic parishes.) And, in some cases, not even the Hungarian members of the congregations believed that Magyar instruction was all that important. "Unfortunately," reported Dégenfeld, "I also heard such opinion even in the Pittsburgh presbytery, that Hungarian teaching was unnecessary and that English was the only useful language in America."[14]

Parents had some interest in the question of the teaching of their children in the mother tongue in school. Those parents who came to America to work temporarily and then to return to Hungary wanted their children to have a Hungarian education lest they would feel as strangers once they returned home. At the same time the intention to return was coupled with the urge to save money. As a result these parents preferred to send their children to the public schools that were free than to the church-operated schools which charged tuition fees. These parents were satisfied with a limited amount of Hungarian instruction for their offspring during the vacation periods. Those parents who did not want to return to Hungary saw quite clearly that their children had to learn English in order to be successful in American society. The easiest way to learn English was certainly by attending the public schools.

At that time, the General Synod of the Reformed Church of Hungary did not see how serious these problems were. The preparations to open "Hungarian" schools in America's Magyar settlements were continued even though the next delegate sent from Hungary to the United States, László Bede, clearly pointed out that the lack knowledge of English posed a danger for the children's future.[15] One of the main tasks of Bede was to find a solution for Hungarian-America's "school problem." In his report on his mission Bede claimed that "the result of setting up schools and the conditions of setting up more, do not meet our requirements partly because of the financial conditions of the Church and partly because of certain restrictive State laws on education."[16]

According to Bede's information, only English-language schools were legal in Connecticut. Schools teaching in a foreign language were legal in Pennsylvania if half of the subjects were taught in English. Such schools were also legal in the states of New York and New Jersey, but English teaching was also compulsory there as well. Based on similar legislation and the circumstances of the Hungarian congregations, Bede thought the establishment of schools with daily instruction in Hungarian to be possible in the New York City, Passaic, and Phoenixville parishes. In his opinion the earlier plans had to be changed, and Hungarian reading, writing, history, and geography should be taught parallel with the com-

pulsory subjects, but only after regular school hours or during holidays. He believed that one reason to do so was that children "preferred to be in public schools to learn ordinary subjects." With half the children's instruction accomplished in the public schools, the cost of their overall education would be lower.[17]

In spite of all this, in September, 1907 the Hungarian authorities opened the Magyar day schools they had been planning in New York City and in Passaic. In Bridgeport they chose the evening and holiday version, because of Connecticut's laws. The Hungarian Government specified that instruction in these schools should be in Hungarian only, that all children should be accepted regardless of their religious affiliation, that no tuition fee should be charged, and that books and school supplies had to be provided to them free as well. The teachers' salary was conditional on there being at least fifty students and the teacher had to double as the cantor of the parish as well.[18]

Unfortunately for the advocates of these schools, the results were disappointing. In New York City the school functioned only for one year because of the limited interest shown in it by parents. In Passaic, the teacher had a quarrel with the congregation at the end of the first school-year and teaching ended.[19] The representative of the Synod had to report: "minority schools do not have a future in the United States, we can only try schools on Saturdays, Sundays, and on holidays."[20] Within these schools and under appropriate leadership "we can teach Hungarian children to write, read, and count and we can also bring a vague picture of their homeland to their minds and hearts but there can be no doubt about the fact that the emigrants' children born in the United States, and their grandchildren even more, will be totally Americans who will not return to Hungary for good."[21] Hungarian-American clergymen were also aware that parents who knew no English preferred to send their children to schools where they could learn English in order to help their parents in their quest to learn basic English.[22]

At about this time the Hungarian Government received information about negative experiences of two Hungarian Greek-Rite Catholic elementary schools. A parochial school teaching in English and Hungarian had been started in Cleveland even before the launching of the "American Action" in 1903. Similar education had started in South Lorain, Ohio in the fall of 1906. Members of the parishes of these places, "day labourers in factories," had applied many times for a teacher for the school they had built "without any support, amidst very hard working conditions."[23] The

Government in Budapest sent a qualified Hungarian teacher, the necessary books, and school equipment to each place. The Hungarian authorities made it clear that they expected children of other religions to be admitted to these schools as well. Unfortunately they soon learned that the priests of the local Roman Catholic parishes and the pastors of the Reformed Church congregations did not allow the children under their supervision to go to the Greek Catholic schools.

In times of economic hardship, most Hungarian-American parents did not want and often could not pay the tuition required by the church schools. Others preferred to send their children to public schools because they were not taught proper English in the Hungarian school. (A father took his daughter out of school because she could not understand the butcher's bill that was written in English.) Counsellor Lajos Ambrózy, who visited Hungarian settlements on behalf of the Hungarian Government, wrote: "Children become Americans in their feelings and emotions in spite of their perfectly spoken Hungarian."[24] On the basis of Ambrózy's and other similar experiences, the Hungarian Government closed the Greek Catholic schools of Cleveland and South Lorain and recalled their teachers.

The Hungarian newspapers in the United States protested this action. They accused "official Hungary" of not caring about the Hungarian emigrants.[25] Ambrózy's astute observations show clearly that the expectations of the Hungarian Government could not be attained by the Magyar day schools in the United States. The Budapest authorities wanted to establish institutions that served their interests and would have prevented the assimilation of Hungarian immigrants in the United States. When these aims could not be realized, they lowered their requirements and came up with new guidelines. The new scheme matched better the modest aims of Bede, and it also tried to use the meagre financial resources more efficiently.

Mother Tongue Education Outside Regular Schooldays

The real solution lay in organizing weekend and summer schools. After the failure of the experiments with day schools, the Hungarian Government urged the Hungarian-American churches to introduce this form of education. The congregations were advised to include appropriate classroom space in their plans for church buildings. Teaching became the

ministers' task and the money for the teachers' salary was stopped, except in Cleveland.[26] Even though this form of education was not developed at all at that time, the Hungarian official decision accepted the local Hungarian-American practice and made it compulsory. In 1907 only five of the sixteen congregations affiliated with the Reformed Church of Hungary had Sunday schools and only six of them organized courses during school holidays (Saturdays or during the summer) with almost 300 students.[27] By 1911, when the Synod's decree was introduced, the situation had improved. In that year there were 20 affiliated congregations and 12 had vacation schools — with a total of 677 students. By 1915 the number of students had increased to 2300.[28]

We should also mention congregations affiliated with the American Churches. Some of these also had schools where classes were taught in Hungarian. In Lorain, Ohio, for example, there had been a Hungarian school for more than a hundred children every summer since 1905. The small Presbyterian community in Wharton, Ohio introduced summer school in 1907. Some wealthy "non-joiner" congregations could afford qualified teachers from Hungary. One of them was the Bridgeport congregation that was affiliated with the Reformed Church of the United States. Here Lajos Ambrózy found 250 students, while there were only 25–30 students in a school of the congregation affiliated with the mother Church in Hungary. Both schools held classes three times a week, in the evenings and on Saturday, and they used books from Hungary.[29]

The Hungarian Government developed a uniform program for the summer schools. It prescribed the curriculum and provided pedagogical guidelines. Subjects of the summer schools were to be: *Hungarian language* (speaking and listening practice, reading, writing, grammar), *History of the Hungarian Nation*, *The Constitution*, *Geography of Hungary*, *Singing* (folk songs, patriotic songs, and religious songs). The program was based on textbooks for elementary schools that were used in Hungary. These books were supplied to the Hungarian-American summer schools by the Hungarian Government through the Synod. In addition, the local deans were required to supervise the summer schools regularly. The purpose of this program was similar to the earlier program of Hungarian day-schools: to make sure that the children of Hungarian immigrants became familiar with the Magyar language and the country of their parents, so that their ignorance of these would not to keep the parents from going home.[30]

Teaching was a big burden for the pastors, especially in the bigger congregations where they often had more than 100 children to deal with. They were not paid for the teaching but those who achieved significant results were given some small bonus. Many of the ministers had their wives and children help them with the teaching. Many of the congregations had to pay a local teacher as well, who usually did not have the proper qualifications. The largest school of the Reformed congregations was in Cleveland, with around 300 students in attendance. As an unusual exception, this school and its a nursery-school had two teachers paid by the Government of Hungary.[31]

Seeing the difficulties experienced by some congregations, the Hungarian authorities sent assistant pastors to the larger communities, for example to Detroit, where a day nursery-school was opened in 1911. The Government supplied all the equipment for the nursery-school (just as in Cleveland).[32] Besides the summer school and the nursery-school, the local church in Detroit opened a regular day school in Magyar and English in 1914 without any homeland assistance. But financial troubles split the congregation, and the pastor, who had been keen on the school, had to resign his position. However, the school was maintained even by his successor, though with reduced ambitions. The Reformed congregation in Detroit had *daily* Hungarian instruction even in the 1930s, held after the regular school day.[33]

The Hungarian program, the requirements, and the books of the Hungarian elementary schools, established very high standards for the Hungarian-American students and teachers. Not everyone was pleased by the situation. Sándor Kalassay, the dean of the Western Classis of the Hungarian Reformed Church in America, claimed that a program should have been set up which better fit the local circumstances. In his opinion the Hungarian schools in the United States needed special textbooks.[34] On the whole, however, financial help from the mother Church in Hungary affected very positively the education of the second generation in America. If the First World War had not intervened, the help from Hungary could have continued. Local efforts and aid from the mother country could have been coordinated more effectively and the quest for the preservation of the Hungarian-American communities' ethnic heritage could have continued with better results throughout the interwar decades.

The rivalry between the congregations belonging to the Reformed Church of Hungary and those affiliated with the Reformed and Presbyterian Churches of the United States, the so-called "affiliation war", had

some beneficial impact on the development of the schools belonging to the Protestant churches. On the whole, however, denominational divisions within Hungarian-American communities were a source of weakness for the Magyar ethnic group in America. The rivalry among the various denominations extended to the issue of the establishment of schools. The Reformed Church and the Presbyterian Church in the United States also financed their Hungarian congregations' schools. Except for the teachers' salary, the Presbyterians maintained a Hungarian day school in New York City, in Harlem, and a nursery-school in Cleveland and in Detroit for a couple of years.[35] These congregations could not count on Hungarian support because of their affiliation with the American Churches rather than the Hungarian. Once the bishop of Debrecen, Hungary, sent a large number of textbooks (1,300 pounds) to these "non-joiners," which made the members of the congregations affiliated with the Hungarian Church protest profusely. They hardly had grounds to complain, since each affiliated congregation had received a library of 100–150 volumes of textbooks as well as great many Protestant religious publications from Hungary.[36]

Mother Tongue Education in the Catholic Parishes

Most of the emigrants from Hungary to the United States (about 60%) were Catholic. Despite this numerical strength, Magyar Catholic parishes were organized more slowly than the Protestant congregations. The Hungarian establishment and Hungary's R.C. church authorities began paying real attention to the emigrant Catholics' problems only after 1910. Before then they proceeded with much caution. Starting with the "American Action", only priests reliable from the "patriotic viewpoint" were slated to be sent to serve Hungarian immigrants in the United States. This cautious approach came from the desire of not getting involved in any conflicts with the American Catholic Church, and from a respect for the hierarchical structure of the Church. Another problem was a shortage of priests in Hungary.[37]

Catholic Hungarians in the United States repeatedly appealed to church authorities in Hungary for help with the education of their children. The parish priest in Trenton, New Jersey, applied for financial support for a Hungarian parochial school as early as 1904. "There are not going to be Hungarian speaking people here in 20 years," he wrote,

"because socialism and English schools will turn our people away from their homeland."[38] The first convention of Hungarian Catholics in the United States suggested to the Hungarian Government that schools should be set up in every parish where more than 60 Catholic students could be found. The parish priest in McKeesport wanted to "import" nuns from Hungary as early as 1903, but he could only realize this plan in 1912. In the meanwhile he started a summer school which then functioned every year and managed to get free textbooks from Hungary. The parishioners themselves paid the cantor-teacher's allowance.[39]

We can also learn from the sources that Hungarian instruction was not considered very important everywhere. According to a report, Károly Bőhm, the most respected Hungarian Catholic priest in the United States, was himself a "great opponent" of it. In his parochial school ten English-speaking nuns taught 650 students in 1906 but "no one teaches the children to read in Hungarian." Only a few parents dared to send their children in secret to the Greek Catholic Hungarian parochial school which also existed in the same community.[40]

In most cases, Hungarian-American Catholics had to establish their schools themselves. Their chances for success greatly depended on the local bishops' attitudes, the financial state of the local churches and the ethnic composition of the parishes. The situation was illustrated by the experiences of two parishes. The already mentioned Catholic school in South Bend would have liked to employ a teacher sent and paid from Hungary. According to the Hungarian authorities the teacher's salary could be paid from Hungary only if at least half of the courses were taught in Hungarian. The parish priest, lacking the permission of his bishop, could not meet this condition, and he could not employ the teacher. Characteristically the parish intended to invite a teacher who spoke Hungarian, Slovak, and German.[41] In contrast, the Szent László (St. Ladislaus) Roman Catholic congregation in New Brunswick could maintain a four-grade Hungarian day school with episcopal permission and without any assistance from the homeland, between 1907 and 1914. Teaching took place in the basement of the church, in very modest circumstances. The morning courses were held in Hungarian and matched the education in Hungary. In the afternoon a qualified American teacher taught in the English language. This arrangement lasted for seven years. It clearly benefitted the community from the religious, ethnic, and national points of view.

Unfortunately, the social problems that caused the failure of the day schools of the Protestant congregations were not absent in the case of the Catholic parishes either. One of the priests who served the Szent László parish later explained: "The all-Hungarian school became a disadvantage for the future of our young people. They were left behind in the field of American education, the necessary elite were not reared and if they were, we lost them." It is also a fact that many of the children in the parish attended the public schools. On the basis of these experiences a six-room school was built where education went according to the standard of the American public schools. Teaching was not in Hungarian. Furthermore, only the Magyar language was taught during certain hours to the students. The ethnic-national education of the second generation was carried out only in the totally Hungarian nursery-school, in the supplementary courses of the elementary school, in religious classes, and in the cultural activities outside of school hours. The nuns that came from Hungary played an important role in the later type of activities.[42]

Two significant developments took place in connection with the Catholic schools before World War I: 1) the Hungarian Government donated a of lots of books to almost all of the Hungarian parishes; 2) two of the Hungarian orders of nuns started to work in the United States. Both were inspired by the intention to extend the "American Action" program to Catholics as well. The Government could not ignore the Catholics' demands any more. The paucity of priests became more and more serious as time passed. As a result of the Hungarian Government's support for the Reformed (and even certain Slovak and Ruthenian) congregations, discontent arose amongst the Catholics. Not surprisingly new appeals for help were addressed to the Government. Expanding the Catholic branch of the "American Action" program was made easier by the discovery that a Catholic organization in Hungary independent of the Government, the St. Ladislaus Society, was willing to assume a role in helping America's Hungarian parishes. The Society's involvement also had the advantage of not giving the American Catholic hierarchy an excuse to protest official Hungarian "intervention" in the affairs of the Catholic Church in the United States.[43]

In time the Government in Budapest extended the program designed for the schools of the Reformed congregations to the Catholics as well. The original syllabus of the summer schools was not to be changed except at points where it was required according to the Roman and Greek Catholic canons, in the religious and singing courses. The Government

also promised to send textbooks to the parishes participating in the program and to reward the parish priests involved.[44]

The delegate of the St. Ladislaus Society who toured the schools found thirty-seven active Hungarian Catholic parishes. Nine of them had day schools but the Hungarian language did not play an important role in any of them — except in the above-mentioned New Brunswick parish. Eleven parishes had schools where some courses were taught in Hungarian in addition to the religious instruction. In five parishes only the religious education was conducted in Hungarian. The rest did not have any kind of Hungarian teaching. In the summer of 1913, vacation-time day schools existed only in Perth Amboy and South Norwalk. That year there were only two other Hungarian summer schools — and neither lasted for more than three of four days.[45]

The homeland authorities just managed to respond to the first requests of the Catholic parishes for textbooks when World War I broke out. The 17 boxes of textbooks provided by the Hungarian Government (in the value of 10,000 Crowns) arrived at their destination on August 27, 1914. The shipment consisted of textbooks for religious education, for the six-year elementary school, and handbooks for methodology. The shipment was distributed among thirty-two congregations, including those that did not have a Hungarian parish priest. This significant donation of books was meant to form the basis of the Hungarian Catholic summer schools. The program could not be continued the next year because of the war.[46]

Education in the Mother Tongue in the Era of World War I

Just as aid from the mother country became cut off by the war, teaching in the mother tongue became more popular among Hungarian Americans. This is indicated by the fact that in 1918 two Hungarian textbooks were published in America. They were the first of their kind. Sándor Kalassay, the dean of the Western Classis, edited a textbook for summer schools under the authority of the Hungarian Reformed Church of America. The *Magyar Bányászlap* (Hungarian Miners' Journal) published its spelling-book at the same time; it was intended to meet the educational needs of the Hungarian immigrants who lived out of the reach of the major Hungarian centres.[47]

One of the serious problems of the parochial schools — and also of the whole program of passing on the knowledge of Hungarian language

and culture to the children of immigrants — was the paucity of teachers. Because the Hungarian "school-network" was organized very late in America, just before World War I broke out, Hungarian teaching orders could not establish chapters in the United States. The applications of South Bend and South Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, for members of one or another of such orders were rejected. In the fall of 1912, however, Kálmán Kováts, the parish priest of McKeesport, Pennsylvania, did succeed in bringing to America four sisters of the religious order the Daughters of the Divine Redeemer. Their travel expenses were covered by the St. Ladislaus Society, in agreement with the Hungarian Government.

The McKeesport parish did not have a parochial school at that time so the Hungarian sisters started to teach religion, reading, and writing in eighteen different places, visiting one after another the parishioners who lived scattered around this industrial town. The children usually studied two hours a week for ten months in this peripatetic school. Sometimes the classes were held in a rented room, sometime at private houses "in a kitchen." The sisters also travelled far away to teach elsewhere as well. There was no Catholic church in Daisytown, Pennsylvania, at all, but the congregation had a brass band to greet their first Hungarian teacher. The McKeesport parish's weekly publication reported annually on the exams that were taken usually by as many as 400–500 students. These reports considered the aim of teaching Hungarian (which was "opposed by everyone here" as the priest wrote in 1915) to be the strengthening the students' national consciousness. The weekly's editors hoped that, as a result of the parish's educational efforts, Hungarians of the next generation would no longer by called "Hunkys" and that it would become evident that the "future of our nation is not yet lost in America."[48]

The president of the St. Ladislaus Society informed the Government in December 1912 that another order of sisters in Budapest, the *Daughters of Divine Charity* was also willing to send nuns to teach in the United States. The sisters who were sent had a very hard start. Some of the parishes could not provide support for their work, and the local ecclesiastical authorities also hindered them from realizing their plans. According to one of the sources, "The bishop who invited them [later] sent a message without any explanation that there was no need for them." The essence of the controversy can not be detected from the contemporary reports, but it is a fact that in the beginning these nuns could not work in the Hungarian parochial schools. Nor could the church authorities find accommodation for them. There was only a home for young women

— opened with the permission of the archbishop of New York. The idea of placing the nuns in a home for destitute people was naturally not applauded by officials in Hungary. The Hungarians shared the blame for this situation since their Government had failed to provide for the expenses of the nuns for the first few years of their stay in the United States.[49]

The sisters started to teach Hungarian independently of the parish schools. They opened a Hungarian weekend school in New York City. In Perth Amboy, New Jersey, and vicinity they tried the peripatetic teaching method that had been introduced around McKeesport. Thanks to the bishop of Trenton, New Jersey, they were finally allowed to teach in three of the Hungarian parish schools, in Trenton, New Brunswick, and Perth Amboy. By they years had been lost. In the meantime other Hungarian parishes began showing an increasing interest in their work. Ten more sisters managed go to get the United States before the outbreak of World War I. They even established a convent of their own — for which they received modest financial support from the Hungarian Government. The order opened a "mother house" on Staten Island, at Arrocher, New York. They accepted local, Hungarian-American applicants. The house's "graduates" managed to receive the necessary American teachers' qualifications so they could gradually take over teaching in Hungarian-America's Catholic schools in the 1920s. Fifteen Catholic elementary schools functioned in the Hungarian centres of the United States in 1924. The nuns of the two Hungarian orders established in the new homeland just before and during the war were teaching in ten of them. They were also helping in the cultural and social activities of six other parishes.[50]

World War I severed the connection between America's Hungarian immigrants and their homeland. Catholic Hungarian education was to be dismantled during the war. Many of the parishes, lacking any kind of support from the home authorities, could not maintain their schools, religious and social organizations. And the conditions for running the schools that survived the war changed sharply after the conflict was over.

The 1920s started a new chapter in the immigrants' lives in which the state of their Hungarian schools was rather disappointing — at least at the beginning of the decade. The Czech, Lithuanian, and Slovak Catholics, not to mention the Poles, maintained parochial schools in larger numbers. Usually the subjects which were to impart the non-English native culture to the children of their immigrants played a proportionally larger role in the syllabi of their schools.[51] The situation in respect to the Hungarians was somewhat happier if we include the Hungarian-American

Protestant congregations and the large network of their summer schools. In the post-1920 years, just as in the preceding decades, the chance to establish financially strong Hungarian parishes, which could also maintain more significant educational institutions, continued to be lessened by the religious division of the Hungarians and the conflicts about affiliation within the congregations of the Hungarian Reformed Church.

Conclusions

From that 1890s to the First World War, Hungarian immigrants to the United States made real sacrifices to save their language and culture, and to pass them on to the next generation. In this struggle for culture maintenance the help they received from the mother country was a plus rather than a detrimental factor.

The historical evidence reveals that the Hungarians could not copy the "German model" of education that had exited in the German communities of America before World War I. Under the "German model" we understand those schools for immigrant children which taught *in* the newcomers' mother tongue. After World War I the new situation, the end of free immigration and the increase of "Americanizing" pressure, did not favour such ambitions. Starting with the early 1920s, the restrictive American Acts of Education ultimately made it impossible that courses for passing on the ethnic languages and cultural traditions should play a significant role within the official curriculum.[52]

From the turn of the century on, as we have seen, both the Hungarians in the United States and the Hungarian Government would have liked to realize the "German model" for Hungarian-Americans because of practical reasons. They thought that the educational system transplanted to the New World from the mother country could ensure that the emigrants could return home at any time without experiencing difficulties of adjustment to life and society there. The attempts to establish schools on the "German model" failed.

Next came the efforts to achieve the more modest aim of establishing weekend and summer schools in which some attempt would be made to pass on the immigrant heritage to the second generation. The motive for introducing this type of education was the same: to facilitate the emigrants' return to the mother country and their adjustment there.

The reason why the home authorities had high expectations in regard to the return of emigrants was the fact that most of the Hungarian "immigrants" to America were really sojourners who planned to return to their native lands after making some money in the United States. The school's existence probably did little to encourage Hungarian immigrants to return to the old country. Some Hungarian-Americans did go back to Hungary but many of those who did, did not stay long. After a while they decided to re-emigrate to the United States, this time with the intention of staying there.

While the schools did not fulfil the expectations of Hungary's authorities, they also created some problems for Hungarian Americans. They sapped their very meagre financial resources. They also tended in some cases to hinder the immigrants' adjustment to American society, especially if they interfered with their students' acquisition of the English language. The fact was that, for both the immigrants and especially the second generation, the English language was essential, especially for climbing the social ladder.

For some parents, however, the learning of the mother tongue gained a great deal of emotional significance. The more the knowledge the mother tongue was threatened by the practical value of the "rival" language (i.e. English), the greater importance was assigned to it by some parents.[53] This fact motivated the Hungarian-American leaders to make more and more strenuous efforts to maintain their native culture and language. They did not even try to prove the practical usefulness of learning the parents' language to the second generation. In their view, the emotional, symbolic meaning of education in the mother tongue was enough to justify their efforts to maintain their Hungarian school programs.

NOTES

[1] Robert D. Cross, "Origins of the Catholic Parochial Schools in America," *The American Benedictine Review*, 16 (1965): 194–209; Richard M. Linkh, *American Catholicism and European immigrants* (Staten Island, NY, 1975), 1–17, 110–120; James W. Sanders, *Education of an urban minority: Catholics in Chicago, 1833–1965*, (New York, 1977); John A. Leahy, "Parochial education," in *The Encyclopedia of Cleveland History*, ed. by David D. Van Tassel and John J. Grabowski (Bloomington, 1987), 755–6.

[2] Linkh, *op. cit.*, pp. 1–17, 110–120; Hieronim Kubiak, *The Polish National Catholic Church in the United States of America from 1897–1980: its social conditioning and social function* (Krakow, 1982), 76–81; Andrzej Brożek,

Polish Americans: 1854–1939 (Warsaw, 1985), 147–152; Dolors Lipták, *Immingrants and their church* (New York–London, 1989), 131–141. For similar efforts made by Lutherans see Walter Beck, *Lutheran elementary schools in the United States* (St. Louis, MO, 1939).

[3] Julianna Puskás, *From Hungary to the United States (1880–1914)* (Budapest, 1982), 14–33.

[4] "Magyar egyházak és iskolák," in Tihamér Kohányi, *Az amerikai magyarság múltja, jelene és jövője* (Cleveland, 1901), 25–31; St. Elizabeth's Church. Cleveland, Ohio, *Golden Jubilee 1892–1942* (Cleveland, 1942) np; *A Toledoi Szent István Hitközség jubileuma 1899–1924* (Toledo, 1924), 141–2.

[5] *Amerikai Nemzetőr*, September 29, 1897; "Magyar egyházak és iskolák," 1901, p. 20; Sándor Kalassay, *Az amerikai magyar reformátusok története 1890–1904* (Pittsburgh, Pa. 1937), 119.

[6] *Amerikai Nemzetőr*, September 29, 1897; "Magyar egyházak és iskolák," 1901. p. 20; Kalassay, *Az amerikai*, p. 119.

[7] "Magyar egyházak és iskolák," 1901.

[8] For more details on the "American Action," see Puskás, *From Hungary*, pp. 192–201; Paula K. Benkart, "The Hungarian Government, the American Magyar Churches, and Immigrant Ties to the Homeland, 1903–1917," *Church History*, 52, 3 (1983): 312–21; *"Valahol túl meseországban..." Az amerikás magyarok 1895–1920*, ed. by Albert Tezla (Budapest, 1987), Vol. 2. pp. 260–346.

[9] *Ibid.* Cf. Gábor G. Kemény, *Iratok a nemzetiségi kérdés történetéhez Magyarországon a dualizmus korában* (Budapest, 1964), Vol. 3, pp. 230–36. On the state of the Hungarian-American press of the times see Bela Vassady, "Hungarian-American Mutual Aid Associations and their 'Official' Newspapers: A Symbiotic Relationship," *Hungarian Studies Review*, 19, 1–2 (spring–fall, 1992): 7–27.

[10] *Ibid.* Also, Kemény, *Iratok...* Vol. 3, pp. 230–6.

[11] Count József Dégenfeld's report: Országos Levéltár, K 26 (Hungarian National Archives, Record Group 26, The centrally registered documents of the Prime Minister's Office [hereafter NAH RG 26]) 1905–XIX–146. Part I. (2686–1904). Cf. Aladar Komjathy, "The Hungarian Reformed Church of America. The effort to preserve a denominational heritage," Ph. D. diss. (Theological Seminary, Princeton, 1962), pp. 70–96.

[12] Dégenfeld saw only 27 pupils in three classes. Instruction was held in a tiny, wet, dark basement. The General Synod subsidized the small "school" for a couple of years, but the financial help was soon put an end. See *"Valahol túl meseországban..."*, Vol. 2. pp. 236–254, NAH RG 26–1905–XIX–146. (4440 – 1905).

[13] Count József Dégenfeld's report: NAH RG 26–1905–XIX–146. Part I. (2686–1904).

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] Géza Antal's final report of his American tour, Pápa, May 7, 1906. Zsinati Levéltár (Archives of the General Synod of the Reformed Church of Hungary, American Affairs; Budapest [hereafter ZsL]) Box 114. 342A/1906.

[16] Report of delegate László Bede to Baron Dezső Bánffy, the president of the General Synod, New York, February 26, 1907. ZsL Box 117. 89/1907; Similar information was got from the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: NAH RG 26–1910–XXIII/C–279 (1903–4870).

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] Instructions done to László Bede for his second American tour, Budapest, September 1, 1907. ZsL Box 120. 451A/1907, Box 119. 291A/1907. NAH RG 26–1913–XXI–386 (1913–3855). Cf. note 31.

[19] *Almanach of the American Hungarian Reformed Church*, ed. Zoltán Kuthy (New York, 1909), pp. 36–37; Zoltán Kuthy, "A New Yorki Első Magyar Református Egyház története," *A magyarországi református egyház amerikai egyházmegyéjének naptára*, ed. Zoltán Kuthy (New York, 1911), 87–121. (p. 111); Passaic: ZsL Box 119. 234/1907, Box 125. 5507/1909. In Passic a portion of the congregation insisted on a Magyar day school. They even threatened the General Synod with secession if they were not sent a new teacher. The plan of the Hungarian government, however, could not be implemented.

[20] Report of László Bede's second tour, October 9, 1908. ZsL Box 123. 5469/1908.

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] Letter of Zoltán Kuthy, dean of the Eastern Classis to the General Synod, October 9, 1908. ZsL Box 132. 5574/1908; cf. Kuthy, *op. cit.*

[23] NAH RG 26–1910–XXIII/C–279.

[24] Ambrózy's report: *"Valahol túl meseországban..."*, Vol 2. pp. 391–395.

[25] *Ibid*; NAH RG 26–1910–XXIII/C–279; *Szabadság*, September 2, 1909. Cf. *Magyar Napilap*, July 9, and September 11, 1909. The Greek-Rite Catholic church of Passaic, Bridgeport and Ashtabula wanted establish similar parochial schools but the government did not approve the plans.

[26] The Prime Minister's statement of May 12, 1910. ZsL Box 132. 5200/1910. With the help of loans received from Hungary ministers were influenced to build rooms for teaching in the churches. For Cleveland, see note 24.

[27] Bede's statistical report, ZsL Box 123. 5622/1908. For Sunday schools see Leslie A. Kalassay, "The educational and religious history of the Hungarian Reformed Church in the United States," Ph. D. diss. (University of Pittsburgh, 1939), pp. 83–91.

[28] NAH RG 26–1916–XXII–1739 (1913–6316). The number of children in schools follows as 929 in 1913 (only in schools of the Western Classis), 1706 in 1913, 1917 in 1914, 2297 in 1915. See NAH RG 26–1915–XXI–1610,

1916–XXV/a–2. The number of children in summer schools of churches affiliated with American denominations cannot be exactly determined. In 1915 the *Amerikai Magyar Református Lapja* reported 603 pupils in nine schools, but there were more summer schools.

[29] *Amerikai Magyar Református Lapja*, February 7, 1914. (Jubilee Issue 1899–1914), p. 13. and 23; "*Valahol túl meseországban...*", Vol. 1, pp. 385–386; ZsL Box 123. 4034/1908.

[30] NAH RG 26–1913–XXI–386 (1911–2321). *Az amerikai magyar református iskolák tanításterve* (Budapest, 1913).

[31] Minutes, General Synod of the Western Classis, 1915. ZsL Box 136. 6386/1915. Sándor Tóth, "Visszaemlékezés az ötven esztendő munkájára," *Református Lapja*, LIX (June 15, 1959), pp. 9–12.

[32] NAH RG 26–1913–XXI–386 (1913–1788, 1913–4615), ZsL Box 134. 4637/1913. Assistant pastors served in New York, Perth Amboy, Bridgeport (cf. note 8.) and Pittsburgh. For nursery-schools, see NAH RG 26–1914–XXII–2605.

[33] NAH RG 26–1915–XXI–3388, 1917–XXI–701; István Borsos, "Az amerikai egyházi élet mélységeiből II," in *A magyarországi református egyház amerikai keleti és nyugati egyházmegyéjének naptára* (New York, 1913), 134–145; *A detroiti református egyházközség husz éves története 1904–1924*, ed. Mihály Tóth (Detroit, 1925), *Detroiti Ujság*, November 25, 1932.

[34] Minutes, General Synod of the Western Classis, 1914. ZsL Box 136. 7505/1914.

[35] *Amerikai Magyar Református Lapja*, February 7, 1914 (Jubilee Issue, 1899–1914), p. 11; For Cleveland, see *ibid.* December 5, 1914. pp. 1–2. (A Saturday school and a reading circle were also initiated.), for Detroit, see ZsL Box 134. 16/2, 4241/1914.

[36] *Szabadság*, May 31, 1913. Cf. *A Magyarországi Református Egyház Amerikai Keleti Egyházmegyéje közgyűlésének jegyzőkönyve*. Philadelphia, Pa. 1913. junius 16. (New York, 1913), pp. 8–10.

[37] Puskás, *From Hungary*, pp. 182–201; also Julianna Puskás, *Ties that Bind, Ties that Divide: One Hundred Years of Hungarian Experience in the United States*, transl. Zora Ludwig (New York and London: Holmes & Meier, Ellis Island series, 2000), 214f; "*Valahol túl meseországban...*", Vol 2, pp. 269–89; Árpád L. Várdy, "A kivándorlásról," *Katholikus Szemle*, 24 (1910): 359–80. Catholic writers usually lay the blame on the government for the shortcomings. See e.g. Béla Bangha, *Amerikai missziós körutam* (Budapest, 1923), 18–19. But the American bishops' insufficient knowledge of the immigrants' ethnic background is also referred to. István Csernitzky, "Amerika római katolikus magyarság," *Amerikai Magyar Népszava* (April 17, 1924), [Hungarian-American Section], pp. 9–11.

[38] NAH RG 26–1910–XXIII/C–279 (1904–1939).

[39] *Magyarok Vasárnapja*, January 7, 1908; "A mi iskolánk," *Magyarok Csillaga*, September 4, 1903. Cf. NAH RG 26–1910–XXIII/C–279 (1903–4870, 1905–5187, 1909–3672), for summer school see *Magyar Zászló*, June 20, 1907.

[40] Report of the apostolic delegate, Andor Hodobay. NAH RG 26–1910-XXIII/C–279 (1906–269).

[41] NAH RG 26–1909–XXII–1952 (1905–1773). This decision also influenced the conflicts of the parishioners mentioned bellow.

[42] *Souvenir Book of the 35th Anniversary of the St. Ladislaus R.C. Church and the Silver Jubilee of the St. Ladislaus School* (New Brunswick, NJ. 1939), np.; István Török, *Katolikus magyarok Észak-Amerikában* (Youngstown, OH. 1978), 217; Boneventura Peéri, *Daughters of Divine Charity in the United States 1913–1923. Tenth annual anniversary report* (New York, 1924), 59–63.

[43] NAH RG 26–1915–XXII–3727. First, the St. Ladislaus Society, established in 1861, dealt with the ethnic Hungarians of Romania. As an outcome of a change of the by-laws in 1908 it extended its activities to all Hungarians living abroad. See József Szemes, *A Szent László Társulat története 1861–1941* (Veszprém, 1942), 64–74, cf. Várady, *op. cit.*

[44] NAH RG 26–1916–XXII–1739 (1913–3831, 6316).

[45] NAH RG 26–1916–XXII–1739 (1913–6316). Report made by Rev. Vilmos Biskoroványi, Hungarian pastor of New York's harbour.

[46] NAH RG 26–1916–XXII–1739 (1914–3404, 8268, 1915–1672).

[47] Alexander Kalassay, *ABC és olvasókönyv* (Pittsburgh, 1918), cited by Louis Kalassay, *op. cit.*; *Magyar Bányászlap*, April 18, 1918; Győző Drózdy, *Amerika* (Budapest, 1924), 98.

[48] NAH RG 26–1915–XXII–3727 (1912–3025, 5604); *Magyar Katolikus Zászló*, October 20, 1912. pp. 2–3, July 2, 1914. pp. 214–6, June 24, 1915. pp. 192–3; *Az Isteni Megváltó Leányai amerikai tartományának jubileumi emlékkönyve a rend átágazásának 25-ik évfordulója alkalmára* (Elizabeth, Pa., 1937), 63–71.

[49] NAH RG 26–1915–XXII–3727 (1912–7508, 1913–5331, 8004); Csernitzky, *op. cit.*

[50] NAH RG 26–1915–XXII–3727 (1914–2262, 4113, 1915–3727); Peéri, *op. cit.*, pp. 13, 51–63; Stepen F. Chernitzky, "Our Hungarian Catholics," *Catholic Builders of the Nation*, ed. by C. E. McGuire (Boston, 1923), Vol. 2, pp. 84–100.

[51] Linkh, *op. cit.*, pp. 108–15. In 1912 parochial schools were maintained by 72.7% of the Polish, 57.4% of the Czech, 44.7% of the Slovak, 29.1% of the Lithuanian churches, but only 21.5% of the Italian churches. *Ibid.*, on the basis of Table 3. The same figure for the Hungarians is 24.3%.

[52] Zoltán Fejős, "Az anyanyelvi oktatástól az etnikus kultúra átörökítéséig (Magyar iskolaügy Amerikában 1890 és 1940 között)," *Magyarságkutatás. A Magyarságkutató Intézet Évkönyve* 1990–1991 (Budapest, 1991), 7–40.

[53] Cf. Hermann Bausinger: "Kulturelle Identität – Schlagwort und Wirklichkeit," in *Ausländer – Inländer. Arbeitsmigration und kulturelle Identität*, Hrsg. Hermann Bausinger (Tübingen, 1987), 141–159, especially p. 148.

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Ilona Duczynska meets Ervin Szabó:
The making of a revolutionary personality — from theory to terrorism, April-May 1917

Kenneth McRobbie

"I'm not against bombs.
Not *all* bombs are bad..."
Ilona Duczynska (1969)[1]

The Unknown City

Ilona Duczynska (1897-1978),[2] born near Vienna and a resident of Canada after 1950, has been called one of Hungary's outstanding revolutionary personalities.[3] In the first part of what was to have been an autobiography,[4] she describes, with no little satisfaction, how her "rebellious" nature developed in opposition to her mother's Hungarian gentry family, and then outlines how it became truly revolutionary under the impact of the momentous events of March 1917. Duczynska was just twenty in the late spring of 1917 when she was privileged to spend several weeks in the company of Ervin Szabó (1877-1918). Through Hungary's leading socialist theoretician, she became exposed, as never before or since, to questions of ideology, and the variety of the conflicting currents of socialist theory. These made little impression, however. What did leave a permanent mark were two things that spoke most directly to her nature: Szabó's emphasis upon the importance of the critically thinking individual, and the imperative of action. Duczynska considered herself a socialist, on the basis of her reading, since the age of fifteen. Certainly, she was not uncritical[5] of the early betrayals of the principles of peace and proletarian internationalism after 1914 by social democratic parties, nor later of the infinitely greater betrayals of Marx's moral injunctions by national communist parties and the degenerate Soviet system. But her criticism, which resulted in her being expelled from two communist parties, owed as much to her psychological predisposition to challenge authority as to her early

exposure through Szabó to anarchism. However, such criticism paled in comparison to her life-long opposition to the liberal capitalist order. Her hatred (a word Duczynska never hesitated to apply) was visceral, being based on moral, indeed quasi-religious condemnation. This was the world view current among Hungarian intellectuals such as György Lukács and Karl Polanyi (Duczynska's second husband) who remained convinced that theirs was "the age of absolute sinfulness."[6] Like them, Duczynska always held to the conviction that the mission of socialism was to redeem humanity from this condition.

The magnitude of World War One's human and material destruction on a scale previously inconceivable would have a lasting effect on Duczynska. By May 1917 she had internalized the legitimacy of violence as a weapon, and attempted to employ it in an assassination attempt on a leading Hungarian political figure. This she revealed only late in life, in an article published in a leading Hungarian journal. Her startling revelation — in effect, of intending to commit an act that "existing socialist" Hungary would have regarded as a crime and, even more, a dangerous provocation — was successfully insinuated into, and insulated by, the wider context of an insightful and engaging discussion of the work and personality of one of Europe's most sympathetic socialist thinkers who had the misfortune to die tragically young. Duczynska's experiences in 1917-22 hardened her in preparation for the new era of violence that characterized European politics during the ensuing decades. Finally, in the 1970s following a life of active political involvement in several countries, she seems to have felt compelled to feel her way towards yet again justifying the use of violence, in its new manifestation of random terrorism, against the western capitalist order.

Like many of her generation, in 1914 Duczynska was profoundly disillusioned by the support given to the war by social democratic parties, particularly the German party which was the largest and a model for others. She was eighteen in the autumn of 1915 when she enrolled in engineering at Zürich's prestigious *Eidgenössischer Technische Hochschule* (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology). Her determination to devote herself wholly to her studies — "young, wounded, one whose faith had been betrayed" (UL) — was as much an indication of political disillusionment as it was of a disposition to commit herself totally to whatever she might at a given time decide upon. Then, at the electrifying news of the Russian Revolution of March 12 (February 27), with the formation in Petrograd of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers deputies,

Duczynska threw herself into neutral Zürich's hectic political life. For there the 1915 Zimmerwald anti-war movement had put down roots, and among the vibrant émigré communities Lenin and his followers argued that the war could only be halted by a social revolution. During the ensuing five weeks Duczynska was introduced to Marxism by the Polish communist Henryk Lauer, one of her instructors, and to the energetic Angelika Balabanov, secretary of the International Socialist Committee, the executive body of the 1915 Zimmerwald and 1916 Kienthal Conferences.[7] By then a woman given to headstrong reaction, Duczynska declared her eagerness to publicize "at home" (as she called it) the revolutionary March 20th Manifesto of the International Socialist Committee. Accordingly, with the help of her newly acquired comrades she prepared a microphoto of the front page of the *Berner Tagwacht* where the document had appeared on March 26th, secreted it in the empty rubber ink-sac of a fountain pen, and purchased a rail ticket for Vienna.

Duczynska was convinced that to her had fallen the responsibility of bringing the Manifesto, as she put it, to the attention of the proletariat of the Central Powers, or rather to such left-wing groups among the social democrats who would accept it in theory and as a basis for action. She knew that censorship was stringent, and that all travellers crossing frontiers were subjected to a strict search. Thus, just in case the microphoto were to be discovered, she committed the document to memory. "I remember some of it to this day," she wrote half a century later:

> The revolution lives. The red flag of the workers flies over the Tauride Palace.... Now is the historic moment when the proletariat of every country has to choose between revolution and war... because either the war will kill the revolution, or revolution will overcome the war... if the workers in Germany and Austria-Hungary do not rise up.

Accordingly, she formally withdrew from her programme of study at the "Poly" and took the train to Vienna, the city of her birth. There to her disgust the small group of left social democrats, to whom she had been given an introduction by Balabanov, proved to be too cautious and even downright pessimistic as to the prospects of printing and circulating the Manifesto. Thereupon, Duczynska cut short her stay and proceeded on her way further east to Budapest. There at least, she trusted, she would find a more promising reception, if only from the one person with whom she was personally acquainted — the director of the Budapest Municipal

Library, leading socialist theorist, the editor and translator of the first Hungarian edition of the works of Marx, Ervin Szabó.

The train carrying Duczynska to Budapest left Vienna's *Ostbahnhof* on April 20, 1917.[5] It reached the frontier in less than an hour, and after the usual delay continued on across the wide plain of Burgenland. "I must... return home, to the revolution," she repeated to herself to the rhythm of the wheels; the thought was still in her mind three hours later as the train entered the industrial outer districts of Pest. She was only twenty, she reflected, also consumptive, and — though she never considered this a handicap — but little acquainted with Marxism. Yet she was clear that her objective should be to spread the message of the Manifesto, clear too that the time was ripe and Budapest was the place, though just how this action would be realized was "shrouded in obscurity." Still, the first step, she thought, was clear: she had to join the workers movement. For this, she trusted absolutely that Ervin Szabó would "show the way." Soon Duczynska was walking down the platform with its massive brick pillars supporting the narrow curved glass roof of the Hungarian capital's *Keleti pályudvar* (East Station). Beyond the swing doors, she was confronted with a main thoroughfare teeming with uniforms and the obligatory working-class threadbare dark suits. Her only item of luggage — winter clothes, books and notes presumably having been sent on ahead, care of her family, to their country home of Zsennye — was a small, flat suitcase, divided into separate compartments (which in a few months would hold contraband printers' type).

In Zürich, Duczynska had spoken of going home; but to her this raw newly dynamic city of Budapest was anything but that. "It was much stranger to me than Vienna," she comments, "it was an unknown city..." Come to which, she knew relatively little of Hungary, beyond what she had read in the country house libraries of her gentry relatives. At that time, she wished to remain unnoticed in the city. Thus it was "potentially disturbing" that her gentry relatives owned a house in Budapest on the very upper middle-class street where she expected to be accommodated by friends of Ervin Szabó. "I was afraid of them; they were a great danger; one could not trust them," she says, "they would give you away knowingly or unknowingly, so I had to avoid them." The family usually spent the winter months there, while her aunt Gizella attended eurythmic classes given by the very woman to whose apartment Duczynska was then heading. Still, she had no other option for the time being. In later years. Duczynska would become very interested in the history of early

twentieth-century Budapest, particularly as it was the scene of Karl Polanyi's activities as well as her own. Her early hope that Budapest would become an arena of the class struggle was shared by elements of the burgeoning intelligentsia that was being recruited not as traditionally from the gentry and aristocracy, but from the urban business and professional classes. Painfully aware of new elements of western culture, conscious of living within a non-western social entity, they were fiercely committed to change.[10] Furthermore, a rapidly emerging working class, among whom literacy was close to 80% among males (over seven) that promised to be available for political mobilization.[11]

For this socio-political aspect of the Budapest cultural phenomenon Duczynska was reasonably well-prepared by her precocious early acquaintance with the works of the avant garde radical lyric poet Endre Ady (1877-1919). Hungary's oppressively chauvinistic conservative official culture provided the social basis of artistic revolt, such as in Zürich, say, the international avant-garde lacked. "Socially we live in prehistorical times," Ady wrote in the "Wasteland."[12] It was this shared perception that inspired the Hungarian intellectual elite to proclaim "Liberty for the people!" in contrast to their Viennese counterparts' "Liberty for Art!" Ady reassessed the social components of the nation: devaluing the nobility and historical middle class, he looked to the workers, peasants, and professionals as alone capable of rejuvenating the country.[13]

This ideologically oppositional counter-culture was represented by the sociological journal *Huzsadik Század* (Twentieth Century), the literary periodical significantly named *Nyugat* (The West) founded in 1908, and the work of Endre Ady whose volume *Uj Versek* (New Poems) appeared in 1906.[14] The impact of the latter was immense, above all, as in Duczynska's case — she says she "grew up with him from the age of 12 or 13"[15] — on Hungary's youth in whom his words seemed to conjure up new powers.[16] Similarly, György Lukács confessed that at the age of nine (!) he rejected novels about Hungarian heroes who reminded him too much "of the social condescension of the real-life ladies and gentlemen" who visited his parents.[17] Duczynska's tastes were similar. She claims to have read all the great Russian writers in her teens, while reading "practically nothing" of Hungarian literature apart from Ady ("everything") and the poet Mihály Babits (1883-1941) "to some extent."[18] At the end of her life, when asked what her generation had to thank Ady for, she replied, in

what the interviewer called "that spirited girl student's voice of hers:" "For everything."[19]

The revolutionary significance of Ady's poetry and journalism generated paroxysms of verbal insult that contrasts with the at times heated artist-public debates in other countries. In response to the poet's castigation of his country as "the hunting ground of gentlemen nomads," and inferior even to Korea and Macedonia,[20] prime minister István Tisza (1861-1918) retorted "Ady and *Nyugat* are plant-lice on the palm tree of Magyar culture."[21] In addition to helping to prepare the ground for the political revolutions of 1918-1919, Ady's writings are credited with initiating a spiritual revolution through self-realization. His "I shall not let myself be ordered around,"[22] together with the "No!" implicit in his poetry, echoed Duczynska's early passion for her favourite fictional character — Bazarov (in Turgenev's *Fathers and Sons)* with his, to her ear, equally definitive "No! flung in the face of humanity!" (EM) But there was also Ady's "Yes" in his "Vision in the Fens" (1903) that shows how, just as individual salvation comes through love, the salvation of all may come through revolution.[18] Basically, it was his rejection of compromise with existing reality — widely shared by many intellectuals at the time — that accounts for Duczynska's attraction towards his verse, and for why György Lukács could declare that Ady had been more important to him than Marx.[24] The effect of poetry upon certain personalities invites discussion. It is significant that Ady's verse resists translation, partly because of its being rooted in the psycho-social context of the times. Certainly, it mobilized consciousness in a particular direction to which some readers, though not by rational processes, were already predisposed. Early exposure in her youth (indeed, before she commenced her formal education) to the vatic, condemnatory poetry of Ady — like her late interest in Hölderlin (a new edition of whose works lay open on her table, at the end) — represent Duczynska's absorption of, and reliance upon, poetry as a repository of values, feelings and modes of expression from which she would select in order to confirm the "irrational momentum" of her absolute faith which determined her political outlook. She seems to have lacked the ability and inclination, for it would have invalidated her life's commitment, to test or revise this faith — which she sought to confirm even in the oppositional poetry of 1956 — against the testimony presented by the sea-changes in the real world about her.[25]

The initial impression of Budapest's strangeness that greeted Duczynska as she descended the steps from the broad stone platform

outside the East Station's main exit — with its huge round window's "eye blinded with dust"[26] — would for her never change. The soot sifting down from the smoke cloud hanging over the city would have reassured Duczynska that she had come to the right place. Her intended action would be directed towards Hungary's one-million strong industrial work force whose unionized numbers were increasing dramatically[27] in an economy that grew before the war at 8.5% per year, with patterns of ownership concentrated in large production units.[28]

In comparison with Vienna's ample parks and gardens, the booming city of Pest was a network of crowded housing developments, warehouses, and factories.[29] There were tenements where one third of the population could but rent a bed, or, as Duczynska would later see for herself, merely a mattress for the night. The novelist Gyula Krúdy wrote of how by day there rose new palaces "topped by towers rising towards the sun," while by night processions of carts hauled away corpses along with old ways of life.[30] Yet cutting through it all was the pseudo Champs-Elysées of Andrássy út with its neo-classical villas where the young György Lukács lived, as well as some years earlier the family of Duczynska's second husband Karl Polanyi. But she had little inclination to register the progress of new stucco facades. "Budapest was very alive, but I had no time to notice."

The few features of the urban environment that Duczynska does mention reflect mainly her immediate concerns. Thus she notes that there was bread rationing and she became "very hungry." Of the city's downtown, she admitted, she had "no memories." "I once asked Ervin Szabó where the Váci utca [the most elegant shopping street] was. He looked at me, and burst out laughing, which was very rare for him; he exclaimed that I knew where the Váci út [the workers' quarter] is, but not the Váci utca." Even then Duczynska may have sensed she was embarking upon a life-time of self-denial. "Budapest was full of coffee houses," she grants, "but I never went in one; we did not meet in such places"; instead, she would meet with Szabó — by then, her "Master" — in side streets, and most memorably in a cemetery. Only once did the city impress her with its beauty — though this took the form of a vision of the coming power of the proletariat. It was the dark bulk that loomed behind her when crossing the Chain Bridge to Pest.

> I remember how the Castle Hill looked on those days when it was turning pink in the morning fog. And I recall the peculiar

> feeling that the centre of power conveyed, and with it a special appreciation of the holiness of power that was over there — and that we were going to conquer it. (K)

Budapest would always remain for her a castle shrouded in fog.

Seeking direction

On leaving the East Station, Duczynska somehow found her way "as if sleepwalking" to the address she had been given almost two years earlier by Alice Madzsar (sister of Oszkár Jászi), then visiting Barok with Ervin Szabó (two emissaries from "the other Hungary") who invited her to visit her in Budapest. Now Duczynska made her way down Rákóczi út, crossed the Danube by the Elizabeth Bridge to Buda, skirted the Gellért Hill, laboriously ascended one of the steeply sloping side streets to Ménesi út, and presented herself at number 8. József and Alice Madzsar were at home. They asked no questions, took her in, said she could stay, and allotted her a sofa. Of József Madzsar, her host after all, Duczynska has nothing to say, other than that he played his part uncomplainingly in a *ménage a trois* together with his wife and close friend Ervin Szabó. Surprisingly, for she almost never praised the appearance of women she encountered, Duczynska recalled Alice as being "in her own way, very beautiful; very small and very typical, very; she taught Dalcroze dancing, and lived for it, to develop the body."[31] She was at once encouraged to find herself where Ervin Szabó's was a daily visitor. His mother, who was "still very beautiful," had a small flat in the same villa as the Madzsars, while Szabó himself lived further along the street at number 19. On his way home from the library, it was his custom as a diabetic to stop in to have the special meal his mother (aunt Lujza, to Duczynska) prepared for him. Afterwards he called in on the Madzsars for up to half an hour. József Madzsar (1876-1940) remained on terms of warm friendship with Szabó. In addition to being a physician and sociologist, he was an honourary lecturer at the University, and vice-director at Szabó's Municipal Library. In politics, he moved steadily to the left: from the Bourgeois Radical Party to the HSDP, and subsequently to the Communist Party. Like many other Hungarians, shortly after emigrating to the Soviet Union in 1936, he was liquidated during Stalin's purges.

The day after her arrival at the Madzsars, Duczynska got down to work: "The good life of a 'postman' was already a thing of the past!" Noticing a microscope on József's desk, she used it to transcribe the text of the microphoto[32] which she then translated into Hungarian. This took little more than a day. Then problems arose. Discussions ensued as to what might be done with the document, with a variety of visiting left-oriented social democrats. "We talked about everything, we discussed everything, exactly as in Zürich," Duczynska granted. But it was all talk. There was no organization, she noted, nothing to equal even that of the hitherto despised Viennese left: "I saw, for better or for worse, that there was nothing to be done with these people." The complaint is familiar. Of course, she expected that things would go differently with him who was destined to become her "Master."

In all, Duczynska met Ervin Szabó during three distinct periods: for a few hours at a relative's country house in the summer of 1915, almost daily from late April till near the end of May 1917, then finally on a few occasions between September and November. The aggressively expectant young woman who now presented herself to Ervin Szabó in the Madzsars' living room was very different from the diffident girl who in 1915 had hung on his every word and barely managed a whispered response in her aunt's garden at Barok. The tone of Duczynska's tape-recorded voice suggests she was barely able to suppress a smile, recalling their second meeting: "I simply said to him: 'Well, here I am!'" She had always believed in him: "For a long time the one thing I trusted in was that Ervin Szabó would instruct me when the moment came." Now it had come. But she admits that she was not in a mood to be instructed — that would only come much later, from her reading. Nevertheless, during their conversations Duczynska would form an unforgettably favourable impression of Ervin Szabó, as man and thinker, though her powers of reception and absorption were limited by her narrow fixation on two predetermined objectives. Consequently her image of Szabó would undergo considerable enhancement half a century later — including, as was characteristic of her at the time, over-enthusiastic use of the term 'revolution'.

> He was a very strange personality, an intellectual bordering on being a bookworm; by day a civil servant, by night a conspirator unlike any other. I think I can honestly say that in Hungary there was no revolutionary action that was not initiated or influenced by him -- but this I would discover only later. As a person, he was very mild of manner, and had about him an air

> of sadness, perhaps due to his illness, diabetes, you know. (Beg)

It must have been difficult to know what to make of the young Duczynska. Her Zürich political mentor Henryk Lauer had shown caution, as had Balabanov. Now here she was blurting out to Szabó the first of her reasons for coming to Budapest: namely, to establish contact with factory workers. But he studiously refrained from offering advice during their otherwise "long and thorough" conversations in the Madzsars' living room, "sincere and profound" though they may have been. They always concluded with Szabó putting her off, with his typical sad smile: "'It isn't so easy to join the workers' movement'." That was hard to take. She remembered: "I had all kinds of illusions...." Szabó's caution bordered on scepticism: "I believe that he was doubtful as to just how serious I was," she recalled. In later years, Szabó's biographer attempted to gauge the impression made on him by Duczynska's sudden irruption into his circle:

> There appeared suddenly in his midst — and in his life — a disciple, almost the only one who took him literally at his word, and called into question the ethical substance and message of his whole teaching: namely, responsibility for revolutionary activity. Ilona Duczynska was hewn from a different sort of wood than [previous followers]....[33]

Szabó resorted to delaying tactics, to test Duczynska's motives, commitment — and good sense. Later, she would appreciate that out of natural caution and understandable prudence, as well as the need to preserve what free time he had for his own writing, Szabó was not prepared to take it upon himself to tell "such a half-baked little girl what she should read and study, and what questions she should ask." Above all, he was not prepared — not until the third phase of their association in September — to disclose to this impetuous young stranger the nature of the links with selected union shop stewards that he had carefully built up over the years.

Nevertheless, something of Duczynska's obvious sincerity spoke to him, and he tried to be helpful — "going, I think, against his better judgment," she observes wryly. First, he put her in touch with one of his friends Zoltán Rónai[29] who also visited the Madzsars, though predictably he did not measure up to the intense expectation against which she now tested everyone and everything. Accordingly he was dismissed as no more than "a sort of critic," one of the intellectual leaders (though at least

"mildly left-wing") of the Hungarian Social Democratic Party (*Magyarországi Szociáldemokrata Párt,* hereafter HSDP). Next, Szabó suggested she visit the editorial offices of the periodical *Nőmunkás* (The Working Woman). But whomever it was he referred her to there, "the contact was stone cold" probably — bearing in mind Duczynska's aversion to feminism and 'the womens' movement' — because it was a woman. "I went from one dead end to the next; there was no way 'leading to the masses,' no opportunity for 'joining the movement'. The task which had seemed to be so clear at the beginning was becoming more and more distant and unreal." (OM) Was there no step anyone could recommend that would lead her closer to her goal? she asked herself, though with no clear idea of what exactly she was asking. "Is there no ray of light? One that will reveal all?"

When Duczynska looked back in old age to the seeming triumphs and undoubted tragedies of the revolutionary century, she acknowledged that "the ethics of Ervin Szabó's heroic socialist man" — which she had been far from understanding or appreciating in those early days — was more relevant than ever. (UL) In the evening of her life, she sought the key to him who "was the spiritual father of us all," who died in 1918 when she was twenty-one, and whose works had been consigned by communist ideologists to a dusty niche over the course of four decades. She played a part in restoring his image, but not in a manner that conformed to the dictates of Hungary's then 'existing socialism.' In perhaps her most inspired passage, she wrote: "For some he stands like an honoured statue, one of stone. But not as a stone statue should he stand among us, he who was a flame, a self-consuming flame. Let his memory be a statue of flame."

In the creator of that memorable image a new sort of person had entered Szabó's life. Indeed, Duczynska had appeared at a time when his attention was directed towards a cause very different from the one she represented. For in discussions with Oszkár Jászi and other liberals, Szabó was attempting to formulate some sort of organization of a spiritual and ethical elite. Nothing could have been more remote from Duczynska's mind. Belonging to no party or grouping, not particularly well-read, indeed "ignorant" as she many times admitted, she could think of nothing but her action plan. Thus, she impressed Szabó's biographer as being possessed of some predetermining "disposition of spirit", rendering her a self-effacing, solitary and "silent conspirator". Indeed, in Litván's view, by the middle of May, her resolution "could have caused the master

unpleasant and sometimes perhaps serious conflicts of conscience."[35] Her psychological inclination predisposed her to see in Szabó what she needed him to be — and what perhaps he too *wanted* to be — a revolutionary activist. Consequently, despite their long discussions, she was probably not in a state of mind fully to appreciate what Ervin Szabó had to say.

Against party bureaucratism

Within a few days of their first meeting, Duczynska found in Szabó's openly expressed detestation of bureaucratism support for her own instinctive dislike of organizations (not excluding that of the family). At that time, it had the effect of heightening her sense of alienation from social democracy. At the outbreak of war, she had been made brutally aware of the limitations of the HSDP when her aunt Gizella one morning triumphantly tossed onto her bed the issue of the social democratic *Népszava* (The People's Voice) for August 3, 1914.[36] Under the banner headline "The Nation's Holy Cause," the party's leadership was reported as announcing the suspension of the class struggle and that the trade unions would henceforth be at the service of the war economy.[37]

The 1917 May Day festival of supposed working-class fraternal solidarity turned out to be anything but solidarity as far as Szabó — and Duczynska, following his lead — were concerned. Presumably, he had not encouraged her to attend the party's colourful downtown march, with all or most of whose slogans she would surely have agreed. At least, though, the two of them did make an afternoon excursion to the Buda Hills, together with Alice Madzsar and Lili Magyar. "We sat on the grass.... violets were everywhere; it was a very beautiful day; May clouds were in the sky, and the sun was shining," she remembered vividly. However, for Szabó the experience was spoiled by the spectacle of a group — whom Duczynska would term "the dark company" (of "portly" individuals!) — sitting nearby on blankets, noisily tucking into a picnic lunch, and drinking beer. Szabó glanced across at them, then turning his back remarked: "It's the Jakabs, the lot of them," meaning the associates of the HSDP secretary Jakab Weltner.[38] "He hated them," Duczynska explains, "he became physically ill when he saw one of them."[39] Towards the leadership, Duczynska realized, Szabó's bitterness knew no bounds, "and his contempt was boundless too." He disapproved of them, apparently, because he considered that they had betrayed their class, as workers who

had advanced themselves in the movement and thus now counted as "bourgeois plebeians." That was enough for her: "I had no dealings with them, and wanted to know as little about them as possible." Duczynska remained anxious to interpret Szabó's criticism as blanket condemnation of the party. It was at this time that Duczynska conceived such a detestation for social democracy — comparing them unfavourably to the police[40] — which inclined her, at least in the short run, towards communism. Later though, Zsigmond Kunfi, a leading left social democrat, suggested that Szabó had a more balanced view: "If he criticized, it was with the troubled, jealous criticism of the lover, who did not regard the one he loved as perfect enough."[41]

Founded in December 1890 and modeled on the German and Austrian parties, within a decade the HSDP was numerically a significant force with 72,790 members. Due to its origins, its leaders, mainly trade union bureaucrats with little ideological training, cautiously followed the revisionists of the international movement in making parliamentary representation their main objective.[42] Inevitably, a split occurred early on between the leadership and younger radicals. In 1902 Ervin Szabó organized a group known as the Revolutionary Socialist Students of Budapest. Two years later his activities earned a severe reprimand, and by 1909 he and other "dissident" intellectuals effectively broke with the party, and resigned from it in 1918.[43]

It was in order to achieve financial independence that Szabó had accepted a post that would lead to his becoming Director of Budapest's Municipal Library (which today bears his name). Being free to write what he liked, he contributed to many leading socialist and sociological journals in several countries as well as at home, besides acting as leader of the loosely-defined left opposition. What impressed Duczynska as much as anything was Szabó's harsh critique of the HSDP's German-style bureaucratic structure. In his article entitled "Marx" Szabó accused the party of having moved away from Marxism's view of the individual in terms of his class relations, and conceiving of "democracy" not in the socialist but the bourgeois democracy sense of rule of the majority. Against this, he argued that parliamentarianism would "change nothing," which Duczynska soon came to appreciate. (A) It is reasonable to suppose, though, as Kunfi again argued, that Szabó meant only that among the means available to socialism he did not consider the struggle in parliament "the most important." But Duczynska was probably correct in saying that it was Szabó's conviction that only through direct action, on

the part of trade unions — at least those imbued with the spirit of revolutionary socialism expressed in syndicalism — could an economic struggle be waged against capitalism. (UL)

Hence the uncompromising stand he took as early as 1904:

> The most successful tactic of the socialist parties is to develop the consciousness of the working class... it remains the only party principle which is unquestionably in agreement with the higher laws of social development. Whichever party deviates from this road either has a defective organization, or a false spirit, or both. In any case, it only deserves to be burned! ("Party Discipline and the Freedom of the Individual.")[44]

In denouncing social democracy's other failing, namely its bureaucratism, Szabó was in good company: Rosa Luxemburg castigated the German Party's leaders as "Judases" and "traitors;"[45] the liberal Oszkár Jászi declared that it was "virtually a cultural insult whenever I happen to make contact with them,"[46] and Count Michael Károlyi (though he personally had a 'very good war') was loud in his contempt for socialists who had "no faith, and are therefore incapable of dying for their beliefs."[47] For her part, Duczynska regretted that the Hungarian leadership included no one of the stature of the Austrian party's Victor Adler, not to mention his son Friedrich, her hero. Many years later though, with the hindsight of experience, she would grant that among the party leadership there were some "fantastic speakers," even some "honest people," some of whom she admitted to knowing personally: Dezső Bokányi[48] (even though "he counted as one of the Jakabs"), Vilmos Böhm (to her an intellectual, with whom she had differences),[49] and Zsigmond Kunfi.[50]

In accounting for what made Szabó so different, Duczynska points to the Russian tradition which, she claims, also influenced both herself and her husband Karl Polanyi. In his youth Szabó declined a trade union position in the party apparently on the advice of his old mentor the Russian revolutionary Samuel Klatschko: "You are too good to become cannon-fodder; rather you should become the sort of leader and advocate who stands in the vanguard and conjures up fertile soil from the swamp." At the 1905 Party Congress Szabó spoke out in defense of intra-party democracy, criticizing the party's "principles of military organization," in terms that spoke later to Duczynska's instinctive suspicion of organizations.[51] Later it may have crossed her mind how unprepared Szabó would have been had he been confronted by bureaucratic developments in

the Russian party that went beyond what he could ever have imagined possible in a self-styled Marxist party. So it would be for her too. As early as 1920, even amid the excitement of working for the Comintern in Russia, Duczynska found "life within the bureaucracy very hard to tolerate." (A) Later that year, she was faced in Vienna with the challenge of having to conform to the dictates of the émigré Hungarian Communist Party — which she had joined in late 1918[52] — as spelled out in lectures and debates: "It was really the first time in my life that I was in a proper party school." Slowly, views that she had developed "internally" began to surface and found expression in what she called "my search to introduce more and more democracy within the party... to give greater voice to the rank and file of the movement." (A) Finally, she realized that the party's main problems of corruption and talking down to the masses were inevitable products of its being an apparatus that was centralized on a "military basis." In a devastating passage in her 1922 article, she describes the results.

> In many comrades there developed an inability to think, to such an extent that they became unable to evaluate the crucial situations encountered, in fact even to see the bare facts. It's not only that they were no longer revolutionaries, but already they were not even conscious and responsible human beings. Such a devaluation of the human [to the material level] has prevented all attempts directed towards the renewal of the party.

Duczynska's article represented her conversion to Szabó's way of thinking regarding the dangers of bureaucratization.[53] After declining to retract her published views, she was expelled — in the party's usual meeting place, the Café Liechtenstein — in front of the assembled membership. The charge: violation of party discipline.[54] Half a century later, in her book on the anti-fascist Austrian Workers Militia (*Schutzbund*) in 1934, Duczynska accused the hidebound Austrian Communist Party of being less effective in offering resistance than the existing autonomous worker organizations.[55] She concluded, in a passage remarkable for its optimism, by expressing satisfaction that there was no longer just one model for communism, because within the worker movement there was a process of renewal in terms of "the dichotomy of power and respect for humanity."[56]

Individualism

Both master and disciple were as instinctively opposed to bureaucratism as they were in favour of individualism. Duczynska claimed to locate the well-spring of this attitude explicitly in Szabó's — and to some extent her own, if more indirect — experience of Russian turn-of-the-century radicalism. This she viewed in extravagant terms as the "the life-giving, passionate scene of every shade of [Russian] socialist thought and revolutionary practice" that she imagined shaped Szabó during his student days in Vienna. While studying philosophy and history at university (1899-1903), he read Proudhon, Lavrov and Kropotkin. But more importantly he came under the influence (as did his younger cousin Karl Polanyi) of the Russian émigré Samuel Klatschko while boarding in his modest 3-room apartment at Belvederegasse 3 ("his real home") an experience of which Duczynska writes in some detail.[57] (Indeed, similar "magic circles" that supposedly emanated from Klatschko's surviving family would make a deep impression on her too in Vienna after 1923.) The Belvederegasse apartment was "a hot-bed of the Russian revolution and the 'red' Red Cross" where for thirty-four years until his death in 1914 Klatschko, the former *narodnik* and "a non-party man," gave assistance to revolutionary fugitives of all parties from Russia; for some, the bedrooms of Adolf and Karl, in the much spacious Polanyi residence at Andrássy út 2 in Budapest also "served as a temporary lodging place." (UL) As Duczynska came to see it, the cousins were influenced in different ways.

> The wind of the Russian revolutionary student movement blew upon Karl Polanyi, the *gymnasium* school boy; in it he recognized the practice of devotion on the model of 'he who is committed to the movement'. Later, in the first initiatives of his youth — in the Galileo Circle — the ethic of the 'Russian Student' movement was unmistakable.

Of the two, Ervin Szabó was the more profoundly affected by Klatschko, "his spiritual father," and by such famous guests passing through the household as Plekhanov, Axelrod, and Leo Deutsch. In consciously becoming a socialist, Szabó would combine the tradition of objective Marxian social and historical truth with what Duczynska terms "the well-spring of Russian populism's subjective element." (UL) Oszkár Jászi said much the same thing of Szabó in his Funeral Address in 1918: "For his very being was the blood relation of Russian propagandists and

revolutionaries, in spite of all his Marxism."[58] After returning to Hungary, Szabó undertook to link the Russian revolutionary movement with the West, particularly through transmitting printed materials, while also establishing contacts with a wide range of groups: anarchists, syndicalists, bourgeois radicals, and Marxists.

The emphasis Szabó placed upon individualism perhaps not surprisingly elicited less response in Hungary from the organized workers' movement than from the 'bourgeois' or citizens' reform movement. After all, the latter provided the audience, readership and producer-base of virtually all the counter-cultural achievements of the first two decades of the century. In 1901 sociologists, journalists and philosophers organized the Association for the Scientific Study of Society (*Társadalomtudományi Társaság*), and in 1914 some of its leaders formed a 'Radical Bourgeois Party' which advocated reform and also mounted educational programs in collaboration with the HSDP. On account of his disagreements with the party, Szabó resigned from an editorial position with *Népszava* in order to become an editor of the Association's new journal *Huzsadik Század* (Twentieth Century). Through this move, he would find among its readership's democratic-radical intelligentsia, particularly the youth, his most appreciative audience.

'Home' with the Galilei Circle

Ironically, it was within the institutional bourgeois framework of the Sociological Society and the related Association of Free Thinkers that Duczynska, albeit reluctantly, allowed herself to be pressured into finding a temporary "home". This was the Galilei Circle, established in 1908 by radical students of the University of Budapest, dedicated to reforming the outdated university curriculum through seminars on new areas of study and research, pioneering outreach programs for working people, and discussions on western radical ideas.[59] Initially, Duczynska made a show of despising the Circle's intellectualism. Only later, when undertaking research on the early years of her husband Karl Polanyi (the Circle's founding president) and with the probable aim of writing about its left-wing members, would she overcome her earlier prejudice. As it happened, there existed two more radical groups in which she might have felt more at home, but these Szabó did not think it wise, for reasons that will become clear, to bring to her attention.[60]

"Join the Galilei Circle," Szabó abruptly advised Duczynska at some point during the first week of May, "you're a student, so that's the place for you." Perhaps he viewed it as a solution as to what to do with her, for he could not risk compromising himself and his trade union contacts through the possible indiscretions of this relatively unknown young woman. Duczynska implies that she already knew enough about the Circle to be sceptical, and that Szabó was of like mind: "Incidentally, he didn't like the Galilei Circle either; in fact, he hated it. But he said there was no other way, I had to join, people had to get to know me." (Tisza, UL) So that was the point. The Circle would serve as Duczynska's cover. Having a Polish name, being a student recently arrived from the most radical centre in Europe — "from Switzerland, the homeland of spies" — with no admissible motive for being in Budapest, having chosen not to live with relatives while possessing no visible means of support, and the very fact of her isolation, Szabó argued, would sooner or later attract the authorities' attention. Thus, he concluded, for the time being it was prudent for her to belong somewhere, and to be seen to have a place. She understood: "Otherwise I could even be labelled an agent of the Entente."

Accordingly, Duczynska duly presented herself at the Galilei Circle's meeting place, in one of the row of narrow neo-classical buildings in the curiously semi-circular Anker köz (Close), 2. II. 4 in the VIth district in the centre of Pest. (BM) Her worst fears were confirmed: "The first meeting was devastating... theoretically, every one of them was more left-wing than the next."

> It cannot be denied that it was a disastrous experience. They were very nice, enthusiastic young people; they were studying, and wanting to have perpetual peace. — Oh, not here and now! Not against *this* war, not a revolution against *this* war — just a sort of "perpetual peace"... As if they would have been living outside of history: as if from their organs of feeling they were missing the one which registers political reality. Perhaps I was unfair in my aroused impatience. (UL)

Criticism even came from the liberal Oszkár Jászi who declared that the Circle was home primarily for "utopian" reformers trusting solely "in the power of ideas" and in the weakness of the "ancien regime".[61] (In contrast, a Hungarian-American historian accused the Circle's founders of sowing "the seeds of troubles" that all too soon began "sprouting!")[62] Initially, Duczynska sat in on a seminar on philosophy and sociology,

which she soon left "feeling very discouraged". Her lack of interest in ideas was never more obvious than in her disapproval of those Galileists who were studying the writings of Ernst Mach (1838-1916). "The overture to a new age in Austria", was how Péter Hanák[63] described Mach's *Analysis of Sensations*, a much-reprinted work that would rank with Freud's in questioning the concept of stable identity. It is difficult to avoid concluding that Duczynska's attitude was determined by Lenin's attack on Mach (and the Swiss philosopher Richard Avenarius) in his *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*. True, it is possible that the tone and level of discussion failed to stimulate her. In which case, she was not alone. György Lukács also recorded his dissatisfaction, after witnessing a seminar in which Karl Polanyi — perhaps arguing in favour of Comte's positivism against metaphysics — struck him as doing less than justice to his theme.

> It was typical of the state of public opinion before the dictatorship... that Polanyi once read out a passage from Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* in a seminar at which I was present, caricaturing it by his manner of reading. He read out a long sentence which was followed by uproarious laughter, and then another long sentence that provoked a similar reaction.[61]

However, Duczynska could not deny that she was made to feel welcome. Some students were genuinely interested in Duczynska and in her experiences; enquiring about her background, about Zürich, and about "what sort of people Russians are." But when she started speaking of what really interested her, the Zimmerwald movement, it became clear that they had little interest in the political workers' movement. The students' reaction to the war was "the mailing out of postcards, on which they wrote that they were in favour of perpetual peace. This formula plunged me into despair," she admitted, "because for there to be peace, there must — and at once — be action!"

Action, not theory

Duczynska never questioned Szabó's strategy of seeming deliberately to ignore her desire — craving, rather — for action. Later, though, she came to realize that he himself yearned to give practical expression to what perforce remained mere theory. Being of a generation who looked to

poetry to convey what could not be clearly or honestly expressed, Duczynska prefaced her second article on Szabó with lines from Hölderlin: "...perhaps there will come / like a sunbeam through clouds, the deed / that has been spiritualized by thought?" At least by that time she had matured enough to hold Szabó's theoretical writings in high regard, perhaps even as a species of action. His conspiratorial nature was already legendary, and Duczynska seems to have accepted that this accounted in part for what she found missing in him. In 1917 though she was not to realize that Szabó probably consciously chose not to put her in touch with oppositional groups and individuals already experienced in the type of activities she would later undertake. Cautiousness on Szabó's part — or desire personally to oversee the political education of a young female admirer — were hardly adequate reasons for causing her, in effect, to waste valuable months. Why, for instance, did he not send Duczynska first to the offices of *Népszava* where associates had set precedents for her later antiwar actions a good two years before her arrival? As early as May 1915, radicals on the newspaper had been involved in producing shipments of pacifist leaflets to the armed forces (though they were intercepted by the police). At the same time, some individuals on the newspaper established contact with Swiss and Entente socialists, and sent one of their number, Mandel, to Zimmerwald. Then it must have taken considerable initiative to include an advertisement, in the May 11, 1916 issue, for "The Workers Education Circle," inviting subscribers to request the "Library of Awakening" to send free books and pamphlets to soldiers at the front or in hospital. Furthermore, some in the HSDP leadership tacitly encouraged these clandestine activities. It was only when such efforts failed that, fearing the authorities might impose martial law, the leadership decided to focus, together with other parties, on electoral reform,[65] though this did not hinder further peace initiatives by individuals.[66]

These activities set the stage in early 1917 for the unlikely appearance of the first major war-time opposition group. Engineers, technicians, draftsmen, and administrators — thus far rejected by established trade unionists as 'representatives of capital'[67] — formed the movement known as "engineer socialism," later the National Association of Engineers. Their radically new interpretation of the theory of surplus value and plans for revolution through industrial action were alluded to in a novel set in those times by Duczynska's close friend of the 1960s the writer József Lengyel ("the Hungarian Solzhenitsyn").[68] Engineer socialist

leaders would be joined by representatives of twenty major factories in Budapest to form the Inter-factory Committee, which led to proposals for a general strike (which predictably the HSDP refused to support).

Duczynska would have been equally puzzled, if not dismayed, had she known that Angelika Balabanov had omitted to brief her on the interest already shown in the Zimmerwald movement by some of the HSDP's leaders. In 1915 indications of mass discontent in Hungary caused the leadership to write to the International Socialist Committee (ISC) on July 15th, and then to send Mandel to the Zimmerwald Conference. Subsequently, the *Népszava* published an article (September 25) praising the Conference (though according to a police report this indicated no change in the party's position).[69] In January 1916 two HSDP leaders tentatively approached the ISC regarding peace initiatives, but the party rejected the notion of joining the Zimmerwald movement and ignored the appeal of the Kienthal Conference.[70] In the autumn, two leaders went to the Hague, censorship's blank spaces appeared more frequently in the *Népszava*,[71] and the police reported that elements within the party had been engaging in peace propaganda.[72] In May 1917, a Hungarian delegation visited the ISC which had by then moved to Stockholm; and in the summer an expanded delegation — including Szabó's *bete noire* Jakab Weltner, along with Manó Buchinger[73] and four other party leaders — went there for discussions with the preparatory committee.[71] In as much as Balabanov was the ISC Secretary, and would thus have been aware of these Hungarian initiatives, it may be concluded that she regarded Duczynska as little more than a courier whose responsibility — and presumed limited ability — extended no further than delivering the Manifesto to known leftists in Vienna, and presumed leftists in Budapest. Beyond that, she had no reason to place any confidence in the former student's political abilities. Hostility to the HSDP's leadership probably explain why Szabó himself did not attend the European conferences, quite apart from the problem of obtaining the necessary accreditation and financial support.[75] In the final analysis, though, it cannot be ruled out that it was part of Duczynska's agenda to ignore these earlier initiatives in order to portray her own activities in Hungary between September 1917 and January 1918 relating to Zimmerwald and anti-war propaganda as pioneering undertakings.

Still, Duczynska's blanket profession of ignorance on matters Hungarian have to be taken seriously. It was a measure of her isolation from the Hungarian political scene, that, as she admitted, she was ignorant

of the long campaign to extend the franchise. This had peaked with the demonstration before the Parliament, on "Bloody Sunday" on May 23, 1912, when the party's proclamation — soon withdrawn — of a general strike for a full extension of the franchise, resulted in the deaths of six workers and the wounding of 182 others. Like Rosa Luxemburg, Duczynska was too ready to regard parliamentarianism as diverting energies from the class struggle. It was certainly significant that Trade Union membership — in 1906 129,332, but declining to a low in 1916 of 55,338 — had increased to 215,222 by late 1917, and now included white-collar workers, engineers and civil servants, whose conditions were worsening.[76] Yet the franchise issue could not be viewed in isolation from the need to politicize the peasantry — of whose plight Duczynska seems to have remained ignorant until the early 1940s — and from resolving the crucial problem of the nationalities' desire for independence from Magyar hegemony. In effect Duczynska viewed politics not as work on a continuing basis across a broad and varied human terrain, but as a series of violent events.

Master and disciple

In the beginning conversations between Duczynska and Szabó probably took place in the Madzsars' living room. However, she became aware that her presence was inconvenient on occasions when Szabó wished to be alone with Alice, while the presence of numerous social democratic visitors likewise inhibited hers. So some time in the first week of May Duczynska moved out from the apartment and into a furnished room she rented for one month in a building on a nearby major thoroughfare, the Fehérvári út. The experience of living alone made Duczynska more aware of her surroundings, more conscious too of how the war cast its shadow over all aspects of life. Every morning the tantalizing smell of freshly baked bread wafted up into the street from the bakery in the basement. In the evening, war's shadow cast a pall of apprehension in her room. "It was a ghostly room," she recalls. She was alone now. Uncertainty again took hold.

The new room turned out to be not entirely secure either, for the landlady was well placed to observe visitors (also a hazard at the previous address). Therefore, during the next three weeks — the period during which she turned over in her mind the second plan she felt she had to

resort to — Duczynska and Szabó, seemingly by that time meeting every day or two, continued their talks "about various things," as she puts it evasively, not in Szabó's apartment, of course, and "absolutely not" at his library. Instead, after his daily visit to the Madzsars', the two of them would walk during the lightening evenings in neighbouring small side streets. On Sunday mornings, though, they met in the Farkasrét Cemetery[77] in the bright spring sunshine, to Duczynska's mind a better time and place. "We would walk among the large crowds alongside the graves; where could we have spoken more freely?"

How freely *did* they speak, this ill-matched pair? A degree of intimacy seems to have coloured their relationship. Perhaps Duczynska would not have returned so often, and in such detail, to Ervin Szabó, had there not been subtle bonds of affection between them. According to Oszkár Jászi, Szabó had "an almost magical influence on idealistic youth and on women."[78] It seems to have been the case with Duczynska too. At their first meeting in 1915, she saw in him the likeness of her father, until then the only person she had ever loved.[79] Concerning Szabó, when pressed Duczynska declared, "certainly I loved him."[80] As to his feelings for her, Duczynska retreats into affirmative metaphor.[81] But according to "historical gossip" Szabó was in love with her.[82] When asked whether Szabó ever displayed emotion — he who lost his father early, never married, and remained very close to his mother — again Duczynska replied evasively: "Rhetoric was completely alien to him....". (A) At the time, Duczynska was almost certainly a virgin who had known only platonic love for her brilliant cousin, the poet Ferenc Békássy. Yet she would always represent a curious mix of puritanism and assumed worldliness, such as caused her almost always to refer to Alice as "Mrs. Madzsar." Thus, even from the perspective of old age, she would not presume to elaborate on what sort of man Szabó was. According to her, he appeared almost every day at the home of his close friend József Madzsar, because "he was very affectionate towards Mrs. Madzsar." They had "a very intimate personal relationship," which she chose to describe as "a very great love." "It was a triangle: the life of mature people." (A)

The age difference between master and disciple seems hardly to have mattered, though a curious incident made Duczynska aware of it for the first time. Most days she went to the Galilei Circle. But one afternoon it chanced that Ervin Szabó took the unusual step of calling without prior arrangement, only to find that she was out. The incident later struck Duczynska as showing how young people misguidedly exaggerate age

differences. She was surprised to hear from the landlady that "a young man" had called round, for the only young men she knew belonged to the Circle, and none were on close enough terms to visit her. She soon learned that the mysterious caller was Ervin Szabó, who "of course," to her at that time was an "old man". "Or so he seemed to me," she reflected, "though when he died he was not yet forty, just thirty-nine."[83]

Nevertheless as director of the Budapest Municipal Library, an established author and leading intellectual he was on a different plane. Szabó's uniquely activist concept of the book, and indeed of the Library, was memorably described by József Madzsar.

> For him, a book was... a living organism: each one of them had its own function, and his mission lay in marshalling books and dispatching them in all directions in the fight for culture. Each book enters like a corpuscle the body's cells, bringing with it the oxygen of culture, afterwards re-assembling before going again and again in different direction. (Farewell Address, October 1, 1918).

At least one such book came into Duczynska's hands a few months later. An issue of an anarchist-socialist journal,[84] it bore a circular emblem (of two hands breaking a rifle) that she would use on one of her anti-war leaflets. Though she ill-advisedly called Szabó a "bookworm", she would never have questioned the value of his creating such an institution for the wider diffusion of knowledge. Furthermore, Duczynska had a naïve awe of Szabó's self-discipline: he worked from six (others say from five) until eight o'clock every morning ("in his cloistered study," she adds archly), writing his history of 1848-49 in a firm hand on grey paper. (OM) And yet, age did count for something, in terms of registering the passage of time. Duczynska now found herself becoming aware of the impermanence of life. Thus, on one of their walks, they passed a construction site. "I remember that Ervin said that not even our foot-prints will remain, because somehow they [who have power] control the streets, will re-plan them, and break up the very concrete."[85] (K) She, on the other hand, was convinced that a new age was about to dawn upon the ruins of the old. Inevitably, then, later that year Duczynska sought out radical students of around her own age — their youth seemingly a guarantee of the activism she valued beyond any theory.

One lesson Duczynska did learn from Szabó — and would attempt to apply from September on — was his conspiratorialism. She

liked to think it was typical of the Russian illegal movement whose principles he had absorbed in Klatschko's Vienna apartment ("the high school for conspiracy"). "Through him there percolated down to us in some measure the principles of the illegal movement and conspiracy," she claimed. (OM) This practice was apparent in the caution Szabó exercised in what he said even to Duczynska, whose inexperience and gentry family connections he could hardly ignore. "He always acted according to the rules of conspiracy," she notes, "and never told anyone, not even his closest friends, anything that wasn't strictly their business." (Beg. & OM) Nevertheless, it may be that her own liking for conspiracy, which became almost a way of life[86] as well as infatuation with what she thought were 'Russian' tactics, caused her to exaggerate it in Szabó's case.[87]

During their unequal conversations, Duczynska was painfully aware that she was the disciple, rightly in awe of one whom she was already inclined to regard as her "master". Yet her impetuous ambition ran up against Szabó's cautiousness, creating a dilemma. She could not ignore that he was deliberately steering discussion towards theoretical questions, rather than practical solutions. Her initial plan of contacting workers in factories was getting nowhere. Although Szabó gave her a disproportionate amount of his limited free time, to Duczynska he seemed like someone from "another world". The first two weeks of May (which she would call "Bitter May") were, as she recalled so clearly, "a time of roads without direction, a time of sterile endeavour, inner indecision, isolation, impotence. Later discussions hardly opened a way out, however sincere and intense they were." (OM)

It was a new experience for Duczynska to try to discuss, in her mother tongue, subjects that she had only limited acquaintance with, and that in German. Probably, she availed herself of the Madzsars' personal library in order to begin to familiarize herself with Szabó's writings. At least since 1913, she had become to some extent politicized while at school in Braunschweig — principally through reading the "always very radical" daily *Braunschweiger Volksfreund* — though it was the outbreak of the Russian Revolution that reclaimed permanently her allegiance to socialism. Yet she had felt no desire to read Marx until her Zürich mentor Henryk Lauer recommended *The Communist Manifesto* as a start. Nevertheless, Duczynska seems to have deliberately given the impression of being poorly read, never speaking of exemplars (other than Szabó), nor of what she may have read against the war (unlike Lukács who mentions Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht). After describing her 1917 experi-

ences Duczynska would never again refer to Marx. It may have sufficed that Szabó's interpretation accorded with the dictates of her rebellious nature. What she learned from him was the significance of certain derivatives and applications of Marxism, not its essence. "I did not hear him speak of theory, of Plekhanov for example," Duczynska says, adding, "theoretical matters were of another world." (A)

From syndicalism to anarchistic individualism

Despite Duczynska's allegation that Szabó, even if reluctantly, was concerned with theory at the expense of action, nevertheless she granted, at least with the benefit of hindsight, that some aspects of theory were more potentially action-oriented than others. Thus, though it was not clear to her in 1917, she came to grant that Szabó did emphasize the essential role of "the individual" (if not all individuals). This was because he was a syndicalist "in the fullest sense of the word" — indeed, Duczynska emphasizes, "an anarcho-syndicalist". Later, her rudimentary political philosophy seemed to have been influenced — if not arrested — by Szabó's argument that anarchism was in the best Marxist tradition: "Today it is mostly the anarchists who call themselves communist, and collectivism is the social ideal of the Social Democrats."[88] What direct experience he'd had came from his short-lived early association with the small Hungarian anarchist movement led by the curious figure of Count Ervin Batthyány. The correctness of his instinct was to a degree confirmed by Lenin's statement that Bolshevism must seek allies within the best elements of the anarchists.[89]

That Duczynska was impressed by what Szabó said on the subject is suggested by her declaration, on virtually no evidence, that her father Alfred von Duczynski — who in her eyes could do no wrong — was an anarcho-syndicalist. However, it was clear that syndicalism was Szabó's active political concern. For he had formed a Syndicalist Propaganda Group dedicated to establishing independent trade unions with the objective of revolution.[90] Duczynska was interested to know what Szabó's syndicalism amounted to. Eventually she concluded that he believed neither in purely political movements nor in the usefulness of street demonstrations; his aim was simply to bring the workers out onto the streets, though without even the sort of programme which at least the Zimmerwaldists had. Whether or not it was possible to achieve such a

thing, she commented with obvious scepticism, was another question. In any event, the working class would remain, for both of them, a preferred though little-known dimension of humanity. When Szabó warned Duczynska that it "wasn't easy" to make contact with the workers, he could have been speaking of his own limited experience. According to his biographer, "he did not idealize the working class and did not try to 'rub shoulders' with them."[91] In Duczynska's case, too, although after 1946 she idealized the peasantry as the most likely catalyst of world revolution, her milieu remained the intelligentsia. Master and pupil were typical of the Hungarian intelligentsia who, drawn from the upper and middle ranks of society, looked to the West, in contrast to the Russian intelligentsia that came from the people and went back "into the people."[92] However, recognition did eventually come from the workers, if only on the occasion of Szabó's funeral. The large factories stopped work for ten minutes, of which Duczynska observed, "Ervin Szabó in death moved the masses as he never did in life. In death he acted." (UL)

Not until late September 1917 would Szabó provide Duczynska, along with the student group she had by then assembled, with introductions to those formerly elusive intermediaries necessary for contacting factory workers in armaments factories. These turned out to be long-time syndicalist associates of his, shop stewards who like him regarded trade unions as vehicles of class warfare. In the short term, Duczynska's goal accorded with theirs: to organize a general strike as prelude to the long-awaited proletarian revolution. But over the long term, she did not share Szabó's view that 'after the revolution' government should consist of a national federation of syndicates. In her last years, though, the distortions arguably inherent in 'existing socialism' seem to have caused her to ponder whether a syndicalist system might not be preferable to a centralized state apparatus. (UL) Here perhaps was the reason for her having chosen to write about Ervin Szabó in the first place — to present anarchism and syndicalism as fruitful critiques of 'existing socialism.' This was at least partly confirmed by what she wrote about the Austrian *Schutzbund*.[93] For on the basis of her experience in its activities from 1934 to 1936 she became convinced that communist renewal could come only through "the trend towards autonomy." Above all, from "respect for humanity [wherein lies] direct democracy,... acting as an antibody on bureaucratic structures, and spontaneous initiative in all walks of public life."

The state and bolshevism

The March Revolution may have been an inspiration to Duczynska, but it inclined Szabó to anticipate crucial weaknesses in the bolshevik mode of socio-political structuring. For according to his syndicalist principles, the class struggle must be waged through direct action on the part of industrial workers *themselves*, not by a political party claiming to act for them. The latter course would be the breeding ground of bureaucracy and ultimately *étatisme*. Duczynska expressed this in a particularly striking formulation — indeed, one more prescient than she could have dreamed of at the time — "He almost feared more the statist deformation of the coming revolutionary transformation than that it might never come at all." But in 1917 she would have regarded this as totally removed from reality. It was natural for Duczynska to have been impatient with Szabó's seeming hostility to the coming Bolshevik people's state. Even later, she could not bring herself fully to accept that Szabó's objection had a rational basis. Thus, she attempted to trace it back,[94] as others had done, to underlying psychological factors that induced lack of confidence resulting in awareness of contradictions and self-doubt. The result, she concluded, was that he whom she decided to call "the unhappy lover of action" (UL) was doomed to remain ineffective in practice.

Even subsequent bitter experience — expelled by two communist parties, the liquidation of her first husband and old comrades of different nationalities in Stalin's Purges — did not alter her conviction that at that time the formation of socialist statehood in the motherland of the Revolution had been necessary. However, following Szabó into theory and some unspecified future, she could not disagree with Ervin Szabó's conviction of the need to realize — via a bridge leading to tomorrow from everyday disappointments — the vision of Marx and Engels of the withering away of the state. (UL) But who would be the bridge-builders? For Szabó, they would be the trusted "few" who alone had the ability to discern "the more distant great objectives of the future." It is not obvious to what extent Duczynska objected to this. "Basically, Szabó was not of a democratic way of thinking, but was for an elite which would transform society in which there was democracy (in an intensive, not broad sense), not a mass movement, but based on direct action in the factory." (K) Still, it troubled her that "he was like Lenin, in that basically he did not believe in the working masses as a political force," preferring an elite social formation. At the time of writing, Duczynska was despairing of 'socialism' as theory,

and turning towards individual action. Years of disappointment had taken their toll: the Stalinist system, its imposition upon Hungary, the ossification of 'existing socialism'. Perhaps it was her despair of 'socialism' at least as it was commonly understood that caused her to write that "every practical movement is the seat of continual disillusions, constant contradictions." In May 1917 too Duczynska was feeling dissatisfied. The openness and optimism of neutral Zürich was very different from Budapest's climate of irresolution and suspicion. No one took seriously her half-thought-out scheme. "It was a time of untrodden ways, futile attempts, gestation, isolation and helplessness," she remembered only too well.

On Saturday May 12th, Ervin Szabó delivered a lecture in Gólyavár, under the auspices of the Galileo Circle's Peace series, entitled "Imperialism and Lasting Peace."[95] Duczynska was in the audience. As she watched and listened she was forced to conclude that for Szabó, "to lecture, to speak from a rostrum, like some 'actor', was torture." Sitting beside Alice Madzsar, she was nervously trying to follow "with half an ear" the to her totally irrelevant line of Szabó's reasoning concerning Cobden and Bright, Free Trade, economic liberalism, and English trade unionism. For she was restless, her mind elsewhere.

> Why? What good is it? What it is good for? Two months ago in Petersburg the soldiers did not shoot, the workers downed tools, they wouldn't make munitions; starving and in misery they demonstrated in the streets. This happened, and that it did actually happen will never be forgotten. This is already our era...

What Szabó said had not the slightest impact. "In my all-embracing ignorance," she later recalled, "I believed implicitly that all this constituted no great problem, that it counted for nothing...." It was also a measure of Duczynska's ignorance concerning Marxism that she failed to grasp the obvious significance of Szabó's liberating observation that "the primacy of economic over political structure is by no means as obvious as many used to believe." (UL) When the lecture ended she left the hall more convinced than ever of his limitations. She kept recalling Zimmerwald's stirring summons to revolution that had galvanized her personally to action. She had been sure that in Ervin Szabó she would find someone of the same mind. Instead, here he was presenting a scholarly lecture

from under his trademark "drooping melancholy moustache." This was no way, she thought, to bring the masses out into the streets.

> I think I didn't understand a word, and it wouldn't have given me any guidance even if I had. The youthful ear 'picks up' only what has previously vibrated within that 'receiving' ear, what has been previously formed in the depths of the mind. It was listening only to the dream: to the rebellious crowd streaming out from Csepel's factories... But is there no step that can take us closer to it, no possible plan of action? Is there no ray of light? One that will reveal all? (Beg)

The March Revolution may have been on Duczynska's mind, but not on Szabó's, or at least not in the same sense. It is difficult to judge from her accounts — written for publication in 'communist' Hungary — whether self-censorship caused her to omit the sceptical comments he likely made. However, one disclaimer, made in the course of the Ackerl interview, strains belief: "I didn't dare to enquire whether he approved or not," she says concerning the Revolution. "But I never heard him say anything against it either, because, after all, it was an immense event and a great Revolution — and so he preferred to remain silent." Evasiveness characterized Szabó's reported attitude on the subject. Nevertheless Duczynska felt obliged to conclude that, if "only obliquely," "the whole structure" of Szabó's way of thinking was different, and that there was "a complete difference" between the two of them in their assessment of bolshevism. When asked flatly whether Szabó approved of the Bolsheviks' seizure of power, Duczynska replied, "It's doubtful, very doubtful." According to her, all he said on the subject was, "never believe everything you see in print." Again, she tried to account for this in terms of personality: "Certainly, he refrained from making any statement on it... due to inner uncertainty." Finally though she accepted that his response was in accordance with his deeply-held principles: "It was the development of *étatisme* that would have struck him most certainly as a danger, from the very first minute." For this reason, Duczynska adds, "he was thoroughly distrustful of the Bolshevik leadership."

Curiously, it seems that Lenin's name, according to Duczynska, "did not come up once" in their discussions. She tries to account for this by pointing out that news from Russia was slow to reach Budapest, and that the nature of Lenin's role was still not clear. Of course, at that time she was focusing on her own projected plans, perhaps even to the exclu-

sion of developments in Russia. In any case, she was hardly up to debating such matters with Szabó. After all, as she confessed, she still had not grasped the basic difference between Lenin and the Left Zimmerwaldists — "I was very far from understanding the Bolshevik way of thinking." It would not have been surprising if Szabó had deliberately decided to deflect her questions. At the time it must have irked Duczynska to realize that "to him, everything and everyone who became organized was suspect." Later though, after saying this (on the Ackerl Interview tape), after a pause, she adds, "It was a very profound insight...." (A) Unlike his disciple, Szabó was spared from having to confront the dilemma presented by onrushing events. He died on September 29, 1918, a few weeks before the first of the two Hungarian revolutions. His funeral was held at the time when ex-prisoners-of-war were returning from Russia to found the Hungarian Communist Party, and some months later the Republic of Soviets. Then, as Duczynska points out, Szabó would surely have found it difficult to maintain his anti-statist position. Yet already the Bolsheviks had acknowledged Szabó's historic role in the workers movement. "He was invited — news reached him before his death — to be the first foreign member of the Socialist Academy which had just been created in Moscow. He accepted. It was a great honour." Honours he could accept, but not the responsibility of acting. "I cannot imagine him participating in the 1919 Hungarian Republic of Soviets,"[96] Duczynska declares. Even though it would claim him as one of its patron saints.[97]

Activism and the individual

Against all the evidence, writing and theorizing were for Szabó not enough — he wanted to act! "A thoughtful person... who philosophizes — is no more than half a man. The whole man is the active man!" That was what one who knew him said he affirmed.[98] It was his tragedy that he was constitutionally unable to become one. Later, this was held against him under 'existing socialism', when his scruples and awareness of contradictions were dismissed as inhibitions which ought to be 'solved', as Duczynska duly noted.[90] Later in life, though, she seemed prepared to grant that more thought and less action would have done a lot less harm. She blamed herself for failing to grasp the profound significance of the issues Szabó raised. "How could it have been otherwise?" she asks, "my theoretical-political ignorance was boundless." Yet the full extent of the

issues would only become intelligible with the tragedies of the intervening four decades. Then Szabó's ethical critique of communist party practice would strike her as "more realistic than anything else." Even then, though Duczynska was more aware of what she calls "the spiritual projections of the attributes of the contradictions," there is no evidence that she was able to comprehend "the theoretical dissonances hiding behind them." (UL) Impatient for 'action', as always, it is not clear that Duczynska fully appreciated the distinctive ethical dimension of Szabó's thinking. As Litván[100] points out, this "incorruptible" thinker's earlier syndicalist view of the leadership role of a "moral elite" would eventually broaden into a vision of what he himself represented. Thus, he could be seen as a model, "one of a few, who will be devoted to far-away goals and are courageous enough to present these constantly to the masses... who serve as steady drivers of present-day mass movements... towards the morrow." In this respect, Szabó would be pointed to as the "the guiding spirit" of Duczynska's group of student revolutionary socialists. Yet they had neither the status nor the ambition to assume any such leadership role.

However, there was another perhaps more crucial dimension to Szabó's concept of activism and the individual. Thus it would come as something of a revelation for Duczynska personally when she read, in a new edition of Szabó's works, that for him all social progress "was the positive achievement of critically thinking individuals." (UL) Typically though she tried to associate this with his early reading in "the heroic theory of Russian populism" (in order perhaps to differentiate between this and the western form of individualism), noting that his view "must be the complete opposite of the Leninist concept" which points to the party organization as representing the subjective element. (UL)In this regard her lack of interest in Marx would have found justification in Szabó's letter to Karl Kautsky (1904): "I think that it is necessary to establish the role of the individual in history," because "[historical] materialism explains only short passages of the development of society."[101] It followed that he opposed the fatalism of revisionist German Marxism which was content to await the "automatic" fulfilment of the objective laws of history (UL), its "a priori party truths" blocking "the free expression of different opinions." "For socialism one must not create soldiers [but] rebels, spontaneous fighters, who know why they are fighting," he wrote.[102] To this extent Duczynska would follow him, criticizing the Austrian SDP in 1934 for cloaking policy in "the magic mantle of historical necessity."[103] From another perspective, for György Lukács too the concept of "Ought" would

involve accepting that things do not change of their own accord, "but as a consequence of conscious choices."[104] However, though he declared that Szabó was "the only one of the Hungarian thinkers of my day to whom I am seriously indebted,"[105] Lukács would never have elevated the critically thinking individual over the Party.

The urgency of the need to renew the fabric of European culture that world war had torn asunder affected Szabó profoundly. But he was consumed by the sense of inadequacy that came from his inability to resolve to engage in action. Duczynska took Szabó's self-criticism to heart, though it meant setting aside his critical standards. During the next three years, action would become her watchword: anti-war street propaganda (for which she was jailed), membership of the Hungarian Communist Party, propaganda in Switzerland for the Hungarian Soviet republic, and work for the Comintern in Russia. Even had she read Szabó's last article "Culture and Civilization," she would still have ignored its recommendations which struck at the heart of her action project.

> Hence, those who know and proclaim the good, but want to realize it with means that are contrary to their moral convictions, are not truly cultured, and are not worthy of leadership. It is better to allow the bad to remain than to change it by immoral means.[106]

"Those whom the gods love die young," Duczynska wrote of Szabó, decades later. At least he was spared having to witness the Hungarian Republic's collapse and the quarter-century of clerical-conservative counter-revolution. Likewise the fatal consequences of the Austrian SDP's intellectual elite which, by showing itself "incapable of action," as Duczynska charged, thereby "paved the way to the abyss" of the Nazi years.[107] Yet if intellectuals could not unite knowing and doing, who else could? Members of the working class, was Duczynska's answer. Szabó's preference was for a directing "elite social formation," hers was "the working masses as a political force." The resolute workers whose resistance to fascism she described in her book on the February 1934 rising of the *Schutzbund*, proved, to her satisfaction at least, superior to their intellectual "betters" through being able both "to determine on and carry out a course of action."[108] The "spontaneous upsurge" in Vienna of working men who hitherto had known only how to obey, turned "the improbable into the real."[109] They demonstrated, in Duczynska's words, that the individual must be viewed as active subject rather than passive

object.[110] Through focusing on "close-ups" of turning points in the campaign, she sought to reveal how "the action of a single person may well determine which way the 'wheel of destiny' will roll."[111] But, of course, they regarded themselves as being within the workers movement. To that extent, Duczynska rejected Szabó's concept of an elite: "I very consciously turned against Ervin Szabó's world view, in that from first to last, it was directed towards individual action, which I viewed as no solution at all."

Back in the autumn of 1917, Duczynska's feelings were a mixture of awe and puzzlement. If she is to believed, she and her student activist group regarded their "master" Szabó, "this scholarly, strange saint of the revolution," as their "spiritual father,"[112] though "outwardly he lived a completely *petit bourgeois* life." (OM) Nevertheless, they were uneasy. Perhaps it was his illness: "He was very mild, and bore himself with a certain sadness," and in appearance he was "more haggard". (A) But it was his demeanour that most affected them most: "He was so aloof that there was no way to get to know him... he was not so much cold as very silent; a certain sadness never left him." She would later learn that even Samuel Klatschko had noted in him "the absence of some fundamental psychic quality," at least as far as his becoming a leader. (UL) It was this, she declared — with a degree of dramatic exaggeration characteristic of her in old age — that in political life caused him to go "from one defeat to another, from set-back to set-back. (UL) Szabó might have been predicting his own fate, when he wrote of Marx, "the full impact of his influence will be felt only in the future... [meanwhile, we have] the example of his heroic life." Duczynska adapted her master's words to stand for a final judgment on him: "A happy life is impossible; the most one can attain is a heroic life."[113] The last words she addressed to her master were sent from prison. During her trial for treason before a military tribunal, the defense counsel Gyula Mérő came over to Duczynska and the other defendants and asked whether a wreath in their name could be placed on Szabó's grave. (UL) It was determined that the wreath's ribbon would bear the inscription "From Ilona Duczynska and her comrades."

The assassination plan

When it was becoming clear that Ervin Szabó would not assist her to publicize the Zimmerwald Manifesto among factory workers, Duczynska

resorted to what must all along have been a fall-back plan, the assassination of prime minister István Tisza. It is a measure both of her isolation and the ties of affection between them that she confided in Ervin Szabó. It might have been thought that the scholarly theorist would have tried to dissuade her. And he did, though but half-heartedly. But that could have no effect now. She was no longer his disciple. "Existence was now weightless; time flowed smoothly," Duczynska felt. It was as though she had entered a new dimension of the Will. Indeed, she might not have been aware, when she started writing, of just how deep-seated this dimension was.

This second plan of Duczynska's probably began taking shape even before she left Zürich, when Katja Adler handed her a letter to smuggle into Vienna. At the prospect of meeting Adler, Duczynska remembered, "I was in seventh heaven!" (A) It was to be forwarded via her to her husband Friedrich Adler (1879-1960) who was awaiting trial for having shot the Austrian prime minister Count Karl Stürgkh. Apparently, the importance of Adler's act was widely understood including in Hungary where, according to Duczynska, "it suggested, so to say, quite naturally, the thought of a similar attempt against Tisza." (Gyöffy) The issue, in both cases, was the continuing war. Count Stürgkh had refused — having since March 1914 been governing Austria without summoning Parliament (under 'Article XIV' of the Constitution) — to reconvene it, to discuss the war and ways of ending it. It was this that provoked Friedrich Adler to assassinate him on October 21, 1916.

István Tisza (1861-1918) was a major Hungarian landowner for whom preservation of the hierarchical social order and its cultural values was a sacred mission.[114] As for supporting the war, even Friedrich Adler declared: "Tisza rules the Monarchy in fact, and Stürgkh is only a mere tool of Tisza who is Austria's dictator."[115] The mood in Hungary was one of desperation: to continue the war meant increased casualties, to end it would lead to the country's suppressed nationalities demanding independence. Michael Károlyi was moved to observe that "people went around as if their brains had been surgically removed."[116] It was in this environment that Duczynska could think only of ending the war. With Adler's action, she thought, "the first spark has been struck." (M) Now she determined to strike the regime at its heart.[117]

At a deeper level, Adler's act had a liberating effect upon Duczynska. It demonstrated what one person acting alone could achieve. By following suit, she may have thought, she would show that she did not

need Szabó's advice or the cooperation of workers' representatives. At yet another level, Duczynska's opting for a voluntaristic solution was expressive of the "identity problem" current among contemporary Hungarian intellectuals, for whom the choice seemed to be between inaction due to the supposedly unbridgeable barriers between human beings,[118] or revolutionary involvement as a means of creating a new sense of community. Not of course that Duczynska had time to think things through. She viewed Friedrich Adler's act as having been precipitated by a sense of "despair and hopelessness," similar to her own frustration at "the absence of any way out of isolation." In Austria the absence of a supportive anti-war movement,[119] she thought, had led to Adler's "self-sacrificing action." (OM & Beg) In Hungary too Duczynska felt herself "in truth to be fatally isolated." She rebelled against it. "I am not, I cannot be alone in this fatal isolation from the working classes!" she told herself.[120] But she was. Szabó's evasive theorizing confirmed it. Her state of mind at that time is re-captured in the otherwise incomprehensibly violent outburst that prefaces her "Early Morning."

> A single experience is enough to shape a human life. Our conclusion: attack with bare hands if necessary, with faith too attack the inhuman machine of an inhuman establishment — revolt and incite rebellion, to help society and life to become more human."

Ilona Duczynska was the only Hungarian woman ever to plan to assassinate a political figure, the only one also to be convicted of high treason. In a newspaper report of her trial, she was referred to — more truly than was then appreciated (for her assassination plan remained unknown) — as "the nihilist gentry girl." It was clear why. It called to mind those turn-of-the-century Russian social-revolutionary and anarchist women who had inherited the *Narodnik* mystique of heroism and self-sacrifice. Indeed, Duczynska actually claimed that it was "love for the heroes of *Narodnaya Volja* (The People's Will)" that caused her to follow Adler's example. (A) Hungary had developed nothing similar to the Russian movement probably because the Hungarian intelligentsia were of the upper and middle classes and looked towards the West rather than the people. Duczynska was only partly an exception. She consciously aligned herself with the Russian intelligentsia and its revolutionary tradition solely in order to legitimize projected acts violence, not because she sympathized with its Byzantine-Slavonic background, and even less because she

"came from the people and went back 'into the people.'"[121] Her fascination with its radical culture had begun through reading and continued in Zürich where she got to know working-class Russians, having lodged with two such families in each of which there was a girl around her age.

The two-day trial of Friedrich Adler began on May 18th and received considerable coverage in the Hungarian press, including the accused's impassioned speech in his own defence. This determined Duczynska's timing: "The dramatic impetus... was perhaps exceptional, scarcely more than a day being taken to decide upon it," she explained. (M) Yet the plan had been maturing for at least two weeks. By early May for Duczynska "the Question", as she put it, was not *whether* but *how* to assassinate the prime minister.[122] It may by then have become almost the sole topic of conversation with Szabó. She was even encouraged: "I saw in Ervin Szabó's world view a major place for individual action as 'a road leading ahead'," Duczynska explained. However, pangs of conscience were only partly allayed by Adler's description of his act as the moral equivalent of war: "I am no more guilty of murder than the military officer who kills or orders others to kill in time of war."[123] For as the clock ticked down, Duczynska admitted to feeling troubled. "I atoned for it in advance: with agony, doubts, thirst for life, and sense of guilt," she explains, "because all humans are brothers and sisters, and to kill one of them is always fratricide." (K)

Providentially, as she would regard it, Duczynska came upon a suitable weapon: a Browning automatic pistol with cartridges stowed away at the back of a drawer in József Madzsar's writing desk. Surprisingly, she claims that she already knew how to "handle" a pistol — indeed, that she had possessed one of the same make in Zürich where she practiced shooting "with some success." (UL) That she at once matter-of-factly pocketed it, and thereafter carried it around with her, suggests that she had been thinking of emulating Adler's action from the beginning.[124] The weapon's comforting weight, she said, helped to strengthen her resolve. On May 6th, the first Sunday when she met with Szabó in the Farkasrét cemetery,[125] she spoke frankly of her plan. She had expected him to object. But to her surprise, "basically, he was not against it." Apparently, the reason was — as she puts it in an oddly flowery passage — that he regarded her as motivated by "purity of heart, sacred conviction, and sacrifice." (UL) — Still, his qualified approval hardly justified the curious story, circulated in Budapest shortly after Duczynska's death, with romantic embellishments, to the effect that she acquired the pistol

directly from "the pale, scholarly" Szabó, who, "with his slim hands" actually taught her how to use it![126] — Perhaps Szabó's grudging acquiescence logically followed from his condemnation of Tisza (in the *Népszava* just a few days before) as the greatest obstacle to peace, "a serious danger to suffering, bleeding humanity."[127] On the following Sunday, the 13th, meeting at the same hour (11 am), they continued the discussion, in daily expectation of news of the Adler Trial. By the time of their final meeting, on the 20th, the trial had ended with Adler being condemned to death. (UL) As they paced between the graves, Szabó again voiced feeble objections — "not that he was against it on principle," Duczynska observes — though with little conviction, concluding lamely, "it isn't right." (UL) All to no avail. "I had already made up my mind," Duczynska concludes. (S&S)

Master and disciple no more, the two friends (or perhaps something more) met again on Monday, probably in some side-street as of old. Certainly they met on Tuesday when it was decided that Duczynska would execute her plan the following day. On the morning of Wednesday the 23rd, Duczynska took the unheard-of step of visiting Ervin Szabó — to say farewell, of course — at his library on Károlyi Street. For the last time he argued with her, saying "it was all wrong", even protesting that "he ought to be the one to do it." But Duczynska's mind was made up — "It was somehow predestined," she felt. (Tisza). By the time she left, they had agreed that her act was both sensible and necessary.[128]

After leaving the Municipal Library, there were still more than two hours remaining. So Duczynska decided to pass the time in the Galilei Circle's premises which were on her route.[129] It was with an odd feeling of security that she sank down into a chair, lulled, as she put it, by the familiar buzz of student voices. She again went over her plan of action. Duczynska had established Tisza's daily routine of leaving Parliament at the same hour in the early afternoon, and driving straight to his Andrássy út residence. It would be at the moment when he descended from his carriage, she decided, that she would take out the pistol from her handbag, and fire. That was the plan she was going over in her mind. But suddenly the door from the street was flung open. There stood Simon Darvas (she would never forget the name), a newspaper in his hand. "Listen everyone," he shouted, "Tisza has resigned." So history had outrun the plans of a mere individual... On May 22, 1917 King Charles IV, who succeeded Francis Joseph the previous November, had revived the Austrian constitution and, favouring peace initiatives, had now

dismissed Tisza whose Cabinet resigned the next day.[130] Duczynska sat, stupefied; she was one of the last to leave the Circle's premises.

Towards collective action

After wandering the streets, it was early evening by the time Duczynska arrived at the house where her Budapest adventure had begun. She still had a key to the Madzsars' apartment. No one was at home. She replaced the pistol in József Madzsar's desk-drawer, then lay down exhausted on the familiar sofa. She slept, until awoken by the sound of voices, Szabó's among them. She got to her feet and joined the familiar trio in the next room. Then after a few minutes, the Madzsars left the room. Duczynska was the first to speak: "What did you think, when you heard the news?" Szabó answered in a low voice: "I felt sorry for you." (UL) He confirmed the significance of the day's events. The target no longer existed. Tisza lived — but no more as "the vulnerable, destroyable symbol" of the war. He had retreated within the collectivity of the political regime for which it would be war as usual. It would no longer be possible to hold a lone individual accountable. By the same token, any future oppositional action would have to be undertaken also not by a single individual, but an organization. That is what Duczynska wrote later. At that time, though, Szabó seemed to have had nothing more to say. She took her leave, and returned to her room. There she pondered her future — just as her intended victim was doing. For Duczynska, of course, there would be options. Tisza would have none. "It had to be this way", he murmured, when a group of ex-soldiers shot him in his villa on October 31, 1918.[131]

With the arrival of summer imminent, the Galilei Circle would soon be closing down. Anyway, Budapest held nothing for Duczynska now. Ervin Szabó had no parting advice, other than that she should translate Emile Vanderwelde's *Le collectivisme*. She would never bring herself to open the book. Yet the title was suggestive of Duczynska's next step on returning to Budapest in September. She was leaving the city "under the sign of miscarried individual action"; when she returned, it would be with the conviction that only collective action could be effective. She boarded a train, "like a whipped dog." The reason Duczynska left Pest so suddenly was because she no interest in staying to observe the political consequences of the change in the government. As a young dissident author who knew her at the end, wrote: "The romantic revolu-

tionary instinctively feared the possible success of political reforms."[132] "I shall have to think everything over again," were her last thoughts as the outskirts of Pest were left behind. Duczynska had no money, and nowhere to go other than to the family who now seemed strangers to her. She duly arrived at the western city of Szombathely, capital of Vas County, where her uncle was lieutenant governor. After a day or so, sickened by the official ritual, patriotism and glorification of the war, Duczynska escaped to her mother's old family home, the Eden of her childhood, "the castle" (as it was called) of Zsennye. She could not then have known that who (or what) she later called the "great director" had reserved for her a leading role in the all-important second act of the drama of Hungary's anti-war movement.[133]

Future of the myth of violence

The second act would begin in September and end five months later. Thereafter the drama of Duczynska's lifetime political engagement would continue in different forms within the wider framework of the twentieth century's ideological conflict. During that time, conviction as to the legitimacy of assassination remained deeply embedded in her consciousness. Later, she would become aware of the process of re-emergence: "If a person still preserves the spark within... in a moment, in an act of protest, in the twinkling of an eye it flames up again." (UL) Thus, while in 1917 she had been prepared to kill in order to bring an end to the state-sponsored violence of the war — in the 1970s she seemed to have come to regard acts of terrorism as legitimate means of opposing the 'social' violence of the liberal capitalist order. She was attracted to anti-colonialist and national liberation movements (in which she saw Che Guevara as a key figure), the Student Revolts of the late 1960s in the West, and eventually and more ominously to the West German terrorist movement.

It was against this background that Duczynska committed to paper an account of her plan to assassinate István Tisza — for which, of course, she is the sole source. Furthermore, she chose to present it in the form of an encounter with Ervin Szabó (who left no reference to it in his papers). This way, she could portray her assassination plan as having the approval of the nation's most respected socialist thinker. Her timing may even suggest that Duczynska may have hoped that her revelation might

encourage young Hungarian dissidents to follow her example — despite there having been no assassinations (apart from those instituted by the state) in the totalitarian societies of 'existing socialism'.

Perhaps, though for reasons beyond her control, Duczynska was not fully consistent in her story. Thus, having written down what must be regarded as her authorized version of events, she may also have told György Konrád something different. Perhaps the discrepancy resulted from the pain of disappointed desire. Thus she told Konrád what she would have liked to have happened: to have confronted Tisza face to face. Or better still, as she fantasized at the time, to have killed him. Of course, the historical record shows that she didn't. Yet a few hours later on that fateful day, in a waking dream, trauma collapsed into fantasy, in which she watched herself fire the fatal shot.

She herself described, at the time, how she had been affected physically and mentally by spiritual strain in anticipation of guilt. She began to be aware of it while trying to relax in the Circle's meeting room. Then the sudden shout. The realization that Tisza had resigned caused her to lose control. Random thoughts passed through her mind. "My hands were lying on the arm of the chair like strange, sleeping animals.... The body had been abandoned, spirit and will had deserted it." "Previously, nothing else had been on my mind... now existence was weightless." Having steeled herself for self-sacrifice, now she felt rejected. It was as if sentence had been passed on her: "Sacrifice declined." (UL)

She followed the students out into the street — she wandered about. She entered a restaurant, and things became clearer. She sat at a table. She did not touch the food set before her. She could think only of one thing — what she had *intended* should happen! Idly, she looked about her. Her gaze fell on a middle-aged man sitting at the next table. The image of István Tisza.... Trauma gave way to fantasy.

> Now, in your mind, you cock the Browning that's still in your pocket; in your mind, suddenly take it out, you take quick aim at the nape of his neck, and fire.... He gives a shudder — his body really does, it really does; there's fear in his eyes, sweat on his brow. People go on eating — surprised, embarrassed.

She had not forgotten. That was how Friedrich Adler had shot Count Stürgkh while he was lunching at his usual table in his usual restaurant in Vienna.

The next thing Duczynska knew, she was fumbling with the key in front of the Madzsars' apartment. There was desultory talk. After a while she left. The last thing she remembered was Szabó's: "I felt sorry for you..." (UL) What did he mean? That he'd never expected her to shoot? That he foresaw how disappointed she would be? But why disappointed? Perhaps he was remembering how during the past month she had revealed her ignorance. Had she been reduced to having to shoot someone, simply to prove that she could act, and that her action could equal — or surpass — his theorizing? Szabó seemed to consider her incapable of anything more than translating a monograph from the French. Or had he intended it as therapy, having sensed that she was on the brink of breakdown? Something had broken. Failure had left her with nothing. The ground gave way beneath her feet. "I was like someone falling down a bottomless abyss in a dream," she wrote in "Bitter May".

That dream state she was in was one of partial consciousness. It was certainly not the type of dream that she — in an oddly conventional reference — thought Lenin would approve of.[134] For weeks she had been removed from life, people (other than Szabó), and possibility. She had shut herself off from the wider world of politics in order to focus on her dream of 'action'. It hadn't mattered to her that hers would have been a copy-cat crime. She had tried to follow in the footsteps of the Russian women students of *Narodnaya Volya*, and of course Friedrich Adler's. Basically, they were her mentors — not him whom she called her "master". Hers was a dream of violence as solution for the world's ills. One from which she would never fully awaken. Adler received a pardon, and resumed a 'normal' life in the service of his country. Duczynska had no desire for such a life; what was normal for her was lifelong struggle against the type of society both she and her husband categorically rejected. As things worked out, she would be restricted to typically 'radical women's work' — as courier, secretary, editor, writer and translator. Also marriage would make increasing demands on her time and energy. Only after Polanyi's death in 1964 did she begin writing sections of what might have been a somewhat more ambitious autobiography.

Her decision to write of her assassination plan may not have been unconnected with developments in the world at large. In the context of the Cold War, 'unofficial' conflicts of varying dimensions proliferated all the way down to self-defining violent 'political' acts on the part of individuals. The turn-of-the-century tradition of assassination of high state officials had degenerated into the new terrorism of indiscriminate acts of

murder and destruction. The former 'cause' of revolutionary activism was becoming a species of 'performance art' for the alienated. Duczynska seems to have decided to descend from the real world of apparently fruitless political activism into the dream realm of violence — again.

As had been the case in 1917, she would be inspired by the deeds of others in other places. This time it was another shooting in Central Europe by "the most important woman in German politics since Rosa Luxemburg," Ulrike Meinhof (1934-76).[135] Even prior to that, though, Duczynska was becoming interested in the wider issues of terrorist violence, as shown by her collection of relevant books and articles. To Isabelle Ackerl with whom Duczynska recorded in Vienna her most detailed account of her life (1976) she declined to speak of her 1917 assassination plan: "I am at the moment writing about it so I would sooner not talk about it." (Ackerl) She had already published a short account in 1968, one which she expanded in 1978.[136] Furthermore, she had gone about obtaining photocopies of contemporary Hungarian newspaper reports of the 1917 Adler Trial, suggesting that she was intending to write at some length also on that subject.[137] Then, at eighty-one, she summoned up her last reserves of energy in the cause of a young West German. To her mind, often romantic, never sentimental, Peter-Paul Zahl (1944-) had all the right stereotypical anti-bourgeois qualifications — young (with obligatory long hair, beard and dark glasses), poet, worker, communist, in addition to being prepared to use violence against the 'capitalist order'.[138] Convinced that he was the victim of great injustice done by the 'fascist' authorities through having his jail sentence extended — he had been sentenced for shooting a policeman — Duczynska entered into correspondence with him, and was preparing to go to considerable lengths, to the dismay of family and friends, to obtain his release by means apparently not excluding bribery. Thereupon "the great director", as Duczynska had called him, decided to ring down the final curtain.

A significant clue as to the nature of the mainspring driving Ilona Duczynska is to be found among her notes. There are four typewritten pages based on Hans-Magnus Enzensberger's article, "Dreamers of the Absolute,"[139] a study of the second generation of Russian terrorists of 1904-5. For such as them, he wrote, political commitment was all the more personally attractive because it represented empowerment of the individual, for whom action became "liberation in and of itself." Action, a blow struck in the struggle, was personally fulfilling, and thus was itself

fulfilment. Such had always been Ilona Duczynska's dream. "'Utopia?' So what? To live without utopia?"[140] That had always been her goal.

NOTES

[1] Comment made to the present writer in 1969.

[2] Ilona Duczynska (1897-1978) was born in Maria Enzersdorf, just outside Vienna, of mixed parentage. Her father, Alfred von Duczynski (born in Lemberg, Austrian Galicia) [today's L'viv, Ukraine] was of a noble Polish family; her Hungarian mother Helene Békássy was of an eminent gentry family resident at Zsennye (near Rum, Vas County), where by 1917 one of her brothers was lord lieutenant of the county (*főispán*). A naturalized British citizen since 1940, Duczynska entered Canada in 1950 as a landed immigrant and resided (while making frequent lengthy stays in Vienna and Hungary) at "Skunks Hollow", Rosebank, near Pickering (Ontario) for the last third of her life.

[3] György Litván, "A forradalmak vándora. Duczynska Ilona 1897-1978" [The Wanderer through Revolutions] in *Világosság havilap*, Budapest, 22 June 1978.

[4] Duczynska's autobiographical articles have been used in the preparation of this article. References in the text (in parentheses) are made to the following articles by their initial letters or abbreviated form. The most significant (though it breaks off in April 1917) is "Korán reggel" (Early Morning. Chapters of an Autobiography), pp. 6-25 in *Új Irás* (New Writing), Budapest, March 1973, with an Introduction by József Lengyel (hereafter EM). There are relevant unpublished articles (in typescript) that contain references to 1917: "The First Step" (Zürich) in German (S); also in Hungarian: "A Kind of Start" (Start), "Bitter May" (BM), and "Spring and Summer" (SS). There is an early less complete version of events in "Duczynska Ilona feljegyzései as 1918-as januári sztrájk előzményeiröl" (Ilona Duczynska's record of the events leading up to the anti-war strike of January 1918), *Történelmi Szemle* (Historical Review) (JS). The Historical Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Nos. 1-2, Budapest, 1958. There are relevant parts of the interview "Beszélgetés Duczynska Ilonával" (Conversation with Ilona Duczynska), Magyar Television, 24-26 April 1974; text printed in *Valoság*, 74/7, 50-60 (Conv.). There are also some useful passages in the short "Beszélgetés..." (Conversation with Sándor Györffy and others) (typescript, in Hungarian) Budapest, March 15, 1975 (Gyöffy). Essential are the interviews: (1) with György Konrád (in Hungarian), 1975, in the 0SzK (National Library of Hungary, Archives) Budapest (K), and (2) with Isabelle Ackerl (in German) 1976, in the Karl Polanyi Archive, Concordia University, Montreal (A). For Ervin Szabó, see Duczynska's impotant articles: "Mesterünk, Szabó Ervin" (Ervin Szabó, Our Master, on the Fiftieth Anniversary of his death), *Kortárs* (Contemporary), Budapest, October 1968, 8, pp. 1619-26 (OM), and "A cselek-

vés boldogtalan szerelmese" (The Unhappy Lover of Action) *Valóság* (Reality), 5, May 1978, pp. 8-19 (UL).

[5] E. J. Hobsbawm, "Introduction," pp. 15-26, in Ilona Duczynska, *Workers in Arms. The Austrian Schutzbund and the Civil War of 1934* (New York & London: Monthly Review Press, 1978), 26. This is an abridged version of *Der demokratischer Bolschewik* (Munich: Peter List Verlag, 1975). A somewhat modified Hungarian edition also appeared: *Bécs — 1934 — Schutzbund* (Budapest: Magvető, 1976).

[6] Georg Lukács. *Record of a Life. An Autobiographical Sketch.* Edited by István Eörsi. Translated by Rodney Livingstone (London: Verso Editions, 1983). On page 48 Lukács cites the phrase from Fichte's writings, interpreting it to mean that Europe in 1914 had "collapsed", and, further, (49) that "Lenin inferred from it" "the need to change the whole of society from bottom to top."

[7] The First International Socialist Conference at Zimmerwald was held on September 5-8, 1915, at which time the International Socialist Committee was elected. On April 24-30, 1916, the Second Zimmerwald Conference was held at Kienthal, and a Manifesto was issued.

[8] The date is established in Duczynska's interview with György Konrád. Cf. Rudolf L. Tőkés, *Béla Kun and the Hungarian Soviet Republic. The Origins and Role of the Communist Party of Hungary in the Revolutions of 1918-1919* (New York: Praeger, 1967). The author mistakenly alleges (p. 33) that initiatives taken by radical Budapest students in the fall of 1917, "coincided with Ilona Duczynska's return from Switzerland" ("return," because he is under the impression that Duczynska's family had always lived in Hungary).

[9] Actually, ignorance has worked the other way, for Hungarians continue to be confused regarding her origins and activities. See the letter from Ilona Duczynska to The Editor, *The New Statesman* (London), March 1949, in which she complains that "An anonymous correspondent in *East Europe*," almost certainly Hungarian, had alleged, "This lady is Russian... her parents, both of them Jewish, fled to Hungary from Russian pogroms in 1906." Tőkés, *Béla Kun*, p. 32 wrongly identifies Duczynska as a descendant of a Polish nobleman who had settled in Hungary after the Galician peasant riots of 1846. Also see Georg Lukács *Record of a Life* where the editor (presumably) István Eörsi states that she was a Hungarian journalist and founder member of the student Galilei Circle (i.e., at the age of eleven!); he gives her dates as 1896-1980, instead of 1897-1978.

[10] Andrew C. Janos, *The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary 1825-1945* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1982), 170-73.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 157.

[12] Péter Hanák, *The Garden and the Workshop. Essays on the Cultural History of Vienna and Budapest* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 80.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 169.

[14] Michael Löwy, *Georg Lukács — From Romanticism to Bolshevism*, translated by Patrick Camiller (London: New Left Books, 1979), 92. Unlike

Nyugat [West] and *Huszadik Század* [Twentieth Century], the poet Endre Ady (1877-1919) rejected both the old feudal Hungary and western bourgeois 'progress'.

[15] "Endre Ady especially had a huge impact... I grew up with him from the age of 12 or 13. Apart from the great Russian writers, Ady had the greatest influence on me." (Györffy)

[16] John Lukacs, *Budapest 1900. A Historical Portrait of a City and its Culture* (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1988), 165, quoting Zsigmond Móricz: "No one will ever be able to measure his impact on the entire youth of our time... where his words fell, the seeds of new powers were cast in the souls of men."

[17] Georg Lukács. *Record of a Life*, pp. 39f; "Gelebtes Denken," p. 146.

[18] Erzsébet Vezér, "Ilona Duczynska, An Obituary," *The Hungarian News*, May 20, 1978.

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] Gábor Vermes, *István Tisza: the liberal vision and conservative statecraft of a Magyar nationalist* (New York: Columbia U.P., 1985), 155-59.

[21] Ady's epithet occurs in Ady's *New Poems*. See Vermes, *István Tisza*, p. 165.

[22] Georg Lukács, *Record of a Life*, 38. Lukács refers to Ady's poem "Ugocsa non coronat". Ugocsa was a small county in Eastern Hungary which refused to support the monarch during the election of the first Habsburg king, and remained a symbol of courageous protest.

[23] Hanák, *The Garden and the Workshop*, pp. 118-120.

[24] Georg Lukács, *Record of a Life*. "Interview with *The New Left Review*," p. 181. "My earliest political influences were reading Marx as a schoolboy, and then — most important of all... Ady." English critics named Lengyel "the Hungarian Solzhenitsyn" because he wrote of his experiences in Soviet prison camps in Siberia. Duczynska translated almost all his novels and short stories.

[25] Also see György Dalos, *A Cselekvés Szerelmese. Duczynska Ilona élete* [The Lover of Action. The Life of Ilona Duczynska] (Budapest: Kossuth könyvkiadó, 1984), 160-61, for a skeptical view typical of the younger generation.

[26] From the opening sentence of József Lengyel's second novel on 1919 *Prenn Ferenc hányatott élete*, translated by Ilona Duczynska as *Prenn Drifting* (London: Peter Owen, 1966).

[27]Trade union membership grew as follows: 1916 (55,338), 1917 (215,222), 1918 (721,437), 1919 April-May (one million), 1919 June (1,420,000).

[28] Janos, *The Politics of Backwardness*, pp. 151-57.

[29] Hanák, *The Garden and the Workshop*, p. 19.

[30] Lukacs, *Budapest 1900*, p. 24.

[31] She did not respond to Konrád's question as to whether Alice had a well-developed body for a woman (though photographs show her as far from petite).

[32] She certainly had not brought with her "a set of antiwar leaflets" (as Tőkés alleged, in Béla Kun, p. 33).

[33] György Litván, *Szabó Ervin, a Szocializmus moralistája* (Budapest: Századvég, 1993), 220.

[34] Zoltán Rónai (1880-1940), lawyer and Social Democrat. Commissar of Justice under the Soviet Republic. Went into exile in 1919.

[35] Litván, *Szabó Ervin*, p. 220.

[36] In Budapest there were 21 daily newspapers, and in the country as a whole 24 regular socialist publications. *Népszava* had a circulation of 25,000.

[37] József Galántai, *Hungary in the First World War* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1989), 65.

[38] Jakab Weltner (1873-1936). Cabinet-maker, Social Democratic Party leader, journalist, editor, author of *Forradalom, Bolsevizmus, Emigráció* [Revolution, Bolshevism, and Emigration] (Budapest: Weltner, 1929).

[39] When responding to Ackerl's enquiry, Duczynska confesses that she cannot think of any particular reason why Szabó hated the party "bureaucrats," for "he honoured and genuinely liked" Kunfi, Rónai, and Jenő Varga. Thus, it came back to principle. Duczynska's considered opinion was that Szabó would not have felt differently towards the representatives of *any* party.

[40] In 1918 "The SDP and trade union bureaucracy, in a life and death alliance with the power of the state, represented a more direct danger for an antiwar workers movement than the ill-informed agencies of the police". (OM)

[41] Obituary on the occasion of the death of Ervin Szabó by Zsigmond Kunfi, "Ervin Szabó," *Népszava*, xlvi, 229, October 1, 1918.

[42] Janos, *The Politics of Backwardness*, p. 186. Also, Bennett Kovrig, *Communism in Hungary. From Kun to Kádár* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), 12.

[43] Janos, *The Politics of Backwardness*, p. 176. Szabó resigned from the party in March 1918. (UL)

[44] *Socialism and Social Science. Selected Writings of Ervin Szabó (1877-1918)*, edited by György Litván and János M. Bak (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), 106-120.

[45] *Rosa Luxemburg Speaks*, edited by Mary-Alice Waters (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1970), 423.

[46] Letter to E. Szabó (Oct. 23, 1904). See Mary Gluck, *Georg Lukacs and his Generation 1900-1918* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 102.

[47] Michael Károlyi, *Fighting the World: The Struggle for Peace* (London: Kegan Paul, 1924), 121-24.

[48] Dezső Bokányi (1871-1940). Chairman of the Stonemasons' and Building Workers' Union. Member of the central committee of the HSDP, 1894-1919; celebrated orator of the party. Hungarian Soviet Republic: People's Commissar for Labour and Welfare; member of the presidium of the Budapest Workers' Council; commander of the third division of the Hungarian Red Army.

Was arrested in 1919, tried in 1920, and sentenced to death; was exchanged to the Soviet Union in 1922. Became a victim of Stalin's purges.

[49] Vilmos Böhm (1880-1949). Secretary of the Metal Workers' Union. Member of the central executive committee of the HSDP, 1904(?)-1919. Hungarian Soviet Republic: People's Commissar for Socialization, People's Commissar for Defense. Hungarian representative in Vienna, June 24-August 1, 1919. In exile, 1919-1945. Vilmos Böhm, *Két Forradalom Tüzében* [In the Crossfire of Two Revolutions], (Vienna: Bécsi Magyar Kiadó, 1923).

[50] Zsigmond Kunfi (1879-1927). Professor, theorist, journalist, editor of Szocializmus the socialist theoretical monthly, deputy editor of *Népszava* (People's Voice) the socialist daily. Minister of Welfare in the liberal Károlyi government. Chief socialist negotiator with the arrested communists. Hungarian Soviet Republic: People's Commissar of Public Education. Resigned after the Congress of Soviets in June, 1919. Leader of the *Világosság* group ("Two and One-half Internationale" –oriented socialists) and editor of the Viennese daily *Arbeiter Zeitung* (Workers Paper) 1919-1927. Committed suicide in 1927.

[51] In OM, she quotes from "How to Modify the Party Statutes?" (in Erényi, *Selected Documents...*, vol. 3, pp. 263-64) where Szabó criticizes "a party which has adopted for its internal use principles of military organization [...] Not soldiers, but insurgents and other voluntary fighters should be trained for socialism — men who know *why* they are fighting the way they are fighting.... Let us never forget that socialism must be a society of free men. Will those who have fought for their freedom under military orders be able to live with that freedom?"

[52] It is impossible to verify her membership (perhaps because her name was removed from the records following her 1922 expulsion).

[53] "Zum Zerfall der K.P.U." (Notes on the Disintegration of the Communist Party of Hungary), *Unser Weg* (Our Way), Hg. Paul Levy, 4, 1, Heft 5 (Berlin: March 1922). "Incidentally, I fully identify with it to this day." (Duczynska's letter to Michael Löwy, January 31, 1974.)

[54] This is how she describes it. (A) Of course by that time she was close to Karl Polanyi, because many of his views were then, she considered, very pro-socialist, and he argued with the communists – as to which, in a remarkable passage, Duczynska states, "ultimately everything always returns to this old democracy."

[55] After June 1934, she writes, whenever the *Schutzbund* and the trade unions came in touch with the Communist Party, "they imprinted on it their mass movement traits, with their deep democratic traditions and their autonomy." (*Workers in Arms*, p. 221)

[56] "Following the gruesome tragedy of Stalinism and the hesitant and contradictory return to sanity that followed it, the communist movement no longer possesses a 'center', a 'great model.'" (*Workers in Arms*, p. 246). She was encouraged by "present-day efforts at renewal, self-assurance, and autonomy within the wide political and intellectual reaches of Soviet imperialism." (*Ibid.*, p. 12).

[57] Ilona Duczynska Polanyi, "I First Met Karl Polanyi in 1920," in *Karl Polanyi in Vienna. The Contemporary Significance of the Great Transformation*, ed. Kenneth McRobbie and Kari Polanyi Levitt (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2nd edition 2006), 302-15. For an introduction see Oscar Jaszi's article "Ervin Szabó," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 14, p. 501.

[58] "Szabó Ervin sirjánál", *Vilag*, 3 October 1918, pp. 6-7.

[59] Kovrig, *Communism in Hungary*, p. 14. The best source still remains Márta Tömöri, *Új vizeken járok. A Galilei Kör története* [A History of the Galileo Circle] (Budapest: Gondolat, 1960).

[60] One was a radical student group interested in the new works of European syndicalist authors which Ervin Szabó had introduced into Hungary combining Marxist socio-economic principles with self-governing councils directly involving the masses. Another, smaller group contained future communists who favoured the "Russian model", one of whose leaders Julius Alpári would lecture to radical students in the Galilei Circle.

[61] Gluck, *Georg Lukacs*, pp. 104-5 for Jaszi's statement in "The Radical Party," June 7, 1914, *Világ*.

[62] Lukacs, *Budapest 1900*, p. 201.

[63] Hanák, *The Garden and the Workshop*, p. 146.

[64] Lukács, *Record of a Life*, p. 64.

[65] The HSDP decided to ally with Count Mihály Károlyi's parliamentary opposition and Oszkár Jászi's extra-parliamentary Radical Bourgeois Party. These three groups (with three other small parties) formed the core of the Intra-party Bloc for Electoral Reform and peace — within the framework of the Monarchy — in June 1917 (Tőkés, *Béla Kun*, p. 29).

[66] Jászi and other Radicals joined a world peace movement; Jakab Weltner, Manó Buchinger, and four other leading members of the party executive participated in an international socialist conference in Stockholm in the summer of 1917; Zsigmond Kunfi formed a peace Committee of Freemasons, and established contacts with several Western European and Swiss grand lodges.

[67] For one of the founder's accounts, see Gyula Hevesi, *Egy Mérnök a Forradalomban* [An Engineer in the Revolution] (Budapest: Europa, 1959).

[68] József Legyel, *Visegrádi Utca* [Visegrád Street], 4th ed., (Budapest: Gondolat, 1962), 53-54.

[69] Galántai, *Hungary in the First World War*, p. 169. The chief of police reported on December 8: "I have the party activities constantly watched, but have not observed so far that the decisions the party took after the Zimmerwald conference would be more revolutionary in character than before or that the party would have taken any initiative."

[70] *Ibid.*, p. 170. *Népszava* did not even mention it, though *Világ*, the Bourgeois Radicals' paper, reported it in May 1916.

[71] Galántai, *Hungary in the First World War*, p. 235.

[72] Tőkés, *Béla Kun*, p. 28 note 11 for "Report of Deputy Chief Inspector of Police Heténvi concerning antimilitarist Propaganda in the HSDP, May 15, 1916."

[73] Manó Buchinger, *Küzdelem a Szocializmusért: Emlékek és Elmények* [Struggle for Socialism: Memoirs and Impressions] (Budapest: Népszava, 1947).

[74] Galántai, *Hungary in the First World War*, p. 237.

[75] The fact that Duczynska was writing in 1958 for publication in the Hungary of 'existing socialism' may explain her apparent agreement with the ideologist József Révai's criticism of Szabó for not having taken a pronounced anti-war stand. "Ervin Szabó was absent from Zimmerwald, and he was not there at Kienthal, and among his writings there is no trace of his having taken a position on these international conferences of revolutionary socialism, in which during the 1914-18 world war there occurred the break, not only with the left wing but with the Kautsky-oriented entire left." (OM)

[76] Janos, *The Politics of Backwardness*, p. 160; Galántai, *Hungary in the First World War*, p. 243, note 136; István Déak, "The Decline and Fall of Habsburg Hungary, 1914-18," in *Hungary in Revolution, 1918-19. Nine Essays*, ed. Iván Völgyes (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971), 10-30 (p. 26).

[77] Litván, *Szabó Ervin*, p. 220 says that they walked "under the old chestnut trees of the Németvölgyi Cemetery."

[78] Lee Congdon, *The Young Lukács* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 19.

[79] First, in terms of physical resemblance; second, through their shared interest in the works of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. "In retrospect, it seems that Szabó's life was defined at least as much by the questions of Zarathustra as by the answers of scientific socialism." György Litván, "A Moralist Revolutionary's Dilemma: In Memory of Ervin Szabó," *Radical History Review* 24 (Fall 1980): 77-90; p. 80.

[80] Speaking for her group, she grants: "We loved him... no matter what remained mysterious about him." In answer to the question (in German) "Did you love him?" she replies enthusiastically: "Yes, yes. Of course, he was a person whom one could not fathom. Yes, certainly I loved him." (Ack). Speaking in Hungarian, Duczynska admits to having felt boundless love for Szabó: "Igen, én határozottan szerettem." (K).

[81] Szabó's personality, according to Duczynska, exuded an "enthusiasm suffused with love", resembling "black bryony (Tamus communis)". The word she uses, "folyondár" may be translated as "a twining-plant, liana, convolvulus, clematis, hell-weed."

[82] Litván, *Szabó Ervin*, p. 220.

[83] Actually, Szabó was forty-one when he died. Something of this 1960s hippie-like obsession with age caused Duczynska's group to regard József Nagy, a worker who joined the Galilei Circle, as being "at least forty," though police records showed him to be "only twenty-eight."

[84] *Társadalmi Forradalom* (Social Revolution), Journal of the Revolutionary Socialists, V, 1-2, Budapest, February 25, 1911.

[85] Obviously, she liked this image, and used it repeatedly in K, UL, and in OM (where she had first applied it to September).

[86] Kari Polanyi Levitt, letter to K.McR., July 13(?), 1998, "Ilona loved conspiracy. She had very many friends, from different walks of life, and different political views, etc., but she set a pattern of one to one relations with each of them separately, like she was in the centre of a circle, linked exclusively to each and every one of these people. They were rarely brought together; most did not know each other."

[87] Congdon, *The Young Lukács*, pp. 8-9. According to Lukács, Szabó had rejected it after 1902-03 when he turned towards the French and Italian syndicalists.

[88] Karl Marx, "Fictitious Splits in the International," in *On the First International*, ed., Saul Padover (New York, 1973), 222, quoted in *Socialism and Social Science. Selected Writings of Ervin Szabó (1877-1918)*, ed. György Litván and János M. Bak (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), 89, see also pp. 89-91. "All socialists see anarchy as the following programme. Once the aim of the proletarian movement, i.e., abolition of classes, is attained, the power of the state, which serves to keep the great majority of producers in bondage, to a very small exploiter minority, disappears, and the functions of government become simple administrative functions."

[89] Franz Borkenau refers here to Lenin's *State and Revolution* (1917) and adds "The Bolshevik revolution was the fulfillment of the dreams of international anarchism." Borkenau, *World Communism. A History of the Communist International* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1971), 168.

[90] Szabó's Syndicalism combined elements from Marx (with his emphasis on the economic basis of society and the necessity of revolutionary consciousness), Proudhon (distrust of the state, and emphasis on freedom), and Bakunin (a belief in violence).

[91] Litván and Bak, *Selected Writings of Ervin Szabó*, p. 13.

[92] Borkenau, *World Communism*, p. 109 also asks the question, relevant in the case of Duczynska's assassination attempt, "Why did Hungary develop nothing similar to *Narodnaya Volya* and still less anything like Lenin's party?"

[93] Duczynska, *Workers in Arms*, p. 246.

[94] What is to be done? he wrote in 1913, "with the questions which I ask ten times, twenty times, with no result than that finally I can say to myself: What is all this for? Have deeds ever come out of words? How shall I know if what I write is true? Where can my words give proof of their truth?" (Quoted in UL)

[95] See Szabó's "Freihandel und Imperialismus. Vortrag in der Szoziologischen Gesellschaft in Graz" (Graz-Leipsig, 1918), in Litván and Bak, *Selected Writings of Ervin Szabó*, pp. 9, 11.

[96] She adds, rather unnecessarily, "nor as head of state, either."

[97] Béla Kun's Soviet government, in the editors' phrase (*Selected Writings*, p. 17), made him one of its "saints", and placed his bust next to those of Marx and Engels at the May Day parade of 1919, named the Municipal Library after him, and planned to issue an edition of his works.

[98] See UL. But Duczynska is quoting the recollection of the aged Valeria Dienes as to what Szabó read out to her from an article. Dienes also claims that Szabó "cried out bitterly: 'I was not born to write books, I was born for action!'"

[99] Duczynska notes Szabó's biographer on this: "Ervin Szabó was the first to identify the dilemma of being 'a scholar or an activist', which... he [was not] able to solve...." Litván observes that, in Szabó, a scholar's capacity to doubt, and a revolutionary's obsession with praxis "paralyzed each other, and in the end Szabó himself." See Litván and Bak, *Selected Writings of Ervin Szabó*. p. 1; Litván, "A Moralist Revolutionary's Dilemma," p. 85.

[100] In this paragraph, references are to Litván and Bak, *Selected Writings of Ervin Szabó*, pp. 9, 11, 12, 16; also, Litván, "A Moralist Revolutionary's Dilemma," p. 87.

[101] Litván, "A Moralist Revolutionary's Dilemma," p. 81.

[102] See Szabó's "Party Discipline and the Freedom of the Individual" (1904), in Litván and Bak, *Selected Writings of Ervin Szabó*, pp. 106-120; "How We May Change the Rules of Party Organization" (1905) quoted in UL.

[103] Duczynska, *Workers in Arms*, p. 132. "Here is the very essence of Lenin's reading of Marx. A Marxism of older vintage, with its trend towards determinism.... It had remained hermetically closed to such insights, shrouding the opponents' actions — as well as its own inactions — with the magic mantle of 'historical necessity.'"

[104] Lukács, *Record of a Life*, p. 141.

[105] *Ibid.*, pp. 40-1.

[106] "Culture and Civilization," *Szabadgondolat* (Free Thought) July 1918, in Litván and Bak, *Selected Writings of Ervin Szabó*, pp. 208-211 (p. 211).

[107] Duczynska, "Preface," *Workers in Arms*, p. 12, "These were Austria's years of the mortal sin in politics: premature resignation."

[108] Duczynska, *Workers in Arms*, p. 27 Heading of Chapter 1: "The responsibility for action stands confronted by the responsibility for inaction." (Karl Liebknecht).

[109] Duczynska, *Workers in Arms*, pp. 28, 13, 153.

[110] Duczynska, *Workers in Arms*, p. 39. "The notion of 'historical necessity', then as now, admits of two interpretations. One may consider one's own actions to be the instuments of historical necessity, or one may submit as a mere object to its dictates. The first is a doctrine of action, the second of inaction."

[111] Duczynska, *Workers in Arms*, p. 179. Later (pp. 185-6) she describes a "battalion commander's abandonment of his own realistic plan of action in obedience to his party's indecision and inaction."

[112] These latter terms occur in an article to commemorate Duczynska by Erzsébet Vezér, an authority on the intellectual and artistic life of the period, one who knew her well. See "Ilona összes csínjei," (Ilona was up to Everything), *Népszabadság*, Hétvége 12 July 1997.

[113] From his "Marx" (1918) in Litván and Bak, *Selected Writing of Ervin Szabó*, pp. 93-100 (p. 100). A happy life is impossible: the most one can attain is a heroic life. This is the life of a person who, in some way and in some undertaking, struggles against superhuman difficulties in the pursuit of general good, and finally triumphs; yet his reward remains small or nil. Then he finally stops, like the prince in Gozzi's 'Re corvo', converted into stone, but with a noble bearing and a magnanimous gesture. His memory remains and he is revered as a hero; his will, gradually extinguished by fatigue and hard work, by failure and the ingratitude of the world, sleeps away in Nirvana." ["Parerga und Paralipomena," vol. 2 (Leipzig s.d.), p. 337.]

[114] Oszkár Jászi, *Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), 21.

[115] Gábor Vermes, "István Tisza," in *Hungarian Statesmen of Destiny, 1860-1960*, ed. Pál Bődy (New York and Boulder: Social Science Monographs, Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1989), 81-96. Also, Borkenau, *World Communism*, p. 109.

[116] Károlyi, *Fighting the World*, p. 121.

[117] "Let anyone come, someone who would shoot István Tisza, and thus strike the regime's embodiment at its heart." (UL)

[118] Hanák, *The Workshop and the Garden*, p. xvi. Anna Lesznai wrote "how apolitical most of us were;" "the inhumanity of this kind of society stems from the fact that its individual members are solitary atoms." Cited in Gluck, *Georg Lukacs*, pp. 24-25.

[119] "He had not seen any other way to show his party's inability to take action against the war." (UL)

[120] See "Beginning": "I am not, I cannot be alone in this fatal isolation from the working classes. Fritz Adler had also been driven to despair by hopeless and isolation." Also "Start" and OM.

[121] Franz Borkenau, *World Communism*, p. 109.

[122] György Konrád conducted an interview with Ilona Duczynska. His interpretation of what she said, or his recollection of what she *may* have said, concerning this episode in her life, is contained in his article "Az örök disszidens. Emléksorok Duczynska Ilonáról," (Perpetual Dissident. Lines in Memory of Ilona Duczynska), *Élet és Irodalom* (Life and Literature), 23 December 1994, pp. 8-9.

[123] John W. Boyer, *Culture and Political Crisis in Vienna. Christian Socialism in Power, 1897-1918* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 400 note 164; also see p. 371.

[124] "...the little Browning (which I was carrying now in my pocket)." UL.

[125] In all her accounts she says it was the the Farkasrét Cemetery, which Litván refers to as the Németvölgyi.

[126] In his obituary article "Az örök disszidens. Emléksorok Duczynska Ilonáról."

[127] Litván, *Szabó Ervin*, p. 220. See Duczynska UL.

[128] Litván, *Szabó Ervin*, p. 221.

[129] Duczynska composed four related but essentially identical versions, contrastig contrasting in essentials with that of György Konrád.

[130] Károlyi, *Memoirs*, p. 81.

[131] Vermes, *István Tisza*, pp. 95, 453. Tisza put down his weapon, saying: "It had to happen this way."

[132] Dalos, *A Cselekvés Szerelmese*, p. 37.

[133] "But this last thought may apply to one who is a plaything of fate, because someone chosen by destiny, who with one pistol shot can open the road leading homewards for millions of soldiers, to be a tragic heroine prepared for a tragic ending, had the great director take that role away from her. As compensation he cast her for an uncertain future... with those who are to be helped and those to be loved." (BM)

[134] "If I had known Lenin's saying that revolutionaries sometimes have to know how to dream, which I did not know, perhaps a new beginning would have been made quicker." (OM)

[135] According to Eric Fried, with whom Duczynska was in correspondence. See David Kramer, "Ulrike Meinhof: An Emancipated Terrorist?" in *European Women on the Left. Socialism, Feminism, and the Problems Faced by Political Women, 1880 to the Present*, ed. Jane Slaughter and Robert Kern (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981), 194-219 (p. 194).

[136] Both published accounts were in her articles on Ervin Szabó: two paragraphs in "Our Master" (1968), and an expanded version in "Unhappy Lover" (1978). The plan is mentioned in unpublished sources: Györffy "Conversation" (1975), "Start", and particularly (with the fantasy sequence) "Bitter May". However, it is ignored in her important TV Interview, printed, in *Valoság*, 74/7, 1974, pp. 50-60.

[137] The Archive contains issues of (1) *Világ* May 19 two pages on the trial, with exchanges in the court; May 20 one page on the death sentence; May 22 on the censoring of the trial, plus articles from Viennese newspapers, also an article by Oscar Jászi, "The Tragedy of Friedrich Adler"; (2) issues of the *Népszava*, May 19 one and a half pages on Adler's trial; May 20 four pages with news of the death sentence.

[138] See *Am Beispiel Peter-Paul Zahl. Eine Dokumentation* (Frankfurt: Initiative Group P.P. Zahl, 1976).

[139] *Liberation*, September-October 1974.

[140] Letter from Duczynska to Peter-Paul Zahl, April 17, 1978 (in German).

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French Intellectuals and the Image of Austria-Hungary in France:
Prelude to the Break-up of Historic Hungary

Dany Deschênes

> "La véritable histoire unit les peuples d'Europe centrale plus qu'elle ne les sépare. Ce qui les oppose, ce sont plutôt des versions truquées du passé."
>
> Bernard Michel[1]

In the centuries before the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy in the wake of World War I, relations between France and Austria had been often marked by hostility. This fact explains why the traditional image of the latter in France had been that of an enemy. Yet, during the last decades of 19th century, a different image of Austria emerged in France: a country that could help France to face the threat posed by Prussia and later by the Prussian-dominated German Second *Reich*. The birth of this new image of Austria resulted in a division among French intellectuals who dealt with Austrian affairs. One group remained hostile to Austria; its members tended to sympathize with the Austrian Empire's numerous nationalities who struggled for self-realization within or even outside of the Habsburg Monarchy. A second group favoured a united Habsburg state in which they saw a potential ally against German expansionism.

In his work on the disappearance of the Danubian Monarchy, François Fejtö, the French historian of Hungarian background, focused on the role of the first group while almost forgetting those who had favoured the Habsburgs.[2] If the president of the French Republic, Raymond Poincarré, was correct in saying, in his appeal to the people following the 4th of August 1914, that the country's intellectuals contributed with their writings to the "sacred union of the sons of France before the enemy,"[3] it

should be interesting to explore the roles their ideas had played before the tragic events that followed the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand in Sarajevo. Without denying the powerful influence of the intellectuals who supported the "oppressed peoples" of the Danubian Monarchy, it is nevertheless necessary to examine the reasons for their outlook and to present a more refined image of these intellectuals' attitudes toward the Dual Monarchy from the Compromise of 1967 until the dawn of the 1914-1918 conflict.

* * *

Since the end of the Second World War, we have been witness to a re-evaluation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; from being denounced as the "prison of nations" it has become seen as a relatively positive multinational experience. In this perspective, the causes of its collapse are certainly conducive to divergent interpretations. In France, the debate centred around the book of François Fejtö.[4] In his book, Fejtö blames the Monarchy's collapse on international developments: the foreign policies of the *Entente* and associated powers, the role of Freemasonry, the propaganda of certain nationality leaders such as Edvard Beneš and Tomáš G. Masaryk, and the influence of certain intellectuals especially in England and France. Some historians disagreed with Fejtö's argument. Most prominent among there were Bernard Michel[5] and Jean Bérenger.[6] According to Bernard Michel, Fejtö's thesis is rather philosophical in its approach and conjures up the idea of a plot. In his own book on this subject, Michel argues that internal factors were the main causes of the Monarchy's collapse.[7]

Although Bérenger by and large agrees with Michel's argument, there seems to be a certain similarity in the way he and Fejtö interpret the role of external factors and especially that of Beneš and Masaryk in the disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.[8] Bérenger nevertheless criticizes Fejtö's work for being excessive, notably in its assessment of the role of Freemasonry,[9] the role of Clemenceau, and the role that certain French intellectuals played.[10] According to Bérenger, the internal problems of the Monarchy, from both an economic and human point of view, cannot be ignored. In his view, however, the seeds of the Monarchy's destruction were sown by its own foreign policy, especially its involvement in the Balkans. To Bérenger, the first miscalculation was the occu-

pation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1879, as this resulted in an Austro-Serbian antagonism that had not existed before. The second mistake was the annexation of this part of the Balkans in 1908. This action reinforced the Russian-Serbian alliance. The final blunder was provoking a European conflict with the ultimatum delivered to Serbia.[11]

Fejtö's thesis at least had the merit of challenging a kind of historical determinism that implicity condemned the Austro-Hungarian Empire for its multinational character.[12] He achieved this by emphasizing the elements of cohesion within the Danubian realm.[13] Fejtö also underlined the importance European international developments played in the affairs of this region.

During the First World War France played a predominant role in preparing the destruction of Austria-Hungary and in the rise of the new international order in the Danubian and Balkan realm based on the principle of the self-determination of nations.[14] Although the responsibility of France for this development is indisputable,[15] her role has been overemphasized in many respects.[16]

In view of the fact that France played such an eminent role in Austria-Hungary's demise, as a result of the war and in consequence of the work of the peacemakers in 1919-1920, it may be appropriate to examine the role intellectuals played in this process through shaping the image of the Dual Monarchy in France in the decades before, and even after, the outbreak of the First World War. It would be also interesting to see to what extent Bérenger's assessment of the impact of these intellectuals is appropriate. Accordingly, this article will explore how French intellectuals — and, especially, historians — depicted Austria-Hungary from 1867 to 1918. In doing so attention will be paid also to the image of Hungary itself, keeping in mind that the evolution of French attitudes to Hungary can only be understood in the context of French perspectives of the whole of the Habsburg realm.[17]

From One Perception to Another: France and the Habsburg Empire

Since about the 15th century, in France the Habsburgs had been considered enemies of French interests on the European continent. It was at the end of the 15th century, due to the engagement, in 1473, of the Habsburg prince Maximilian, son of the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick III, and Marie de Bourgogne, daughter of Charles the Bold — the Duke of

Burgundy and an enemy of Louis XI of France — that the first squabble between the Austrian and French royal houses took place. The Habsburgs made a miscalculation however, for Louis eventually succeeded in eliminating the Burgundian threat to the French throne. Yet the bitter memory of Vienna befriending an enemy of the French king remained.[18]

During the following centuries, French sovereigns including Francis I, Henri IV, Louis XIV, and their ministers — especially Cardinal Richelieu who was obsessed by the idea of France being encircled — often fought the Habsburgs.[19] According to historian Pierre Béhar, French hostility against the Habsburgs became pervasive largely as a result of the War of Spanish Succession (known in England as Queen Anne's War) between 1701 and 1714. The idea of the House of Habsburg ruling both in Madrid and Vienna was repulsive to the court of Louis XIV and he took on much of Europe, foremost of all Austria and England, to resist this prospect. Louis' appeal to the people of France of June 1709, which took the form of a letter sent to the country's provincial governors, helped to mobilize French public opinion against the Habsburgs.[20]

In the middle of the 18th century, Chancellor Kaunitz of Austria managed to "reverse the alliances." As a result, France and Austria, enemies in the War of Spanish Succession and in the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748), became allies (against the Prussia of Frederick the Great and his English backers) in the Seven Years War (1756-1763). This alliance between Bourbon France and the Habsburg Empire lasted until 1792. The end of the Ancien régime and the French Revolution, however, reactivated Franco-Austrian animosity infusing into it ideological differences between a revolutionary order and the "old order" that had been abolished in France but not in the Habsburg Empire. French popular hostility against "Austrian" Marie-Antoinette was "but a secondary and demagogical translation of a massive rejection that even the reversal of the alliances had not fundamentally transformed."[21]

From the middle of the 19th century on, however, the French perception of the space between Germany and Russia became dominated, from both a diplomatic and intellectual perspective, by a fear of the German takeover in *Ostmitteleuropa*.[22] France progressively became conscious of the danger of Prussia's German policy, and concomitantly, of the role played by Austria to resist it. Nonetheless, it was truly the Sadowa-Sedan effect,[23] i.e. the successive shocks of the Austrian and French defeats at the hands of Prussia, that gave rise to the vision of an Austria that was useful to French interests, without however totally

eclipsing the traditional French aversion to that state. In effect, Sadowa caused Austria to become one of the prime concerns of French diplomacy.[24] From 1867 to 1870, there was a rapprochement between the French and Austro-Hungarian Empires.[25] The 1870-1871 war and the French defeat at Sedan created a preoccupation in France with the German threat and a reassessment of France's relations with other nations.[26]

This reassessment resulted in a new French perception of the Slavic peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. German unity also fostered feelings of greater solidarity among the Slavic nations. These were the halcyon days of the Pan-Slav movement in Eastern Europe. The fear and resentment of ever increasing German power and influence made Frenchmen and Slavs natural allies.[27] The Sadowa-Sedan effect thus resulted in the emergence of pro-Slav sentiments in France and the rise to prominence of Slavonic studies in French institutions of higher learning.

The French Intellectuals and the Dual Monarchy

The transformation of French attitudes to Austria took root between Sadowa and Sedan. After Sadowa most of France's politicians and diplomats began to see Austria in a different light. The situation was different among the country's intellectuals whom the "Austrian question" divided into two camps.[28] The first of these agreed with the country's political leadership and viewed the Habsburg Empire as a potential ally against Prussian-German ambitions. The members of this group favoured the maintenance of the Empire's unity. The second group maintained a traditional anti-Habsburg stance, but on this time-honoured attitude became superimposed a sympathy for Empire's underprivileged nationalities. Most members of this group were supportive of the Monarchy's Slavic minorities, while a few supported the Magyars.[29] All of them questioned the Habsburg state's existing internal political order.

Actually, during the mid- to late 19th century, there was a strong Hungarophile trend in France. This trend had been generated by the anti-Habsburg revolution and war of 1848-49. It was under the influence of these events that Édouard Sayous wrote his *Histoire générale des Hongrois depuis les origines jusqu'au Congrès de Vienne.* As well, the founder of *Nouvelle Revue*, Juliette Adam, in 1884 published an essay entitled *La patrie hongroise.* There are also the writings of geographer and anarchist

Élisée Reclus. In the third volume of his *Nouvelle géographie universelle,* published in 1878, he declared that Austria-Hungary was plagued by "political chaos complicated by administrative fantasies."[30] However, in comparing Austria (Cisleithania) and Hungary (Transleithania), he deemed the Hungarian part the more solid and coherent entity:

> [l]e royaume de Hongrie est une des parties de l'Europe qui présente, en dépit de la variété des races juxtaposées, l'ensemble le plus homogène et le plus complet. Très inférieure à l'Autriche allemande en nombre d'habitants, en richesse et en civilisation, la Hongrie lui est en revanche bien supérieure, au point de vue politique, par la forme de son territoire et le groupement de ses peuples [...]. Il est bon, pour l'avenir de l'humanité, qu'en Europe même, et dans une partie vitale du continent, ce soit précisément une nation non aryenne, quoique fort apparentée aux autres Européens par les croisements, qui exerce le rôle principal.[31]

Furthermore, Reclus extolled the nature of the Magyar character: "[t]rès brave, il aime à redire les hauts faits de sa nation, à réciter les grands exploits de guerre; mais souvent il est naïf aussi ou plutôt insouciant, et l'Allemand, le Juif, réussissent facilement à le tromper en le prenant par les hauts sentiments, car de tous les peuples d'Europe, il est celui qui a le plus la passion du grand."[32] In fact, as emphasized by Le Rider,[33] the opinions of Reclus "elles sont les archétypes des préjugés français à l'égard de la monarchie danubienne: antipathie naturelle pour un empire dont le maintien apparaît comme un défi permanent à la raison et au droit des peuples; sympathie, au contraire, pour les Slaves et les Magyars."[34]

By the end of the century it was becoming obvious that the sympathy of French scholars was predominantly toward the Empire's Slav minorities. The trailblazers of these sentiments were Louis Léger and Ernest Denis, the two founders of Slavonic studies in France."[35] Louis Eisenmann should also be added to the list. Léger, Denis and Eisenmann were champions of the Dual Monarchy's Slavs, especially the Czechs. Not surprisingly they were hostile to the Habsburg regime, which they considered despotic, especially after the outbreak of the First World War.

The lasting influence these three scholars had on the French perception of Austria-Hungary and on French historiography cannot be questioned.[36] Jean-Marie Valentin, for example, believes that French

perceptions of the Danubian region cannot be understood without reference to France's pre-1914 Slavists.[37] This opinion is shared by Antoine Marès. He goes even further and states that the division between France's Austro-Hungarianophiles and her Slavophiles (more specifically the Czechophiles), still exists today in French research and writing on this part of Europe.[38]

Thus, it may be appropriate to take a closer look at the pioneers of French Slavonic studies and the way they shaped the image and perception of Austria-Hungary in France, and the extent to which they influenced the views of a generation of French scholars of East-Central Europe.

The French Slavists: Léger, Denis and Eisenmann

Louis Léger was born in Toulouse in 1843 and died in Paris in 1923. He became interested in the Slavs of Eastern Europe during the 1863 Polish Revolution. His interest was reinforced through his contacts with members of Paris' large colony of exiles from the Habsburg and Russian Empires. According to Jacques Droz, Léger "learned the hatred of Austria" from the Czech émigré Josef Vaclav Friv.[39] In 1867 he published with Friv the book entitled *Bohême historique, pittoresque et littéraire* in which the Habsburgs were denounced as the shock troops of German expansionism. A year later Léger published his thesis on *Cyrille et Méthode. Etude historique sur la conversion des Slaves au christianisme,* which he dedicated to Croatian prelate Strossmayer in recognition of his struggle for self-determination of the Habsburg Empire's South-Slav populations. It was in this book that Léger first used the adjective "jugo-slave."[40] The term was unknown in France at the time but would become a name recognized by everyone within a generation. In the conclusion of his book Léger wrote: "the Slavs of the [Balkans] (...) could have founded, as early as the Middle Ages, this jugo-slave empire that they can only dream of today (...)." Had that happened, Léger continued, the "artificial state" of the Habsburgs "could not have come into existence."[41]

In 1868, Léger lectured at the Sorbonne on Russian grammar, as well as the literary history of the Czechs, Poles and Serbs. Then in 1873, he became professor of Serb, and later of Russian, at the École des langues orientales. Finally, in 1885, he was admitted to the Collège de

France and became the incumbent of the Chair of Slavonic languages and literatures.

Following the 1870 defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War, Léger became associated with the journal *Correspondance Slave*. According to Jacques Droz, this publication reflected the desire of certain Czech leaders to have closer relations with France to curb German influence.[42] In effect, up to the 1914-1918 War, Léger believed in a politically united Danubian Europe. However, he did not believe that this entity should be the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, which was, according to him, the bastion of Germanism in Central Europe. In his *Histoire de l'Autriche-Hongrie*, he stated: "[t]ant qu'elle n'aura pas trouvé le secret d'accorder à tous ses peuples l'usage loyal des mêmes libertés et de les grouper dans un harmonieux équilibre, l'Autriche-Hongrie restera un État provisoire et jouera un rôle plus négatif que positif dans la politique européenne."[43]

Ernest Denis was born in Nîmes in 1849. Already as a young man he advocated close relations between France and the Slavs of Eastern and Cenral Europe, especially the Czechs and the Russians. In 1869 he was admitted to the École normale supérieure and became an associate professor of history in 1872. In 1878, he became Doctor of Arts with his thesis on *Huss et la guerre des hussites*. In 1906 he became the incumbent of the Chair of Modern History at the Sorbonne. After the war, he taught briefly at universities in Belgrade and Prague. He died in Paris in 1921. On the occasion of his death, his successor as Chairman of Modern History at the Sorbonne Louis Eisenmann paid homage to him in the first issue of *Revue des Études Slaves*, launched in 1921: "[u]ne sympathie naturelle l'avait attiré vers les Slaves, dictée par la claire conscience de la solidarité d'intérêt qui les unit à la France dans la lutte défensive contre les ambitions et les agressions du germanisme prussien. Il n'a jamais varié dans cette sympathie, ni dans la conviction de bien servir la France en s'attachant à lui faire connaître les Slaves et à la faire connaître d'eux."[44]

Denis wanted to build a new Danubian order based strictly on the principle of the self-determination of nationalities. Accoding to him neither a 1848-style revolution nor the arrangement represented by the 1867 *Ausgleich* with Hungary offered a solution for the region's problems. These ideas seem to make him an unquilified opponent of the Habsburg Empire, however, Bérenger notes that Denis was a supporter of Austro-Slavism. Indeed, a comment in his book *La Bohême depuis la Montagne Blanche* suggests that to Denis a Danubian monarchy that addressed the needs and desires of the region's Slavs would have been accepteble. "Les

nécessités qui ont amené la formation de l'Autriche au XVIe siècle n'ont pas disparu et, quelque légitimes que soient les griefs des Polonais, des Tchèques et des Slovènes, ils n'en demeure pas moins un intérêt manifeste au maintien de la monarchie."[45]

The last member of the triumvirate is Louis Eisenmann. He was born in Haguenau in 1869. Following the 1870-71 disaster, his family moved to Dijon. What is interesting in his case is that he is the only one of the three to have had an explicit interest in Hungary. In fact, for his doctoral thesis, he learned the Hungarian language.[46] Eisenmann, as Denis, was educated at the École normale supérieure, where he became an associate professor of History in 1892. He was later licensed in Law, and in 1904, he became Doctor in Law with his thesis on *Le compromis austro-hongrois de 1867. Etude sur le dualisme.*

In 1897, he published an article in *La Revue de Paris* entitled "La crise austro-hongroise."[47] He argued that the future of the Monarchy necessarily involved democratization, notably the adoption of universal suffrage. In effect, he noted that Austria was an Old Regime state, i.e. a dynastic creation. Because of its nature, its domestic policy was determined by its foreign policy.[48] In this perspective, dualism may be understood as an attempt to rebuild the strength of the Habsburg state following the Sadowa defeat.[49] Eisenmann firmly believed that the 1867 Compromise between the Habsburgs and the Hungarians resulted in a double centralism in favour of the latter.[50] To him, the fact that the Hungarians accepted *dualisme* was explained by the fact that they

> ont un patriotisme national enthousiaste, un respect profond de l'idée magyare. Ils ont toujours voulu conquérir, pour leur nation, une première place sur la grande scène européenne, et ils ont toujours refusé de transiger sur ce point. Être, comme le proposait en 1865 le comte Belcredi, cinquième dans une Autriche où les Tchèques, les Polonais, les Allemands et les Slaves du sud auraient eu des parts égales à la leur, ne suffisait pas à leur ambition. Ils ont accepté le dualisme, parce qu'il leur offrait la satisfaction si longtemps poursuivie: à l'aide des ressources de la monarchie commune ils allaient faire figure dans le monde, et ils l'ont faite.[51]

According to Eisenmann the political centre of the monarchy had moved from Vienna to Budapest. He believed that the Magyars dictated the Dual Monarchy's the foreign policy agenda: they were the "firmest

supporters" of the Triple Alliance.[52] To support this claim, he referred to the fact that Hungarian Prime Minister Kálmán Tisza was decorated with the Black Eagle when William II first visited Vienna.[53] The German Emperor next visited Budapest, a fact that placed the Hungarian capital on an equal footing with Vienna. To Eisenmann, the Triple Alliance benefited Hungary by giving it a guarantee against possible Russian aggression.[54] It also supported Hungary against the Vatican in her legislation on civil marriage and religious freedom for Jews. According to Eisenmann, from the very beginning of dualism, Hungary had a specific advantage: its parliamentary system. Despite its malfunctioning, this parliamentarianism helped to explain further why the political centre of power in the Monarchy moved to the Hungarian capital.

In 1894, a dispute pitted Emperor-King Francis Joseph against the Hungarian Parliament. Eisenmann explained:

> le Parlement avait voté des lois politico-ecclésiastiques qui blessaient la conscience très catholique du roi. Celui-ci signifia à son ministère, pourtant en possession de la majorité, qu'il lui retirait sa confiance et voulut essayer de former un ministère placé au-dessus des partis, selon le type autrichien. La majorité lui refusa sa confiance, et obtint ainsi du roi la reconnaissance du principe parlementaire et la sanction des lois laïcisatrices (*sic*). La fermeté du Parlement, son union avec le gouvernement, ont achevé d'assurer à la Hongrie la prééminence dans la monarchie dualiste.[55]

This was the time when historian Ernest Lavisse, who had been commissioned by Cambridge University to produce a history of the world, noticed the young historian. He asked Eisenmann to write the Austrian chapters of this planned work that Lavisse was preparing in cooperation with Alfred Rambaud, the future Minister of Education. Notably, Lavisse preferred him to no other than Denis. Eisenmann later wrote the chapter on Austria-Hungary in *The Cambridge Modern History*.

Nonetheless, Eisenmann's most important contribution to the subject before the war was his thesis presented before the Faculté de Droit de Dijon, in 1904, for his Doctorate of Political and Economic Sciences. As has been mentioned, this thesis dealt with the Austro-Hungarian Compromise.[56] Eisenmann criticized the *Ausgelich* for its archaic and static structure which, in his view, propelled Austria-Hungary toward eventual ruin. To him, a solution involved democratization and federal-

ism; in fact, he wished and believed that Austria-Hungary should become a Switzerland. The most important obstacle to such transformation, according to the author, were Hungary's "reactionary" Prime Ministers: Kálmán Tisza and István Tisza. There was also a deeper historic problem: the monarchy "wanted to be a power more than a state."[57] For Eisenmann, there was a possible remedy to this situation through the implementation of the program of the Diet of Kremsier and of the ideas of József Eötvös which favoured national autonomy for the peoples of the monarchy.[58]

Eisenmann's proposals for the reform of Austria-Hungary and the solution of its nationality question were less radical than those of Léger. His work was well received even in Germany and Austria. Not surprisingly, he was invited to present the results of his research, in 1905, at the *Forschrittliche Reformklub*.[59]

Eisenmann was not a Hungarophobe. In a 1909 or 1910 study,[60] he explained the causes of the Hungarian attempt at the Magyarization of Hungary's nationalities. To him, there were four reasons:

> premièrement, par le sentiment qu'ont les Hongrois de se trouver entre les deux branches d'un gigantesque casse-noix;
>
> deuxièmement, par la conscience d'être une goutte d'eau dans l'océan slave;
>
> troisièmement, par l'expérience négative de l'Autriche, qui a laissé aux nationalités des espaces de liberté suffisants pour qu'elles puissent ainsi s'affirmer, au détriment des Allemands;
>
> quatrièmement, par des traits de caractère de la race hongroise, une espèce d'autoritarisme inné, le reste de l'esprit conquérant, un instinct de domination qui se trouve représenté dans cette noblesse dont Tisza était le représentant par excellence.[61]

For Eisenmann then, the solution was to return to the ideas of Ferenc Déak who felt that there "should be formed in Hungary a bilingual middle class...." This meant forming a kind of intermediate class that would ensure the transition between the inferior classes and the Hungarian state, i.e. that would guarantee a "simply profound and intimate union obtained by free consent."[62]

In February, 1913, Eisenmann,[63] supported by Ernest Denis, was appointed lecturer in Hungarian Language and Literature at the Faculté des Lettres of the University of Paris. In the competition for this post he

beat two applicants who had the backing of Budapest: André de Hevesy and Louis Joseph Foti. It is interesting to note that this course had been launched in January 1907,[64] at the request of the Budapest government, and that this government funded the course until September 1913. Despite the withdrawal of Hungarian funding after the outbreak of the war, Eisenmann kept this position until 1919.

During the war Eisenmann began favouring openly the Monarchy's Slav minorities and began advocating Austria-Hungary's dissolution. And thus it came to pass that the vision of the Slavophiles merged with that of the traditional opponents of the Habsburg Monarchy. More than ever, the Habsburgs became perceived as the agents of Germanization in Central Europe.

The Supporters of the Dual Monarchy

It would be inaccurate to say that this pro-Slav and anti-Dual Monarchy vision was the only view held by French intellectuals before 1914. There were also supporters of the Habsburg Empire. The pioneer of such a stance was the journalist Saint-René Taillandier. He had been one of the first among his countrymen to become interested in the Danubian Monarchy. To him, the Austrian Empire, and later the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, played a unifying force in Danubian region.[65]

Similar opinions were expressed by Alexandre Thomas. In November of 1848 he commented on the developments of that eventful year in the *Revue des deux mondes* and pointed out the stabilizing role that Austria had played between Germany and Russia.[66] In his *Histoire de la formation territoriale des Etats de l'Europe centrale* published in 1876, geographer Auguste Himly expressed the same sentiments. He argued that the Habsburg Monarchy was a necessary factor that protected the peoples of the region from Germany and Russia. He stressed that the intermingling of the peoples forced them to live together and that this situation invalidated the idea of their geographical separation into independent nation states.[67]

A group of historians teaching at the École libre des sciences politiques, including Albert Sorel and Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, also favoured the preservation of the Danubian Monarchy as a counterweight to German imperialism.[68] Leroy-Beaulieu in particular kept stressing the importance of the Danubian Monarchy as a factor of balance: in 1888, in

his book *La France, la Russie et l'Europe*; in March 1902 in an article in the *Revue des deux mondes*; and in 1904 in the prefaces he wrote to Georges Weil's *Le Pangermanisme en Autriche* and to René Henry's *Questions d'Autriche-Hongrie et Question d'Orient.* In the latter preface Leroy-Beaulieu stated: "[i]l importe à l'Europe que l'Empire des Habsbourg ne soit pas à la merci de la politique allemande. L'Autriche-Hongrie reste la pierre angulaire de l'Europe. L'Occident et l'Orient ont un intérêt égal à ce qu'elle demeure indépendante de fait comme de droit."[69]

During the years preceding the conflict, the intellectuals travelling in the Dual Monarchy noticed what they felt was a strengthening of the Habsburg power. For example in 1912 historian and economist René Gonnard, in a political and parliamentary review, wrote about the idea of trialism (the co-opting of the Empire's Slavs into the political leadership of the Monarchy) that seemed to develop around the person of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the heir to the throne:

> [m]on opinion personnelle, comme celle de la plupart des Français qui ont, dans ces dernières années, voyagé sur les rives du Danube, est que la monarchie des Habsbourg se consolide. Et quant au trialisme, je ne me hasarderai pas à prophétiser ce qu'il donnera, si jamais il se réalise, mais ce que je sais bien, c'est que ses partisans autrichiens, loin de voir dans le développement de cette doctrine une cause d'affaiblissement et de séparatisme, la préconisent comme un moyen de fortifier le pouvoir de l'autorité centrale, le prestige de la dynastie, les chances d'expansion de la monarchie vers les Balkans et de diminuer au contraire les résistances particularistes les plus redoutables, j'entends celles que les Magyars opposent aux prétentions de Vienne.[70]

For his part, René Pinon, in the *Revue des deux mondes*, wrote during the 1912-13 Balkan wars:

> [p]resque tous les peuples qui vivent sur le territoire de la monarchie dualiste souhaitent d'en modifier le statut, non pas d'en ruiner les fondements. En cas de guerre, même avec la Serbie et la Russie, il y aurait sans doute des incidents, des défections individuelles ou des rébellions de petites unités; mais l'armée dans son ensemble, est loyaliste; elle a un patriotisme d'Etat qui repose sur le serment au souverain; elle restera fidèle à ce serment.[71]

From this evidence it seems that many French observers of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy were more or less favourable to it. Only one author was openly hostile to the Habsburg regime: Louis Léger. It is essential to point out that the reflection of all these groups is based on two fundamental elements: 1, the opposition to pan-Germanism and German (Prussian) power; and 2, the possible ways by which France could fight against this power.

If we look closer at the image of Hungary, we note that the government of Budapest was accused of being authoritarian, of seeking to assimilate the minorities on its territory,[72] of being *de facto* a faithful ally of Germany, and finally of blocking any structural reform of the Habsburg Monarchy. However, according to historian István Hunyadi, if it cannot be denied that the government of Budapest was reactionary, the observers of Hungary, during the war, lost sight of the need to put the facts into their context and to find out if government's behaviour was not the result of the leading elite's attitude to the underprivileged and the working classes.[73] However, according to Hunyadi, "this in no way reduces the repugnance of the condemned practices but transposes them to a different level."[74]

The Great War: French Intellectuals and the Disappearance of the Danubian Monarchy

With the outbreak of the war, French intellectuals contributed one way or another to the war effort, mainly by what they had written. Obviously, because of the war, the group more or less favourable to the Habsburgs was toned down. It is also difficult to define exactly the influence the three most prominent Slavophiles had on French policy. However, they certainly played a role that was not inconsiderable.

Léger and Denis were the first intellectuals to support the claims of the leaders of Austro-Hungarian political emigres such as Masaryk and Beneš. They clearly took a stand in favour of the liberation of the Slavs of Austria-Hungary and of the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy.

Léger, who was by then over 70, was a convinced Slavophile. In 1915, he published the brochure *La liquidation de l'Autriche-Hongrie*. His argument is based on the argument that Austria was the vassal of Germany and that it missed its historic mission. In this perspective, it can only be reconstructed on the basis of the nationality principle. For his

part, Ernest Denis played a fundamental role at the beginning of the war in favouring Masaryk and Beneš and their proposals relating to the destruction of Austria-Hungary in French public opinion. Denis lent his prestige as a Sorbonne professor to the ideas of the Czech leaders in exile.[75]

In 1915, he published *La Guerre, Causes immédiates et lointaines, L'intoxication d'un peuple, Le traité,* and *La Grande Serbie.* In 1917, he published *La question d'Autriche, Les Slovaques.* We do not know if Denis et Léger consulted, but they share almost identical points of view. In his 1915 publication he argued that Austria-Hungary was Germany's vassal. Because of this, he continued, the Dual Monarchy was bound to disappear. According to historian Bohumila Ferencuhove, Denis' 1915 writing contained "le fondement éthique du programme de la paix de l'Entente: la Société des nations, le droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes, [en plus de] la liquidation de l'Autriche-Hongrie et de la naissance des Etats tchéco-slovaques et yougo-slaves ce qui convenait d'après lui, aussi à l'intérêt français.[76]

In his 1917 book *La question d'Autriche, Les Slovaques*, Denis painted a negative picture of the Hungarian policy toward Hungary's nationalities:[77] "[d]epuis le début de la guerre, les Magyars ont poursuivi dans les pays croates, serbes ou roumains une politique d'extermination: ils ont déporté les habitants par dizaines de mille, ils les ont remplacés partout où il leur aura été possible par des colons magyars."[78] To put an end to this situation, he reiterated an idea developed in *La Guerre, Causes immédiates et lointaines, L'intoxication d'un peuple, Le traité*: that Austria-Hungary must be destroyed:

> [i]l faut partager l'Autriche en Etats indépendants; le royaume serbo-croato-slovène d'une part s'étendant jusqu'au Danube entre Vienne et Raab, et l'Etat tchécoslovaque d'autre part, qui s'étend depuis le Danube jusqu'à la Pologne et la Russie. Ces petits Etats sont trop faibles pour courir des aventures, ne menacent personne mais surveilleront l'Allemagne. Ils pourront ménager les susceptibilités des autres ethnies par leur expérience. Les Tchèques et Slovaques vivront en intelligence (...) car ils sont frères (...). Si on ne brise pas les liens qui rattachent les Slovaques à la Hongrie, on les condamne à devenir la proie des Hongrois; ils seront donc les victimes de l'Allemagne.[79]

Another example of Denis's ideas is expressed his preface to a book written by Jules Chopin.[80] According to Denis, Emperor-King Francis Joseph and Hungarian Prime Minister István Tisza were mainly responsible for the onset of the First World War.[81] Denis believed that the outbreak of the war undoubtedly represented "the only hope of salvation for both groups, the Magyars and the Germans, who, although they were a minority within the Empire, had exercised power since the 1867 Compromise."[82] Denis went so far as to say that the Austro-Hungarian leaders were "insane... [and] possessed. We all know that the most characterized madness does not always exclude external logic, and Tisza, Buryan, Tchirsky, and their accomplices methodically prepared the plan they hoped would submit the world to their shameless fantasy."[83] He denounced the Hungarians for being bloodthirsty, unscrupulous, and responsible for the worst atrocities especially against the other nationalities:

> [u]n frisson d'épouvante nous court à travers les épaules quand nous entendons Tisza dire à la tribune que dans aucun pays les nationalités ne trouvent un terrain aussi favorable à leur développement qu'en Hongrie. Dans un éclair, défile devant nos yeux l'infinie théorie des victimes qu'a égorgé l'orgueil magyar et une odeur de sang nous prend à la gorge.[84]

Louis Eisenmann, the third member of the triumvirate, moved toward a radical position more slowly. At the beginning of the war he wrote to the ministère de l'Instruction publique asking that relations with Hungary be maintained. To him, France must fill the vacant space following the German defeat. He stated:

> [n]otre influence intellectuelle est une force et une richesse nationales, notre arme peut-être la plus précieuse dans la concurrence des nations; dans une certaine mesure, l'extension de notre clientèle intellectuelle contrebalance les funestes conséquences de la faiblesse de notre natalité, et réduit la disproportion numérique du groupe de culture français face aux groupes anglo-saxon ou russe...; nos ambitions sont volontairement limitées par la faiblesse de notre population et par les principes au nom desquels nous combattons. Mais nous devons songer à garder autant que possible notre place parmi les puissances de premier rang. C'est dans l'ordre moral et intel-

> lectuel, par l'affirmation et l'extension de notre mission traditionnelle de protecteurs et d'éveilleurs de nationalités jeunes, faibles et opprimées, que nous trouverons, avec notre rôle original, la plus sûre garanti de notre influence, de notre prestige, de notre autorité en Europe et dans le monde. Tout peuple qui la mérite par un sincère esprit de liberté et de justice a un droit à notre aide. A une Hongrie renouvelée, de démocratie et de progrès, quelle raison aurions-nous de la refuser?[85]

The horrors of war caused him to abandon his moderation. In April 1916, at a conference at the Sorbonne, he came out for the destruction of the Dual Monarchy.[86] To him, the First World War was the completion of the 1789 French Revolution.[87] This idea he reiterated in an article he published in August of the same year. He stressed the important concept according to which the World War was the clash of two diametrically opposed ideas: "one, of the Middle Ages, is the imperial idea, the idea of a universal empire; the other, modern, is the national idea, the idea of freedom for peoples and nationalities."[88] Thus the World War was to complete the Revolutionary wars. To Eisenmann, Austria failed in its age-old mission to have different nationalities live together.

Eisenmann never forgot to admit that Austria had had a few faithful advocates of this concept of the peaceful coexistence of the nations of the Danube region, among them the Czech historian Frantisek Palacky and the Hungarian József Etövös.[89] The Hungarian thinker was the greatest mind of mid-nineteenth century Hungary, according to Eisenmann. His concept of the nationality issue, which can be found in Hungary's 1868 nationality laws, was consistent with the principles of equality and justice.[90] In a preface to a joint publication by Chopin (Jules Eugène Pichon) and the Slovak writer Osusky, *Magyars et Pangermanistes*, Eisenmann regretted that Hungary had turned its back on these ideas.[91]

In Eisenmann's opinion, if Hungary suffered a long time under the Habsburgs, the 1867 Compromise radically changed this situation:

> [l]es Magyars qui avaient souffert de l'idée impériale à l'égal des autres peuples, sinon même davantage, qui avaient avec tous les autres luttés (sic) contre elle, s'y sont accommodés. Dès qu'elle ne les a plus menacés[92] d'une menace immédiate et directe. Ils se sont associés à la politique de la dynastie, politique d'iniquité, dans l'espoir d'en partager les imaginaires profits.

> Ils ont renié la tradition de leurs plus nobles esprits, du grand et sage Déak, du profond et sensible Etövös; ils ont démenti les principes inscrits par leur Parlement dans un texte solennel, la célèbre loi de 1868 sur les nationalités. Ils ont préféré faire, avec Coloman Tisza, le père du Premier ministre actuel, le comte Etienne Tisza, une politique étroite de chauvinisme violent et de brutale magyarisation.[93]

Finally, if the Hungarians, after the Compromise, accepted Habsburgs' plan to become the faithful ally of imperial Germany, only the victory of the Entente and associated powers could revitalize their country. Moreover, this victory would prevent Hungary from being Germanized as a result of a German victory.

> Les Magyars échapperont à ce danger. Ils y échapperont grâce à la victoire des Alliés. Ce qu'ils garderont de l'indépendance nationale, ils le devront au secours que les Alliés leur auront prêté – prêté non point pour eux, qui ne l'ont point mérité, qui ont été infidèles à la justice, infidèles à leur mission, infidèles à l'espoir que, trop confiante, avaient mis en eux les puissances libérales de l'Occident, la France et l'Angleterre, dont les sympathies les avaient toujours soutenus, réconfortés, encouragés dans leurs épreuves et leurs malheurs, mais prêté pour les autres peuples de l'Autriche-Hongrie, pour ces nationalités qui ont été, elles, fidèles à la justice, fidèles à leur mission, et que les Alliés ne pourraient jamais consentir à abandonner à l'avidité germanique, auxquelles ils doivent et ils donneront l'affranchissement, la liberté. Les Magyars comme les autres nationalités échapperont au péril parce que les Alliés détruiront l'Autriche, qui est devenue le simple instrument passif, le simple valet de l'Allemagne.[94]

As reported by Charue:

> On ne peut qu'être frappé par la violence des propos tenus par L. Léger et E. Denis à partir de 1915 [et Eisenmann dès 1916], à un moment où la destruction de la double monarchie n'est envisagée à peu près nulle part. [...] On est conduit à se demander pourquoi ces attaques sont dirigées de préférence contre l'Autriche-Hongrie. Deux séries de causes se conjuguent ici: les unes tiennent aux circonstances; les autres touchent à la nature même de l'Autriche-Hongrie.[95]

Denis' feelings were impacted also by the death of his son Jacques, attorney at the Paris Court of Appeal, lieutenant in the 226th Line Regiment, who was killed at Courbessaux in Lorraine on August 25, 1914. There was also the fact that Léger, Denis, and Eisenmann wished to

> arriver à une paix durable, appuyée sur des garanties pour assurer la sécurité, non seulement la leur, mais et surtout celle de leurs descendants. (...) Il s'agit en fait, chez eux comme chez leurs contemporains, d'une forme de patriotisme: intellectuels, universitaires, ils ont mis au service de la patrie leurs connaissances de savants et leurs relations personnelles, en l'occurrence des Slaves, alliés officiels ou potentiels de la Triple Entente.[96]

Another factor influencing the opinion of the three, especially Denis, was the Catholicism of Austria. Denis was Protestant, and his choice of thesis on John Huss was no accident. For example, in *La Guerre*, he wrote: "The Catholics, eager to seize the opportunity to extend the domains of the Roman Church to the East, weighed on the lethargic conscience of the old Emperor in the decisive weeks of 1914."[97] The decisive element, however, was political and, for Denis and Eisenmann at least, philosophical.

> Ce sont deux principes fondamentaux voire deux conceptions du monde qui s'affrontent. Au principe des nationalités et au droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes s'oppose la notion d'équilibre européen, c'est-à-dire en fait d'accords conclu plus ou moins à l'amiable entre souverains. Pour la démocratie issue de la Révolution française, toute souveraineté réside dans le peuple, et il y a incompatibilité totale avec l'idée de monarchie de nature ou de vocation universelle, voulue par Dieu ou dérivée de Dieu selon le principe *omni potestas a Deo*.[98]

Conclusions

The perception the French had of the Habsburg Empire, and after 1867 of Austria-Hungary, evolved gradually. In this evolution the most dramatic change was caused by the rise of Prussian power, specifically the Sadowa-Sedan effect. Starting with the last decades of the nineteenth

century French intellectuals — and, especially, historians who were interested in the Dual Monarchy — found themselves divided into two camps. The members of one of these sympathized with the Monarchy's Slavic minorities while the adherents of the other, tended to favour the re-organized and re-vitalized, post-1867 Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

It was particularly the group that sympathized with the Slavs, especially Louis Léger, Ernest Denis, and Louis Eisenmann, that succeeded in influencing how the French in general viewed the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. During the world conflict that broke out in 1914 they, above all, took a stand in favour of the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. Although it is difficult to measure their true influence, it can nonetheless be argued that they, more than anyone else, were responsible for the Habsburg Empire's very negative image in France, and even for its eventual dismemberment. The negative image of Austria-Hungary they created persists to our days.

With regard to Hungary itself, it is evident that its image in France of the late 19th and early 20th centuries gradually deteriorated. Despite a wave of Hungarophile sentiments in the late 1860s and early 1870s, in time the Hungarophobe attitudes of Léger, Denis and especially Eisenmann prevailed. Deemed authoritarian, oppressive, assimilative, and a faithful ally of Germany, Hungary had lost nearly all sympathy in France by 1914. This negative perception only grew with the war. The consequences were profoundly harmful for the future of the multinational kingdom. Not surprisingly, when France's leaders worked toward Hungary's dismemberment after the war, there were few protests from French intellectuals.

RÉSUMÉ:

Du compromis de 1867 à l'éclatement du premier conflit mondial, les intellectuels français se divisent en deux groupes dans l'appréciation de la monarchie danubienne des Habsbourg. Le premier groupe est favorable aux nationalités et le second groupe privilégie l'Empire des Habsbourg. Toutefois, c'est véritablement le groupe favorable aux nationalités qui va structurer la vision de l'Autriche-Hongrie dans les écrits de langue française: c'est l'image d'un État décadent. La partie hongroise de la monarchie n'échappe pas à cette perception négative. Ainsi, l'objet de cet article est de s'intéresser à l'image que les intellectuels français vont brosser de la

monarchie danubienne, en insistant plus particulièrement sur celle de la Hongrie.

NOTES

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[1] Bernard Michel, *Nations et nationalismes en Europe centrale XIXe et XXe siècle* (Paris: Aubier, 1995), 264. In loose translation: "True history unites the peoples of Central Europe more than it divides them. What pits them against each other are distorted versions of the past."

[2] François Fejtö, *Requiem pour un empire défunt. Histoire de la destruction de l'Autriche-Hongrie* (Paris: Lieu Commun, 1988).

[3] See for example Émile Durkheim and Ernest Denis, *Qui a voulu la guerre? Les origines de la guerre d'apres led documents diplomatiques* (Paris: Kiné, 1996).

[4] Fejtö, *Requirem....*

[5] Bernard Michel, *La chute de l'Empire austro-hongrois. 1916-1918* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1991).

[6] Jean Bérenger, *Histoire de l'Empire des Habsbourg 1273-1918* (Paris: Fayard, 1990); *L'Autriche-Hongrie 1815-1918* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1994); "L'empire austro-hongrois," in *Les empires occidentaux. De Rome à Berlin*, ed. Tulard (Paris: PUF, 1997), 327-362.

[7] However, he recognizes that certain external factors may have played a role in the end of Austria-Hungary; see in particular his conclusion, Bernard Michel, *La chute...*, pp. 289-292.

[8] Jaques Le Riders, "La France et l'identité culturelle autrichienne," in *Les études germaniques en France,* ed. Michel Espagne and Michel Werner (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 1994), 408.

[9] Bérenger, *Histoire de l'Empire...*, p. 736.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 176.

[11] Bérenger, "L'empire austro-hongrois...," p. 362.

[12] National pluralism is an intrinsic characteristic of the Danubian Habsburg Monarchy in which there was no majority people. Its multinational character had traditionally been perceived as a factor of strength. The rise of the Nation-State ideal during the 19th century altered this perception: ethnic pluralism

became a factor of weakness. In 1914, Austria-Hungary is comprised of thirteen nationalities, including Jews and Gypsies. For a detailed picture, see Bérenger, "L'empire austro-hongrois...," pp. 338-344; Jean-Paul Bled "La monarchie des Habsbourg et le pluralisme national (1850-1914)," *L'Information Historique*, no 58 (1996): 15-20.

[13] Jasna Adler, *L'Union forcée. La Croatie et la création de l'État yougoslave (1918)* (Chêne-Bourg, Georg Éditeur, 1997), 7.

[14] Bérenger, *Histoire...*, and Fejtö, *Requiem....*

[15] Paul Pilisi, "La France et le bassin des Carpathes après la Première Guerre mondiale," *Hungarian Studies Review*, 22, 2 (1995): 91-110; Taline Ter Minassian, "Les géographes français et les frontières balkaniques à la conférence de la Paix en 1919," *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine*, 44-2 (April-June, 1997): 252-286.

[16] There is abundant literature on the American and British policy regarding Austria-Hungary during the First World War. On the American policy see Victor S. Mamatey's seminal *The United States and East Central Europe, 1914-1918: A Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957); for British policy, see Kenneth J. Calder, *Britain and the Origins of the New Europe, 1914-1918* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976), and Wilfried Fest, *Peace or Partition. The Habsburg Monarchy and British Policy, 1914-1918* (New-York, St. Martin's Press, 1978). For a general perspective see David Stevenson, *The First World War and International Politics* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988).

[17] On French policy in general, see Dany Deschênes, "Rupture ou équilibre: les options de la *realpolitik* française face à l'Autriche-Hongrie lors la Première Guerre mondiale," *Études internationales*, 30, 3 (September 1999).

[18] Bérenger, *Histoire de l'Empire...*, p. 108.

[19] Pierre Béhar, *Du 1^er^ au 4^ième^ Reich: permanence d'une nation, renaissance d'un État* (Paris: Desjonquères, 1990) and Bérenger, *Histoire de l'Empire.*

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 98.

[21] Jean-Marie Valentin, "La recherche sur l'Autriche en France," *Austriaca*, 33 (December, 1991): 10.

[22] Le Riders, "La France...."

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] Jacques Droz, "Les historiens français et la Double Monarchie," *Austriaca spécial colloque* (June, 1986): 63-70.

[25] At the 1867 Salzburg meeting between Francis Joseph I and Napoleon III, the French Emperor sought to form an offensive and defensive alliance against Prussia. However, the rapprochement did not translate into an official alliance. The defeat of Napoleon III at Sedan in 1870 was the logical result of Austrian Emperor Francis Joseph's defeat at Sadowa. After 1870, the paths of the two states separated and eventually became antagonistic. This was a critical turning point in the history of Franco-Austrian relations as well as in the European balance of power. On this subject see André Lorant, *Le compromis austro-hongrois et l'opinion publique française en 1867* (Geneva: Droz, 1971); Jean-Paul Bled, *François-Joseph* (Paris: Fayard, 1987), and "Une occasion man-

quée: le projet d'alliance franco-autrichienne 1867-1870," *Études danubiennes*, 6, 2 (1990): 101-110.

[26] Michel Espagne, *Le paradigme de l'étranger. Les chaires de littérature étrangère au XIXe siècle* (Paris: Les éditions du Cerf, 1993), 7-8.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 16.

[28] Both groups emphasized foreign policy. This was in fact a general trend of the French as regards Austria-Hungary. The attempt at creating an alliance, between 1867 and 1870, is a perfect example of this.

[29] Le Riders, "La France et l'identité...," p. 406.

[30] Quoted in Jacques Le Riders, "L'aigle à deux têtes," in *Vienne-Budapest 1867-1918: Deux âges d'or, deux visions, un Empire*, ed. Dieter Horning and Endre Kiss (Paris: Éditions Autrement, 1996), 50.

[31] *Ibid.* Translation: "The Hungarian Kingdom is one of the parts of Europe which, despite the variety of juxtaposed races, represents the most homogeneous and complete entity. Considerably inferior to German Austria in terms of population, wealth, and civilization, Hungary is far superior, from a political perspective, by the shape of its territory and grouping of its peoples [...]. It is a good thing for the future of humanity that, in Europe itself, and in a vital part of the continent, a non-Aryan nation, although closely related to the other Europeans by crossbreeding, play the main role."

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 50. Translation: "Very brave, Magyars like to repeat the heroic deeds of their [ancestors], recall their great war feats; but they are also often naive or rather carefree,... the Germans and Jews easily... deceive them by appealing to their feelings as, of all the peoples of Europe, they are the ones who have the greatest passion for greatness."

[33] To this trend could be added renowned artists, such as Franz Liszt.

[34] Le Riders, "L'aigle...," p. 51. Translation: "are the archetypes of French prejudices toward the Danubian Monarchy: natural antipathy for an empire whose preservation appears like a permanent challenge to reason and the rights of peoples; on the other hand, sympathy for the Slavs and Magyars."

[35] Espagne, *Le paradigme...*, p. 332.

[36] On this issue, see Istvan Hunyadi, "L'image de la Hongrie en Europe occidentale à l'issue de la 1re Guerre mondiale," in *Les conséquences des traités de paix de 1919-1920 en Europe centrale et sud-orientale*, ed. Pierre Ayçoberry, Jean-Paul Bled and Istvan Hunyadi (Strasbourg: Université de Strasbourg, 1987); Jean Charue, "Les slavistes français et l'Autriche-Hongrie de 1867 à 1918," *Études danubiennes*, 6, 2 (1990); Bernard Michel, "Le rôle d'Ernest Denis et du journal *La Nation tchèque* dans la naissance de la Tchécoslovaquie," *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains*, no. 169 (1993); Jacques Droz, "Les historiens français..."; Jean Bérenger, *Histoire de l'Empire...*; Jean-Marie Valentin, "La recherche...,"; Jacques Le Riders, "La France et l'identité...".

[37] Valentin, "La recherche...".

[38] Antoine Marés, "Louis Eisenmann et l'Europe centrale (1897-1937)," in *Regards sur l'indomptable Europe du Centre-Est du XVIIIe siècle à nos jours*, ed. Jerzy Kloczowski, Daniel Beauvois and Yves-Marie Hilaire (Lille: Revue du Nord, 1996), 225.

[39] Droz, "Les historiens français...," p. 65.

[40] Charue, "Les slavistes français..."

[41] Quoted *ibid.*, pp. 125-26.

[42] Droz, "Les historiens français...," p. 66.

[43] Louis Léger, *Histoire de l'Autriche-Hongrie depuis les origines jusqu'à l'année 1894* (Paris: Hachette, 1907). The first edition dates back to 1878. The quotation translated: "until it finds a way to guarantee all its peoples the... same freedoms and [keep] them in a harmonious balance, Austria-Hungary will remain an interim state and will play a more negative than positive role in European affairs."

[44] Louis Eisenmann, "Ernest Denis (1849-1921)," *Revue des Études slaves*, vol. 1 (1921), 139. Translation: "[Denis] was attracted to the Slavs through a natural friendship, dictated by the... community of interest that united them with France in the defensive struggle against... Prussian Germanism. He never wavered in this friendship, nor in the conviction of serving France well by striving to enable [her] to know more about Slavs and the Slavs about France."

[45] Ernest Denis, *La Bohême depuis la Montagne-Blanche, deuxième partie. La renaissance tchèque, vers le fédéralisme* (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1903), 663-664. Translation: "The factors that led to the formation of Austria in the 16th century have not disappeared, and however legitimate may be the grievances of the Poles, Czechs and Slovenians, they nonetheless retain a clear interest in the preservation of the Monarchy."

[46] To be admitted to the Chair of Slavonic History and Civilization created at the Sorbonne, with the help of the Czechoslovakian government, on January 1, 1922, Eisenmann had to obtain a Doctorate Degree of Arts, with a main thesis on contemporary Hungary (1867-1918) and a secondary thesis on Czechoslovakia.

[47] The article is not signed. Antoine Marès attributed the text to Eisenmann based on his research; see Marés, "Louis Eisenmann...".

[48] [Louis Eisenmann], "La crise austro-hongroise," *Revue de Paris* (1 December, 1897), p. 676.

[49] The 1867 Compromise, which gave birth to Austria-Hungary, was received rather favourably in France. It was seen as giving back the great power status to Francis-Joseph's Empire. This was in fact had been the Austrian ruler's main goals in accepting the agreement. See Bled, *François-Joseph*.

[50] [Louis Eisenmann], "La crise ...," p. 679.

[51] *Ibid.*, pp. 698-99. Translation: "[They] had an enthusiastic national patriotism, a profound respect for the Magyar idea. They have always wanted to conquer for their nation a first place on the broad European scene. and they have always refused to compromise on this point. As proposed in 1865 by Count Belcredi, being number five in an Austria where the Czechs, Poles, Germans, and Southern Slavonics would have had equal parts did not satisfy their ambition. They accepted dualism because it provided a long-sought satisfaction: using the resources of the common monarchy, they could play an important role in the world, and they did."

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 699.

[53] And the fact that the German *Keiser* ignored Count Taafe, the Prime Minister of Austria.

[54] On crisis of 1894 see László Kontler, *Millennium in Central Europe: A History of Hungary* (Budapest: Atlantisz, 1999), 291-92.

[55] [Louis Eisenmann], "La crise...," p. 698. Translation: "Parliament had adopted politico-ecclesiastic laws which hurt the highly Catholic conscience of the King. He informed his Ministry, although it held the majority, that he no longer trusted it, and he attempted to form a Ministry placed above the parties, based on the Austrian model. The majority refused to grant its trust and thus obtained from the King the recognition of the parliamentary principle and the sanction of the laicizing laws. The firmness of Parliament and its union with government finally ensured Hungary's pre-eminence within the dual monarchy."

[56] His thesis was first published in 1904 by the Société nouvelle de librairie et d'édition. At the centennial of the Compromise, it was republished by Éditions Cujas with a preface by Victor-Lucien Tapié. According to Marès, it remains the reference tool on the subject in the French language.

[57] Louis Eisenmann, *Le compromis austro-hongrois de 1867. Etude sur le dualisme* (Paris: Éditions Cujas, 1967[1904]).

[58] For a summery of the ideas of Eötvös see Riders, "L'aigle..."; also, Paul Bődy, *Joseph Eötvös and the Modernization of Hungary, 1840-1870* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1972), and the same author's chapter on Eötvös in *Hungarian Statesmen of Destiny, 1860-1960*, ed. Paul Bődy (Highland Lakes, NJ: Atlantic Research and Publications, 1989. Social Sciences Monograph series [Boulder, CO], Distributed by Columbia University Press).

[59] Marés, "Louis Eisenmann...", p. 230.

[60] *Ibid.*

[61] *Ibid.*, p. 231. Translation: "First, by the feeling the Hungarians had of being between the two gigantic pincers of a nutcracker; Second, by the consciousness of being a drop in the Slavonic ocean; Third, by the negative experience of Austria, which allowed nationalities sufficient freedom to express themselves, to the detriment of the Germans; Fourth, by character traits of the Hungarian race, a kind of innate authoritarianism, what was left of the spirit of conqueror, a dominating instinct that is represented in this nobility, of which Tisza was the archetypal representative."

[62] *Ibid.*

[63] From 1905 to 1913 he taught at Dijon.

[64] The position was first held by Ignace Kont.

[65] Jacques Droz, "Saint-René Taillandier et la Double Monarchie," *Études danubiennes*, 5, 2 (1989).

[66] Droz, "Les historiens français..."; Charue, "Les slavistes français..."; Le Riders, "La France et l'identité...".

[67] Antoine Marés, "Les Français face au concept d'Europe centrale et orientale," *Cahier des civilisations de l'Europe centrale et du Sud-Est*, 1 (1983): 11-14.

[68] Le Riders, "La France et l'identité...".

[69] Marés, "Les Français face...," p. 14. Translation: "it is important to Europe that the Habsburg Empire not be at the mercy of German policy. Austria-Hungary remains the corner stone of Europe. The West and the East have an equal interest in the Empire remaining independent in fact and in law."

[70] Jacques Droz, *L'Europe centrale. Évolution historique de l'idée de Mitteleuropa* (Paris: Payot, 1960), 200. Translation: "My personal opinion, and that of most French who travelled on the shores of the Danube in recent years, is that the Habsburg Monarchy is consolidating. As for trialism, I dare not foretell what will come of it, if it ever comes about, but what I do know is that its Austrian supporters, far from seeing in the development of this doctrine a cause of weakness and separatism, advocate it as a way to strengthen the central authority, the dynasty's prestige, the chances of expansion of the Monarchy towards the Balkans, and to reduce on the other hand the most dangerous particularist opposition,..."

[71] Droz, "Les historiens français...", pp. 68-69. Translation: "Almost all the peoples who live under the dual monarchy wish to modify its status rather than ruin its foundations. If there were a war, even with Serbia and Russia, there would undoubtedly be incidents, individual defections, or rebellions by small units; but the army as a whole is loyal; it has a state patriotism that is based on the oath to the Sovereign; it will be faithful to this oath."

[72] According to Hunyadi, the Magyarization policy "was solely aimed at improving the learning process of the Hungarian language, and not at banning the use of the mother language. The progress of the Hungarian language was in fact relatively slow, thus proving the inefficiency of the methods used and the absence of coercive measures. Rather, it could be said that the Hungarians showed that assimilation should not be sought." See Istvan Hunyadi, "L'image de la Hongrie...", p. 174.

[73] After the war, certain people, including C. A. Macartney for example, presented the two sides of the question, without however endorsing either. See C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors: The Treaty of Trianon and Its Consequences, 1919-1937* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1937), 2nd edition, 1965.

[74] Hunyadi, "L'image de la Hongrie...", p. 175.

[75] Michel, "Le rôle d'Ernest Denis...", p. 25.

[76] Bohumila Ferencuhova, "Les slavisants français et le mouvement tchécoslovaque à l'étranger au cours de la Première Guerre mondiale," *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains*, no. 169 (1993), p. 32. Translation: "the ethical foundation of the Entente peace program: the League of Nations, the right of peoples to self-determination, [in addition to] the liquidation of Austria-Hungary and the birth of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia,...."

[77] According to Hunyadi, there was no colonization during the war.

[78] Ernest Denis, *La question d'Autriche. Les Slovaques* (Paris: Delagrave, 1917), 29. Translation: "Since the beginning of the war, the Magyars have applied a policy of extermination in the regions [inhabited by] the Croatians, Serbians, and Romanians: they have deported the inhabitants by the tens of thousands, and they have replaced them everywhere they could by Magyar settlers."

[79] *Ibid.*, pp. 38-41. See also Ernest Denis, *La Guerre. Causes immédiates et lointaines. L'intoxication d'un peuple. Le traité* (Paris: Delagrave, 1915), 336-337. Translation: "Austria must be divided into independent states; on the one hand the Serbo-Croato-Slovenian kingdom, extending to the Danube between Vienna and Raab, and on the other hand the state of Czechoslovakia, extending

from the Danube to Poland and Russia. These small states are too weak to seek adventures and threaten anybody but will be watchful of Germany. Their experience will enable them to avoid frustrating the other ethnic groups. The Czechs and Slovaks will live in good terms (...) as they are brothers (...). If the ties that link the Slovakians to Hungary are not broken, they are condemned to become prey to the Hungarians; they will therefore be the victims of Germany."

[80] Pseudonym of Jules Eugène Pichon, lecturer at the Czech University of Prague.

[81] Yet Tisza was not the keenest supporter of an armed action against Serbia following the Sarajevo assassination. He truly accepted the risk of a war following the delivery of the July 19, 1914 ultimatum. On this question, see Jean-Paul Bled, *François-Joseph.*

[82] Ernest Denis, "Preface," in Jules Chopin, *L'Autriche-Hongrie, brillant second* (Paris: Éditions Bossard, 1917), p. X.

[83] *Ibid.*, p. XVI.

[84] *Ibid.*, pp. XXVII-XXVIII. Translation: "a shiver of horror runs down our spines when we hear Tisza say at the tribune that in no other country do nationalities find a more favourable ground for their development than in Hungary. In a flash, we see marching before our eyes the endless procession of victims whose throats were cut by Magyar pride, and we can smell the bitter odour of blood."

[85] Marés, "Louis Eisenmannn...", pp. 231-32. Translation: "Our intellectual influence is a national force and wealth and may be our most precious weapon in the competition of nations; in a certain way, the extension of our intellectual clientele counterbalances the disastrous consequences of our low birth rate and reduces the numerical disproportion of the French cultural group as compared to Anglo-Saxons and Russians (...); our ambitions are deliberately limited by the weakness of our population and by the principles we fight for. But we must strive to maintain our position among the main powers. It is in the moral and intellectual order, by reaffirming and extending our traditional mission of protectors and promoters of young, weak, and oppressed nationalities, that with our original role, we will find the surest guarantee of our influence, prestige, and authority in Europe and the world. Any people that demonstrates a true sense of freedom and justice has a right to our help. What reason would we have to refuse it to a renewed, democratic and progressive Hungary?"

[86] Louis Eisenmann, "La solidarité Slave. Conférence faite le 1er avril 1916 à l'Institut d'Études Slaves," excerpt from *La Nation Tchèque*, Paris, (November-December, 1916), p. 15.

[87] *Ibid.*

[88] Louis Eisenmann, "La Maison d'Autriche et les Nationalités," *Foi et Vie*, Paris, (August 1-16, 1916), p. 143.

[89] On Eötvös see Bődy, *Joseph Eötvös.*

[90] Eisenmann, "La Maison d'Autriche...," p. 144.

[91] Eisenmann, "Preface," in *Magyars et Pangermanistes*, ed. Jules Chopin and Stephen Osusky (Paris: Éditions Bossard, 1918), p. IV.

[92] This is the imperial idea.

[93] Eisenmann, "La Maison d'Autriche...," p. 149. Translation: "The Magyars, who had suffered from the imperial idea as much as the other peoples, if not more, and who had fought against it with all the others, adjusted to it. As soon as it was no longer an immediate and direct threat, they associated with the dynasty policy, a policy of inequity, in the hope of sharing its imaginary profits. They repudiated the tradition of their most noble minds, of the great and wise Déak, and of the profound and sensitive Etövös; they denied the principles written by their Parliament in a solemn text, the famous 1868 legislation on nationalities. With Coloman Tisza, father of the current Prime Minister, Count Etienne Tisza, they preferred resorting to a narrow policy of violent chauvinism and brutal Magyarization."

[94] *Ibid.*, p. 152. The Translation is: "The Magyars avoided this danger. They owed this to the victory of the Allies. Whatever national independence they kept, they owed it to the help of the Allies-not for them, who did not deserve it, who were unfaithful to justice, unfaithful to their mission, unfaithful to the hope that was given them by the overly confident liberal powers of the West, France and England, whose sympathy had always supported, comforted, and encouraged them in their hardships and misfortunes, but for the other peoples of Austria-Hungary, for the nationalities that had been faithful to justice, faithful to their mission, and that the Allies could never accept to abandon to German greed, to which they owe and will grant freedom. The Magyars, as the other nationalities, will avoid the peril because the Allies will destroy Austria, which has become a mere passive instrument, a mere servant, of Germany."

[95] Charue, "Les slavistes français...," p. 131. Translation: "One can only be struck by the violence expressed by L. Léger and E. Denis as of 1915 [and Eisenmann as early as 1916], at a time when the destruction of the double monarchy is hardly contemplated anywhere. [...] One might ask why these attacks are mainly directed against Austria-Hungary. Two series of causes were combined: one dealt with the circumstances; the other involved the very nature of Austria-Hungary."

[96] *Ibid.*, p. 132. Translation: "arrive at a lasting peace, based on guarantees to ensure security, not only theirs, but mainly that of their descendants.... As was the case for their contemporaries, this was in fact a form of patriotism: as intellectuals and scholars, they put their learned knowledge and personal relations, in this case the Slavists, official or potential allies of the Triple Entente, at the service of their country."

[97] Denis, *La Guerre....*

[98] Charue, "Les slavistes français...," p. 134. Translation: "It was two fundamental principles, and even two concepts of the world, that were opposed. To the principle of nationalities and the right of peoples to self-determination was opposed the notion of European balance, i.e. in fact more or less amiable agreements between sovereigns. For the democracy derived from the French Revolution, any sovereignty lies with the people and is totally incompatible with the idea of a natural or vocational monarchy desired by or derived from God based on the principle of *omni potestas a Deo.*"

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Militia Violence and State Power in Hungary, 1919-1922

Béla Bodó

This essay deals with an under-researched and an over-politicized topic in Hungarian history: militia violence against civilians after World War One. As far as this topic is concerned, historians before the collapse of the one-party state in 1989 focused their attention on two inter-related questions: the responsibility of Regent Miklós Horthy for the atrocities and the continuity between the White Terror, as this period of militia and state violence had been known in Hungary and Europe since the 1920s, and the interwar regime. Ignoring evidence that could have suggested a more nuanced conclusion, they argued that Admiral Horthy controlled the militias and, as their "Leader," he bore both direct and indirect responsibility for their crimes. Seeking to paint as dark picture of the interwar regime and elite as possible, Marxist historians argued that the elite had never eliminated the militias. Integrated, they claimed, in large numbers into the police, the army and the state bureaucracy, the militias continued to function as a reserve army until 1945.[1]

The quality of books and articles on the interwar regime has improved significantly during the last fifteen years. In regards to militia violence, some of the gross oversimplifications have been eliminated. Recent studies point out that many army units and militias were not under Horthy's control; even those militias that recognized Horthy as their leader did not necessarily carry out his orders. Present-day historians also tend to a draw a more solid line between the post-war period, characterized by chaos and random violence, and the subsequent rule of the consolidated conservative regime.[2] Unfortunately, none of these works deal directly with militia violence. Thus many relevant issues still have to be explored and, because of the unreliability of earlier works, many old questions have to be revisited. We do not even know, for example, how many people were killed during the White Terror. The religious, social and ethnic compositions of both the perpetrators and the victims are still to be explored; the social causes of the White Terror and the psychologi-

cal motives of the perpetrators still have to be explained. Violence against women, a strong aspect of the White Terror, has so far been completely ignored. There has been no attempt, moreover, to compare the militias with similar units in other countries after the Great War, thus to put the issue of militia violence in a wider European context. Finally, the larger theoretical questions still have to be raised: does state power originate in violence? Was militia violence in Hungary a creative or a purely destructive force? Does power grow out of the barrel of gun as the Chinese Communist leader Mao Tse-tung believed? Does violence function as the "midwife of history," constantly bringing forth social and political organizations and structures, or does it represent a purely destructive and historically barren force as philosopher Hannah Arendt argued?[3]

In this essay I seek to answer some of these larger questions by examining the complex relationship between the local and national elite and the most important militia unit, the Prónay Battalion between 1919 and 1923. In this paper I will argue that the militias played a complex role in Hungarian society: their destructiveness notwithstanding, the rogue military units fulfilled useful functions by responding positively to the material needs of at least some segments of the population. The economic and political consolidation of the counter-revolutionary regime made the militias as service providers obsolete; simultaneously, conciliation strengthened the hands of the political and military elite by giving them both the means and the nerve to threaten the militias. In this paper, I argue that moral outrage over militia crimes played only a minor role in the final break between the radical and the authoritarian Right. What separated the conservatives from the right radicals was not greater respect for human rights and more ethnic and religious tolerance, even if conservatives, indeed, tended to possess more of these qualities. Rather it was their ability to view politics as a multi-dimensional game and, if necessary, to control and even sacrifice their prejudices at the altar of power. The elite finally turned against the militias because, with the onset of consolidation, the rouge military units had lost their usefulness, and also because they had become a threat to the counter-revolutionary regime. The recognition of the threat posed by the extreme right, rather than the integration at least some of the members of the militias into the interwar army, police and bureaucracy, I believe, represented the most important legacy of the White Terror. Conservatives' fear and distrust of right radial movements and the behind-the-scenes conflict between the two remained the a salient feature of Hungarian political life until 1944.

Anomie and the Source of Militia Violence

By browsing through the police reports, the court documents and the correspondence between military units and various ministries that can be found in the files of the Prónay Battalion at the Archive of the Ministry of Defense in Budapest, one is struck by the similarities between common, especially juvenile, crimes and those committed by the officers of this unit. Gang-style tactics, such as random violence and bullying validated as defense of personal honour, characterize many of the complaints raised against the officers of the Prónay Battalion in police and court records. The perpetrators, like Lieutenant László Thiringer, were typical bullies who rationalized and, to the authorities, tried to justify their aggression by accusing their victims of having unpatriotic or leftist sympathies. On leave in his hometown in Western Hungary, Thiringer beat up a young blue-collar worker, Antal Véber, in the local movie theatre and then handed him over to the police. Thiringer claimed that Véber was a saboteur and an enemy of the Hungarian nation because he booed a documentary that demanded the restoration of Hungary's old borders. Véber told the court that politics was not on his mind at all; he did not understand the documentary and only wanted the feature presentation to start.[4]

In an earlier article, I argued that militia violence had two sources: first, it had to do with the ways in which young soldiers from the elite and the middle class perceived and interpreted the actions of their real or alleged enemies, such as the Jews, working-class activists and radical peasants. This perception was in turn shaped by middle-class values fostered by elite and middle-class institutions, such as the nuclear family, schools and universities, social clubs, political parties and the army. Leaning heavily on the works of Adorno, Fromm and Theweleit, I contended that individuals with peculiar personality structure, i.e. "authoritarian personality types," flocked into the militias. Rouge military units, such as the Prónay Battalion attracted exceptionally cruel individuals. With Christopher Browning, who looked at the history of a police unit in Nazi-occupied Poland, I also argued that perpetual violence, by constantly weeding out the faint-hearted and by turning the timid into hardened killers, tended to reinforce the results of self-selection. The militias differed from regular army units in many respects: recruitment and promotion were based political reliability and personal relations, rather

than on qualifications and merit. Turnover in the officers' detachments was high: officers and soldiers often changed units or left the scene altogether. Prónay's leadership style was charismatic, while modern armies prefer bureaucratic leaders. The officers' detachments had no clear place in the military hierarchy and enjoyed privileges not awarded to regular units. The relationship of the Prónay Battalion with the civilian population both lacked structure and was wrought by distrust, violence and exploitation. The rogue military units in short displayed all the symptoms of an unsettled situation: they were both the product and the cause of chaos. Since the main militia leaders did not enter the army and the state bureaucracy, there was no direct link, I argued, between the militias and the interwar army, just as there was no direct link between the White Terror and the authoritarian regime.[5]

In this essay, I intend to take the argument a step forwards. Militia violence, I plan to argue, cannot be reduced to self-selection and structural peculiarities: the torture and murder of civilians were also the product of a social phenomenon known as "anomie" or "normlessness." The term anomie was first used by the French sociologist Emil Durkheim at the turn of the century and after the Second World War was expanded upon by the American sociologist Robert Merton and his students. While Durkheim perceived normlessness as the result of modernization, Merton understood it as the possible outcome of creative discrepancy between "culturally defined goals, purposes, and interests held out as legitimate objectives for all members of the society" and culturally approved means of reaching these goals. In the absence of a rough balance between the two, aberrant behaviour and the development of aberrant personality types followed. Merton distinguished among five types of personality types; all except the conformist represented deviant responses. The conformist accepted both societal goals and means. The innovator accepted the goals but rejected the means for their achievement. Common criminals usually fell into this category: they usually subscribed to culturally accepted goals, such as wealth and high socials status, and used any means to reach them. The ritualist, typically a bureaucrat, obeyed and enforced the rules but forgot about their original purpose. The retreatist rejected both the culturally set goals and culturally approved means. This was the normal behaviour of alcoholics, drug addicts and other asocials who vented their aggression on their own body and mind. Finally, the rebel did not stop at rejecting both means and end but continued to search for and,

if found, sought to realize alternative societal goals, even if this implied recourse to violence.[6]

Anomie among officers took many forms; it manifested itself, among other things, in asocial behaviour and arbitrary violence against civilians. On return to the military base from a weekly leave, Ernő Prost, another member of the Prónay Battalion, asked his fellow officer on the train to hold his seat while he had a drink in the train restaurant. A young civilian by the name of János Kaspár entered the compartment and took, despite the passenger's protest, Prost's seat. The returning Prost and his comrade manhandled the hapless civilian and then handed him over to the military police at the next station for allegedly making disrespectful remarks about the National Army.[7] Just how little regard and patience officers of the Prónay Battalion had for civilians can also be seen from the case of Second Lieutenant Károly Kmetty. He got involved in a minor car accident while transporting musical instruments in his vehicle. The neck of the cello (bőgő) broke off and the infuriated Kmetty pulled out his revolver and threatened to shoot the offending driver and his passenger. His men succeeded in calming him down; the officers in the end "only" punched their victims in the face and then tied their hands to the bumper of Kmetty's car.[8]

Normlessness implied a disregard for professional codes of conduct, middle-class etiquette and everyday social conventions. The primary sources show that military officers represented a threat to civilians not only as in the roles of enforcers but also as private individuals, including customers. Prónay's men thus provoked a fight with the male staff and the friends of a local brothel in the second district of Budapest because the staff refused to open the door of the establishment after midnight.[9] While the female employees of the local brothel escaped the encounter with the intoxicated bullies, István Bodor, a staff member in Hotel Imperial in Budapest, was not so lucky. He was arrested by officers of the Prónay Battalion for allegedly stealing from them. The officers transported him to the military base in Kelenföld, on the outskirts of Budapest, where he was kept in jail and periodically tortured for four weeks.[10]

Officers usually justified their actions by pointing to the alleged failure of their victims to "show respect." Hence they not only behaved but also talked like criminals: violent criminals too, sociologists and criminologists point out, cite lack of respect on their victims' part as the triggering mechanism for their aggression.[11] Similarity in language and motive was not an accident. Both prisons and army barracks are in

Merton's term "total institutions:" they use similar techniques to annihilate the old self and foster new personality types. Both criminals and officers follow rigid honour codes and keep their distance from civilians. This structurally produced gap between professional soldiers and civilians, if anything, widened in Hungary in the modern era. Professionalization increased segregation, while the ideology that buttressed this process encouraged officers to see themselves as physically and morally superior to the rest of the population. The officers' exulted view of themselves and their job clashed with the more negative perception of their profession by the general public, which continued to fear and distrust men in uniform. Some of this fear and distrust had political roots: in Hungary, the population historically associated the army with the alien Habsburg dynasty and with German domination. While in the decades before the Great War population may have become more friendly towards professional soldiers, as careers in the army became more available to both ethnic Hungarians and talented men of the middle and lower classes, the lost war and the revolutions, all of which implied the abuse of recruits by officers, reopened old wounds. Arbitrary violence and the requisition of goods both by Red and White military units only fostered the popular view that officers were essentially middle and upper-class criminals in uniforms.

Militia Violence as a Form of Profiteering

As a result of enforced segregation, officers moved clumsily in the civilian world and tended to respond violently to any real or imagined threat to self-image and honour. Militia violence had multiple causes, and normlessness defined as the outcome of the growing gap between "culturally defined goals and socially approved means" was one of them. The post-war social and economic crisis touched the armed forces directly as officers complained bitterly about the inability of the government to provide their men with shelter, uniform, food and equipment.[12] The military tried to solve this crisis by wrenching up the violence against and by exploiting more the civilian population. Marxist historians grasped upon attacks on civilians as a proof that militia violence had been informed by class hatred and interest and that the rogue military units were doing the bidding of the elite. They were not entirely wrong: in dozens of cases the militias not only tortured and killed but also stole from poor peasants. One squad of the Prónay Battalion, for example, requisitioned

the grain of poverty-stricken estate servants in the village of Solt in the fall of 1919.[13] Yet, archival sources also show that the officers did not much care about the social background of their victims. In the village of Nagybajom, for example, Prónay's men emptied the cellars of the local tavern keeper, Mrs. Sándor Zavagyil.[14] They also stole pigs from the estate of a noble man in the vicinity of Debrecen. They injected the poor animals with morphine to prevent them from squeaking.[15] In short, the marauding troops if anything posed a greater threat to the relatively well-to-do, in the process reinforcing the traditional distrust by the civilian population of men in uniform — regardless of their class background.

Normlessness implied the transformation of values, the turning of allegedly selfless officers into armed criminals interested primarily in material gains. The leaders of the Prónay Battalion interpreted their privilege to requisition goods and equipment for military purposes broadly enough to enrich themselves. The Battalion seems to have worked out a system to steal motorcycles and automobiles. The chauffeur of the Battalion, János Kukucska, and two or three of his comrades, roamed the streets to gather information on vehicles and their owners. They reported their findings back to Lieutenant István Déván, an enforcer and infamous torturer of Jewish Hungarians. Déván, or someone of his ilk, then paid a visit to owners and, by using a transparent pretext, confiscated the vehicle. Sometimes, as in the case of Sándor Sándor, they encountered resistance. Sándor, the son of a wealthy Jewish businessman and a reserve lieutenant, was not prepared to part with his beloved Puch motorcycle. To save his vehicle, Sándor told Déván that the motorcycle was still registered in the name of his non-Jewish friend, First Lieutenant Károly Matuska. He even had the courage to call in the police to settle the dispute. However, the guardian of law and order, rather predictably, took Déván's side. Prónay's man then took the vehicle and brought it to the officers' headquarters in Hotel Britannia.[16]

The illegal confiscation of private vehicles created a public outrage among the well-to-do. In mid-1920, the Ministry of Defense, under pressure from the same group, ordered Prónay to hand over six cars and one truck (one Mercedes, one Opel, one Daimler, two Benz and one Sisere-Nandin) to the Ministry. It also demanded proof that the commanders of the Battalion were in legal possession of the vehicles they had been driving. At the time of the request, Prónay owned two, a Ford and a Puch, cars. His subordinate, First Lieutenant Iván Héjjas was driving a Ford, while Captain Victor Ranzenberger had a Stoewer. Prónay was also

asked to account for the Fiat that he had received the previous year from the Ministry.[17] Prónay had failed to obey the orders because two weeks later the Ministry repeated the request.[18] His men also seized the Mercedes of a Greek citizen of most likely Jewish descent, Mór Schlesinger, sometime in 1920 or early 1921. To add insult to injury, they forced to the hapless man to pay 39,600 *koronas* for repairing the car that his men had crashed after the seizure. On May 20, 1921, Gendarme Colonel Rákosy, Prónay's new boss, sent a letter to Prónay demanding the immediate transfer of the Mercedes to the Ministry of Defense. The request was repeated on June 14. Four days later the Battalion informed Rákosy that the car had been returned to the garage of the Ministry of Defense. On June 27, the Ministry of Defense responded that they had not seen the vehicle. The outcome of the affair is unknown, but it is clear from the correspondence that Prónay had been playing a cat and mouse game with the Ministry of Defense and had no intention of returning the car.[19] In September, the increasingly frustrated Ministry of Defense decreed that no battalion could have more than three cars and two motorcycles and that the commander of each battalion had to report directly to the minister about carrying out this decree.[20] In October the Ministry of Defense was forced to contact Prónay again about a car that they had confiscated from a liquor manufacturer. The administrator in charge demanded, most likely in vein, to hand over the vehicle, with as explanation of why they had confiscated it in the first place, to the Ministry or return it immediately to its original owner.[21]

Occasionally, primary documents shed lights on the motives and mood of the perpetrators in action. They suggest that Prónay's men saw their actions as a pranks and their motives and mood resembled those of school-yard bullies pulling practical jokes on fellow students and teachers. On November 20, 1920, four officers stopped a truck carrying gasoline on the street of Budapest. The truck and the four barrels of gasoline belonged to Imre Gergely, a Catholic leather manufacturer from Transylvania who had set up shop in Csepel, the manufacturing district of greater Budapest. Instead of a receipt the officers handed the driver a note that read: "Thank you very much and please come again." Gergely estimated his damage at 40,000 *koronas*, which represented a small fortune in 1920.[22] The prank had of course a very practical purpose: stolen vehicle used gasoline which was also in short supply after the First World War. The Prónay files in the military archive show that Gergely was not the Battalion's only victim: between October 1919 and September 1920, at least a dozen indi-

viduals and companies were forced to hand over to Prónay's men their gasoline supply for little or no compensation.[23]

The Prónay Battalion's large appetite was not satisfied with the confiscation of military equipment, food, vehicles and gasoline. In September 1920, a detachment seized three cabinets, six tables, six chairs and one bench from a Jewish school in Kecskemét. In vain did the leaders of the local Jewish community demand the return of school property. The right-wing mayor of Kecskemét also sided with Prónay's men by invoking a war-time emergency law to justify the robbery, which had taken place almost three years after the end of the military conflict.[24] Jews and civilians may have been the main but far from the only target of confiscation measures. In February 1920, Prónay's men, in collusion with the guards, broke into the storage room of famous Komárom fort, stealing the furniture of officers permanently stationed there.[25] The heyday of the militias came, however, during the border conflict with Austria in the fall of 1921. Exploiting the absence of legitimate authority in Burgenland, the contested border region between Hungary and Austria, the militia lined their pockets by acting as customs officers and by stealing cars, motorcycles, pianos, oriental carpets, jewellery, clothing and food from the heavily German local population.[26]

While the commanders focused their attention on luxury items, lower-ranked officers used every chance, no matter how small the promise of reward was, to take advantage of the civilian population. Officers, such as Lieutenant Zsigmond Hubert, ran up high tabs in hotels and restaurants. At Hotel Britannia, Hubert accumulated a 476 *koronas* debt, which, despite repeated warning from the head waiter, he refused to settle.[27] Political assignments also offered an excellent opportunity not only to vent aggression but also personally profit. Lieutenant György Schefnik, who led the arrest of László Szamuely, the brother of infamous Communist Commissar Tibor Szamuely, at the end of 1919, provides a perfect example of such opportunism. Schefnik and his men rummaged through Szamuely's flat during the arrest and stole many of his valuables in the process. Despite repeated warnings from his superiors, Schefnik and his men failed to return the stolen objects at least until April 1921.[28] Sometimes, at bogus orders of their own creation, they broke into houses and took valuables with impunity. Thus, in January 1920, using a transparent political pretext, a squad of the Prónay Battalion raided the flat of Vilmos Horeczky on the Aréna Street in the heavily Jewish Seventh District of the city. During their search, they took jewellery and money in the value

of between 14,000 and 15,000 *koronas*. The wealthy and politically conservative Horeczky was confident enough to report the case directly to Admiral Horthy's office. The head of the National Army in turn ordered Prónay to return the stolen goods immediately. Unfortunately, I found no evidence as to whether Prónay carried out or, as he was prone to, ignored his superior's order.[29]

Anomie in a post-war context involved not only structural changes, such as a preference for charismatic rather than bureaucratic leadership, but also transfiguration of values. The militia members did not simply violate the honour codes of their profession but, both in lifestyle and ideological outlook began to resemble mobsters. The gap between ideology and officers' action had become unbridgeable: while ideologues continued to paint offices as men inexperienced and uninterested in business, the primary sources show that military officers were quite capable of drawing up and carrying out elaborate schemes. In November 1920, a civilian entered Manó Svirszki's candy shop in the Eötvös Street in Budapest. He introduced himself as József Kenéz, a seriously injured veteran of the war. Then he made a business proposition: he wanted to buy Svirszki's store and was prepared to pay 70,000 *koronas* for it. After some hesitation, Svirszki accepted what looked to him a generous offer; the business partners agreed to sign the contract in presence of an attorney the next day. Indeed, next day Kenéz handed over the attorney an envelope with 20,000 *koronas* as his pledge, and told Svirszki that the rest would follow after all the necessary paperwork had been completed. Satisfied, Svirszki returned to his flat where three men, two officers and one civilian, however, had been waiting for him. They arrested him on the charge of having sold his store at an unreasonably high price. Svirszki was taken to the officers' headquarter in Hotel Britannia and tortured repeatedly. With a bayonet pressed against his chest, he finally gave in and signed a paper acknowledging that he had sold his business to Kenéz for only 20,000 *koronas*, which he had already received. Svirszki was also forced to send a letter to his attorney, instructing him to hand over the envelope with the 20,000 *koronas* to the messenger. Svirszki's suffering did not come to an end with the loss of his livelihood. Emboldened by the success of their scheme, the officers demanded an extra 3,500 *koronas* from the unfortunate businessman "for their troubles." Under duress, Svirszki agreed but the officers then raised the price again to 100,000 *koronas*. They told him that he should not hesitate to accept their offer otherwise they, the officers, "would feel compelled to resort to more

forceful measures" both against him and his family members. Svirszki, at his wit's end, told the officer that he did not have that kind of money. Finally, the officers reduced the price to 10,000 *koronas*. Svirszki owed his life to an accident: the government troops and police squads, for reasons that had nothing to do with the tortured businessman, besieged Hotel Britannia in November 1920. In an effort to eliminate all incriminating evidence, the officers sneaked Svirszki out the back door. Encouraged by the government's action, Svirszki gathered enough courage to tell his story to the newspapers.[30]

The internment of political prisoners, in addition to the psychological payoffs, represented another opportunity for officers to enrich themselves. Officers, like Lieutenant Antal Molnár, at Prónay's order, toured the country, collecting information from local dignitaries, spies and informers and arresting "Communists and Communist sympathizers who pose a threat to peace, order and social stability." On the basis of these vague charges, he and his men arrested 33 individuals in the village of Fegyvernek and its vicinity in early June 1920.[31] Many of these detainees were brutally tortured and subsequently murdered by his men.[32] The following week, Molnár and his men visited his home town Szolnok and extorted between 50 and 60,000 *koronas*, which was a fortune at the time, from local Jews eager to avoid deportation, imprisonment and possible death.[33] The local military commander was so outraged by this event that he ordered the arrest of Molnár's brother and father as accomplices and also sent a letter to the military command in Budapest requesting the immediate detention of Antal Molnár.[34] What punishment Molnár received from Prónay remains unknown, however; in any case, it could not be serious because he remained a member of Prónay's entourage for the next two years.

The primary sources make it clear that the Prónay Battalion used politics to act out their ethnic prejudices, vent their aggression and, at the same time, steal from Jews. In Kiskunhalas, on May 13, 1920, three members of the Battalion ordered Sándor Schwartz to appear at the local police station. He was accused of having torn down a political poster or flyer of the National Army. It is unclear if they had advised Schwartz to bring 10,000 *koronas* as well or the hapless man just happened to carry the cash in his case. Be as it may, the money was duly confiscated, and Schwartz was allowed to return home. A few hours later, however, Prónay's men entered his house in search of more cash and valuables. They found the hapless Schwartz at home and beat him to death. Later in

the night, two of the three men, accompanied by a local policeman, broke into the home of another Jewish businessman, Mór Hofmeister. They spared Hofmeister's life in return for 5,000 *koronas* and some jewellery. They also forced him to hand over an additional 14,000 *koronas* the next day.[35]

House searches and the arbitrary arrests of middle and upper middle-class Jewish Hungarians were motivated by greed and ethnic and religious hatred; political considerations served either as a pretext or, as the following example suggests, as a retroactive justification only. On May 7, 1920, in the village of Abony, a squad of the Prónay Battalion broke into the house of a widow, Mrs. László Verhovay and forced her to hand over 1,600 *koronas*. The next evening, they forced their way into the home of Ignác Deutsch; under duress, Deutsch gave them 1,200 *koronas*, two pairs of gold earrings and a few pieces of collectors' coins. Militia men then raped the seventeen- years old Margit Deutsch and the servant girl, Róza Mucsi; they took the gold ring off the half-conscious Margit Deutsch's hand and stole her gold earrings as well. The same night, the gang ransacked the house of Manó Pick; they got away with 9,000 *koronas* in cash, 40 litres of rum, 20 litres of wine and a few kilograms of sweets. On May 28, the same group broke into the houses of Jakab Albert, Sámuel Rechtschaffer and Miksa Véli. They killed Sámuel Rechtschaffer and seriously injured Albert, whom they beat with a leaded stick. To their disappointment, however, the night netted only a few hundred *koronas*, two hand watches and other small valuables. Significantly, none of the victims had anything to do with Communism or with politics.[36]

Relations with the Local Elite

Organizations, such as large businesses, tend to fulfil a wide variety of functions: some of these functions are legal, others operate in a morally and legally grey zone, while the rest are not only illegal but also harmful to the interests and wellbeing of the wider community. On the other end of the spectrum, the mafias tend to run not only illegal but also legal operations and sometimes even succeed in gaining public respect and official recognition. The rouge military units, such as the Prónay Battalion, similarly had a foot in both worlds. The militias survived until 1922 not only because they were made up by accomplished killers and bullies

but also because they fulfilled positive social functions and had roots in some communities. Unlike regular army units, the militias relied heavily on the material, moral and political support of individuals and social and professional groups. In return for their support, the militias often acted as patrons, advocates and arbiters of power struggles. In the village of Marczali, for example, Prónay's favourite was the local priest, András Tóth. He wrote regularly to Prónay, passing on information and denouncing municipal and county administrators as crypto-Communists or spineless opportunists. Tóth also asked Prónay to help him to get his former job back, a request that Prónay immediately forwarded to Horthy's office.[37] A year later, Prónay's right-hand man, Second Lieutenant Nándor Hertelendy, put pressure on the municipal council of Szentes to hire Tóth as a teacher. He told the council that Tóth had distinguished himself in the service of the counterrevolution. To extra weight to his recommendation, Hertelendy, however, also warned the civil servants that "if nice words do not do the job, well, then we will have to use something else." Outraged by this remark, the local notables denounced Hertelendy to General Kontz, the head of the gendarmes. General Kontz found no reason, however, to intervene and referred the case back to the battalion's commanders.[38]

In the chaotic circumstances of the post-war period, many individuals wanted to use the militias to cut through red tape and obtain unfair advantages. One of the most serious issues of the day was the lack of adequate housing, which, as the example of the sculptor Hugo Keviczky, who set his eyes on both the studio and the large flat of the famous Communist painter and cultural commissar Bertalan Pór, shows, could be solved by the militias. By playing up his nationalist credentials, Keviczky was able to get Pór's studio but not his adjacent apartment. The flat continued to be occupied by people whom Keviczky contemptuously described as Pór's "Galician-Jewish-Communist relatives." The right-radical newspaper, *Újlap* (New Paper) also came to Keviczky's aid. The *Újlap* told its readers that, while Communists, like Bertalan Pór, still owned two large houses in Budapest, men of such impeccable Christian and nationalist credentials and obvious talent as Keviczky, who had sculpted the legs of saints in the main Catholic Cathedral, the Basilica, in Budapest, had to live in a cramped apartment located in the outskirts of the city. The decision of the municipal government to deny Keviczky's request "violated the spirit of Hungarian nationalism because it favoured a guilty Communist émigré over an oppressed and much deserving

Christian artist."[39] In the name of "true art and Hungarian natural culture," Keviczky turned to Prónay and asked him to evict the present occupants, a family of five, from the coveted flat.[40]

The bureaucratic chaos and inefficiency, combined with the increased propensity of civilians to resort to violence in the aftermath of the war, forced in rare cases even Jews to turn to the militias for help. Miklós M. Lampel, a twenty-eight-year old Jewish wine merchant sought in vein to get back a large barrel from János Tarr. Tarr refused to return the barrel or provide compensation, by using the meek excuse: the barrel had been borrowed by his wife whom he had meanwhile divorced and the court had ruled that his ex-wife could not have more claim on him. The frustrated Lampel turned to the Prónay Battalion, because, as he later testified in the court, "I knew that the detachment could arrange everything quickly, and because by following the customary route I knew that I would never get my barrel back from Tarr." Lampel asked First Lieutenant Éliás to pay a visit Tarr in his hometown, Cegléd, and impound his wife's bracelet to cover all the expenses. At first everything seems to have gone according to plan: Éliás found Tarr in his vineyard in Cegléd and scared him into promising to return the barrel. Then he began bargaining with Tarr, demanding first 1000 *koronas* and then only 100 *koronas*. Tarr must have bought him off because in the end the barrel remained in Tarr's possession. The hapless Lampel had no other option but to seek justice in the court.[41]

The militias were locked in a mutually profitable relationship not only with selected individuals, but also with communities and professional organizations. The village of Orgovány, for example, requested Prónay's help for getting badly needed coal for the winter. In return they promised one wagon wheat as "a gift" next year, adding that they might give even more to "the best of the Hungarian soldiers" in the case of a good harvest.[42] In his letter, Prónay thanked the "upright Hungarians of Orgovány from the bottom of his Hungarian heart." He warned that "in time like this we decent Hungarians have to stick together; we have to show iron will and stubborn determination and do everything in our power to prevent the repetition of the Red scandals of the recent past." He then added that he had already talked to Gottlob Rauch, the Commissar for Coal Procurement, who promised to send two wagons of coal to Orgovány in October. In closing, Prónay expressed his wish that he and the villagers "would continue, shoulder-to-shoulder, their life-and-death-struggle against the enemies of our nation."[43] In early July 1920, Prónay

asked the Ministry of Defense to not purchase goods from Jews or employ them as intermediaries. The Ministry, he argued, had to draw lessons from the lost war and the two revolutions. Instead of giving favours to "court Jews" (udvari zsidók), it should avail itself of the good services of the Baross Alliance, an umbrella organization of Christian artisans and shopkeepers, whose leaders he knew and whom he trusted because they had proven their loyalty to the counter-revolution.[44]

Among the right radical organizations, it was the Awakened Hungarians' Association (Ébredő Magyarok Egyesülete or ÉME) that had the strongest ties with the Prónay Battalion. The leaders of the ÉME in Orgovány trusted their ties with Prónay enough to request the discharge of their members from military service.[45] In Pápa, ÉME members were infuriated by the arrest of Dr. Béla Zakos, a high school teacher and one of the leaders of the organization. Zakos was accused of providing support for the Communists before August 1919. The local landowner, Dr. Miklós Jókay, wrote Prónay a long letter on Zakos' behalf, asking him to facilitate his immediate release.[46] László Bokor, a right radical journalist and head of the ÉME in Szeged, begged Prónay to do the same for his friend and fellow ÉME member, First Lieutenant Tibor Farkas. He was detained on the order of by Major Shvoy for forcing the Gypsy violinist in a local tavern to play repeatedly the infamous anti-Semitic ditty, *Ergerberger*, and for resisting arrest by the military patrol.[47] Bokor described the whole incidence as the work of Jews and told Prónay that the local ÉME stood solidly behind Farkas.[48]

The boundaries between right radical civilian organizations and the militias were fluid: Prónay was one of the leaders of the ÉME and he and his men helped to establish and maintain ÉME cells in many communities. On the other hand, many ÉME members, especially university students but also local notables, served in the militias for a few months. Right radical civilian organizations provided the militias with material and, through their newspapers, schools and clubs, with moral support. In return, they used the rogue military units to carry out pogroms and settle scores with their local political adversaries. Thus, in an anonymous letter written in mid-July 1920, "the "Christian population of Fegyvernek" denounced the local physician, Dr. Zsigmond Klein, as a trouble maker. According to the letter, Klein spoke ill of the Prónay Battalion in public, calling the officers and rank-and-file of the unit murderers.[49] A week later, the local notables, including the village mayor, sent a second letter to Prónay. In it they informed Prónay that after the departure of his battal-

ion, Dr. Klein told the people around him that "these White bastards are responsible for everything; you can be sure that they will all end up on the gallows. I will not forget their faces and will tell the Russians everything so that each and every one of them will be hanged."[50] The Prónay Battalion reacted to the letters of denunciation in their customary manner. On July 28, 1920, Dr. Klein's remains were found in the outskirts of the village. The county physician, Dr. János Gimpel, noted the deep wound in the left side of Dr. Klein's chest and blood stain on the back of his right hand. From this evidence, he concluded that Dr. Klein must have committed suicide.[51]

Conflict with Police and Military Authorities

The murder of Dr. Klein and similar crimes must have provided local ÉME members with a certain degree of satisfaction. Grasping onto similar events, traditional Marxist historiography argued that the militias and the local elites not only shared the same interests but the rogue military units also acted as the latter's puppets. Archival sources show that the relationship between the two was indeed very complex, and in many cases local gendarme and army officers and civil servants either looked the other way or actively encouraged the atrocities. However, the same sources also indicate that that the relationship between the two groups was wrought with tension, and perhaps in the majority of cases local authorities, not to mention the wider population, were opposed to continued violence. As the following case studies demonstrate, traditional authorities were increasingly frustrated by the inability and unwillingness of militia members to observe the officers' codes of conduct. Worse still, Prónay's men often succeeded in turning what were essentially petty crimes into political events. On leave Lieutenant Molnár, for example, showed up uninvited at the ball of the local manufactures' association in his home town Szolnok. The organization had many Jewish members and, to insult them, Molnár called on the Gypsy musicians to play the infamous anti-Semitic ditty "Ergerberger." To the outraged organizer Molnár responded that "I am a member of both the ÉME and the Prónay Battalion; therefore, I can do anything." Molnár also shrugged off the arriving police with the remark that "go to hell, you nothing, you lowly (közönséges) policemen." He finally left the establishment screaming that "I am going to report every-

thing to Lieutenant-Colonel Prónay; you'll see, he will come down here and clean up this place."[52]

It seems that Prónay' men went out of their way to insult local policemen and military officers. In April 1920, lieutenants László Vannay and Árpád Ráth forbade a gendarme in the village of Solt to look into the pogrom, which their unit had committed only a few months earlier. They sent him back to the gendarme headquarters with the message that the gendarmes had no right to prevent attacks on Jews and if they had continued to insist on carrying out the investigation "they would be swept away along with the Jews."[53] In most case, local gendarmes, who had come from peasant backgrounds and were therefore likely to be deferential towards officers of middle-class and often gentry background, simply complied with their orders. Yet, especially in larger towns and in the capital, police officers displayed more courage. Thus gendarme officer Lajos Labát Ligeti did not hesitate to arrest Ferenc Nagy for having started a brawl, even though Nagy told him that he would notify Prónay and with his help he would smash the entire gendarme unit.[54] The militias also stopped the car of a high-ranking police officer, Jánossy, in Budapest and told him to "get out of the car, you Jew and take your slut with you!" Jánossy neither forgot nor forgave the incident; a few days later he and fifteen of his policemen, dressed in civilian dress, prepared a surprise for the officers. The militia men entered a downtown café, frequented mainly by Jews, and demanded that the clients identify themselves by pulling down their pants. Jánossy and his men were not amused by the rough joke and arrested the trouble makers on the spot. The officers were transported to the district police headquarters, where they were severely beaten.[55]

By the summer of 1920, the police in Budapest had recognized the threat that the Prónay Battalion posed not only to the wellbeing of individual policemen but also to the survival of the new counter-revolutionary regime and, as the story of Reserve Lieutenant Vilmos Rácz shows, they were prepared to act. Vilmos Rácz was a gentleman farmer-turned-businessman, who operated a number of "theatres" in the main amusement park, the *Angol Park*, in Budapest. When the police closed down his theatres because he had failed to pay his fees on time, Rácz first had written a long letter to the police chief of Budapest, Dr. György Mattasovszky requesting a new permit. Having received no answer, he then paid a visit to Mattasovszky's assistant and told him that he was now going to turn to the Prónay Battalion as "the only forum where people

with a just cause were listened to." The increasingly agitated Rácz finally broke into Mattasovszky's office and gave him an ultimatum: either he issued a permit immediately or Rácz and the Prónay Battalion would "smash the Budapest police to pieces." The police chief "shrugged me off in the coldest possible manner," Rácz latter recalled the confrontation. Seething with anger, Rácz then sent his friends, István Balassa and István Csaba, both officers of the Prónay Battalion, to Mattasovszky to "demand an explanation." The two friends did not find the police chief at home but left him a message challenging him to a duel. However, Mattyasovszky was in no mood for duelling. Instead he put Rácz behind bars and ordered the immediate detention of the two officers as witnesses to a crime. Then he placed the entire police force in the city on alert in expectation of a militia coup. As the air cleared the next few days with no coup having been attempted, the police chief decided to release Rácz on bail. The ex-lieutenant used his newly found freedom to write a long letter to the Ministry of Defense, denouncing Mattasovszky for failing to accept his challenge.[56] He also wrote a letter to Prónay explaining what had happened, asking for his continued support, and warning him that the whole case revolved around Mattasovszky's pathological hatred for the Prónay's Battalion, which was "thorn in his side."[57]

If the police increasingly saw militias "as a thorn in the side," local military commanders then had even more reason to complain, since the anti-social behaviour of Prónay's officers threatened their own reputation as officers. By behaving like bullies and issuing threats, Prónay's men, as the story of Lieutenant Rezső Schmidt shows, both embarrassed and made themselves hated by fellow officers. Schmidt disrupted a ball organized to honour local cadets in the town of Kecskemét by forcing the leading violinist to play only for him. Local officers got involved, put Schmidt in his place and thus the ball continued. Later in the night, however, the already drunken Schmidt jumped, or rather climbed, on the table and announced that, as a member of the Prónay Battalion, he had the right to have the Gypsy musician for himself. Taken to the balcony by fellow officers to get some cold air, Schmidt called the entire officer corps of the local Kecskemét regiment "destructive" and just before leaving the event challenged one of them to a duel.[58]

Schmidt's behaviour was ill suited to lowering tensions between the Prónay Battalion and regular army units, which in any case resented the favoured treatment that Prónay and his men received from Horthy. Just how poisoned the relationship between Prónay and many of local

commanders had become by the summer of 1920 can be seen from the weekly intelligence reports that Prónay sent to the Minister of Defense. Prónay used these reports to destroy the reputation and undermine the career of his colleagues. Thus he described Captain Rattinger, the military commander in Békés County as a one-time collaborator and Communist sympathizer. In the same letter, he called the head of the army unit in the town of Békéscsaba a "friend of Jews." While critical of high ranking officers, Prónay staunchly defended Lieutenant Huszka, his man on the ground. Huszka had a fallout with the local officers over the beating of a Romanian peasant whom he suspected of hiding arms. Prónay was infuriated by the soft-heartedness of his colleagues and demanded the reorganization of the military in Békés County on a strictly nationalist and anti-Semitic basis.[59]

The cause of tension between Prónay and the commander regular military units was not limited the lack of personal sympathies. In the final analysis, the conflict was rooted in differences in organizational structure and ideology: the militia leaders tended to be charismatic, while the commanders of regular army units practiced what Max Weber called a bureaucratic leadership style. The switch from charismatic to bureaucratic leadership style was, as the next case study suggests, difficult, if not outright impossible. Captain Kálmán Rácz, with Prónay's support, set up his own detachment recruited mainly from ex-soldiers in the Máramaros region at the end of 1919. The Detachment was to be used to re-occupy the newly separated region at the first favourable opportunity. In March 1920, at the order of the Ministry of Defense, the militia was integrated into a regular army unit, the Infantry Regiment of Mátészalka. At the first review, the Division Commander, Colonel Rubin asked Captain Rácz how he had been able to create such a disciplined unit. Captain Rácz replied that it was love and mutual trust between him and his soldiers that kept the unit together. Colonel Rubin's responded that "I spit on love and trust; what I need here is unconditional obedience." His remark was only the first of the many humiliations that the Detachment, according to Rácz, had to endure the following months. His officers especially resented Rubin's attempt to curtail political activities. On Rácz' and his officers' behalf, Prónay collected damaging information on Rubin and passed it on to the Minister of Defense. In one of his weekly intelligence reports, Prónay described Rubin as an inept professional and a spineless careerist. Rubin's incompetence, according to Prónay, caused the life of thousands of Hungarian soldiers at the Italian front during the last stage of the war.

Instead of being demoted, Rubin, thanks to his political skills and connections, moved further up on the bureaucratic ladder after the war. Still, his appointment as the Division Commander (hadosztály parancsnok) in Debrecen came as shock to everyone who had known him. Prónay closed the long litany of complaints about Rubin with the rhetorical question: "Why are we even pretending that the troops could ever come to trust such as a leader?"[60]

Archival sources make abundantly clear that regular army officers responded to Prónay's back-stabbing and intrigues in kind. By the end of 1920, rumours began to circulate in military circles about the imminent dissolution of the Prónay and the Osztenburg battalions. Regular officers, as the following short story shows, welcomed the news. A military patrol of the Abony-Zemplén Regiment questioned Lieutenant István Ö. Gyenes in the Helvéczia café in Budapest in November 1920. The leader of the patrol, Lieutenant Jenő Köröm, told Gyenes that he was going to take him into custody because "Prónay's men usually forge their identity papers." At the police station, Köröm made further inquires, and in the end, in a disappointed voice, remarked to Gyenes, "so, after all, your battalion has not yet been dissolved." After his release, Gyenes reported this humiliating incident immediately to his superior.[61]

Relations with the Political and Military Elite

Constant frictions with local administrators, policemen and army officers suggest that the militias, without a stable social base, could not take find their place in Hungarian society. Their greed and penchant for violence had an alienating impact not only workers and the agrarian poor but also on better-off peasants, professionals and civil servants. Unlike the fascist militias in Italy and the SA in Germany, the Prónay Battalion and similar units did not recognize the supremacy of any political party or movement. The logical choice of the militias in Hungary should have been the Christian Socialist movement, whose leaders shared Prónay's nationalism and violent racism and whose members were behind many pogroms after August 1919. Yet the movement lacked both strong leadership and cohesion, and soon became fragmented into a number of parties. Perceived by the entente powers as supporters of the Habsburg restoration, the Christian Socialist parties, moreover, did not have English and French

support, without which, no government could retain power for long in East Central Europe after The Fist World War.

Prónay was smart enough not to tie his fortunes to the Christian Socialist parties; he also made the right decision by supporting Horthy and the National Army against the various civilian, mainly Christian Socialist, governments in late 1919 and early 1920. In short, political calculation, distrust of civilian politicians, shared family and professional backgrounds and personal sympathies landed Prónay in Horthy's camp. He seems to have chosen well, since the Admiral was acceptable to Western powers and he shared Prónay's intense hatred of liberal and leftist politicians and the Jews. Yet, in the long run, Admiral proved to be a bad choice for Prónay. In his memoirs, Prónay painted Horthy as an intellectual lightweight, a babbler, a snob and an indecisive and somewhat spineless leader. This picture was more of caricature, since Horthy, his many weaknesses notwithstanding, did possess political talent. Unlike Prónay, Horthy at least recognized his limitations, and was wise enough to listen to his much better informed and more experienced advisors. After 1920, his circle of counsellors was increasingly dominated by conservative aristocrats. These advisors, like the socials group that they came from, were not interested in social and political experimentations; their goal was to restore, with minor modifications, the pre-war liberal-conservative system. In the fall of 1919, out of paranoia and as a form of retribution for Communist crimes, they tolerated and occasionally even encouraged state and militia violence against left-wing politicians and Jews. Interested in traditional domination rather than in power through direct violence, they tried to reduce and ultimately eliminate the atrocities as a feature of social and political life. Unlike Prónay and his officers, Horthy's aristocratic advisors had a more nuanced view of politics: they did not equate, for example, every liberal and socialist group with Communists. More moderate politicians, such as Prime Minister István Bethlen, were prepared to make concessions even to the Social Democratic Party in return for social peace, political toleration and entente support.[62] While Horthy would have liked to ignore socialist complaints about the White Terror altogether, he was smart enough not to close his ears to whispers coming from his moderate advisors and the representatives of the entente powers, both of which had expressed concern about the continued suppression of the socialist movement and the trade unions. The same can be said about militia violence against Jews. His dislike of the Jews notwithstanding, Horthy could not overlook the negative impact

of the pogroms on public opinions abroad and on the heavily Jewish entrepreneurial class at home.

The exclusion of the militias from political life took more than two years because the officers' detachments had powerful friends both in the army and the state bureaucracy. Horthy counted as one of their supporters, even though the militia leaders' influence over him was more limited than many contemporaries and later historians believed.[63] The members of the rough military units could always count on the Regent's sympathy: while he did not necessarily support or even know about the atrocities, Horthy regularly became involved on the militias' behalf by preventing the civil and military courts from prosecuting militia men and by ordering the immediate release of those arrested or already convinced of crimes. Just how close he must have been to the militia leaders can be sensed from Horthy's memoirs: written more than thirty years after the events, in it the ex-regent of Hungary continued to make excuses for the murderers.[64]

Horthy and his political and military advisors were slow to get rid of the militias for a number of other reasons as well. First, they overestimated the power of the Left and remained paranoid about Communist coups. Second, the elite had a use for the militias in their multi-dimensional political game: the rogue military units with their well-known penchant for violence were well suited to frighten political opponents, ensure the desired outcome of elections and kept workers and peasants in their place. The members of the elite, Horthy included, were not ashamed to ask for the same kind of personal favours that helped to forge the alliance between the local elite and the militias. According to Prónay's memoirs, Horthy once asked him to recover some of his goods lost during the Communist regime. Horthy's advisor, Gyula Gömbös, and his *aide-de-camp*, László Magasházy, allegedly requested his help to beat up the Minister of the Interior Ödön Beniczky and other legitimists politicians.[65] The officers' detachments served a representative function as well: young and relatively good looking officers preferably from gentry background were often asked to serve as bodyguards, protect important sites and accompany Horthy and his trusted advisors, including the conservative István Bethlen, on longer trips. Finally, as mentioned above, there were cultural affinities reinforced by similar social origins, shared upbringing and family, friendship and professional ties that made the break with the militias especially painful for Horthy and some of his advisors.

It was the decreasing need for the militias as enforcers and bodyguards, combined with the fear of a right-wing coup, rather than moral outrage over militia crimes that put an end to the collaboration between the conservatives and members of the extreme Right. By the fall of 1921, the political and military elite had become as paranoid about a possible right-wing takeover of power as they had been about communist plots at the end of 1919. While not eager to provoke a confrontation, by the fall of 1921, the government felt strong enough to confront the militias by relying on regular army and police units.

The government's reluctance to confront the militias shows the depth of the economic, social, political and moral crisis in Hungary after the lost war the failed revolutions. The government sought to domesticate the militias by both gradually trimming their power and changing their structure. Both measures had produced, until the end of 1921, only limited results, as the quarrel over military intelligence demonstrates.

In the fall of 1919, the National Army created its own intelligence service to deal with domestic, mainly Communist, threats.[66] This intelligence function was essentially abrogated by the Prónay and the Osztenburg detachments, which, by using their network of spies, arrested, tortured and murdered people in large numbers. To end the abuse of power by the two battalions, in May 1920, the new Minister of War, General Károly Soós, proposed the creation of a central intelligence agency under the direct control of his ministry. This proposal, however, also led to a fight between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior, which wanted to reclaim what it perceived to be a police prerogative from the military. The Ministry of Defense in the end got its way by creating the Centre for Defense against Bolshevism (vörösvédelmi központ) under its tutelage.[67]

On June 11, 1920, bureaucrats in the Ministry of the Interior held a high-level meeting to deal with the public outcry over the continued arrest and imprisonment of innocent civilians by the militias. They decided to put an end to the military's intelligence service. The relevant decree by the Ministry of the Interior (4710/1920.ME.) was published in the *Budapesti Közlöny* on June 13, 1920. The law forbade military units to arrest and interrogate civilians. On June 13, 1920, as a reaction to the new law, the Minister of Defense met with his close advisors to discuss the issue of military intelligence. They concluded that military intelligence units had produced too many important results and "in spite of the mistakes of a few young officers, and the atrocities committed by non-

military elements," it would be a mistake to put an end to their operation. Determined to keep the power of the military intact, Soós issued a new law (1010.215/eln.C.1920.) on June 17: he renamed the Centre for Defense against Bolshevism the Information (tájékoztató) Service without, however, seriously cutting its prerogatives.[68]

Resolute to maintain its intelligence service, the army leadership nevertheless recognized the need to curb the power of Prónay and the Osztenburg battalions. In the summer of 1920, both the Minister of Defense (H.M. 100951/eln. Sz. rendelet), and the District Military Command (5082 Sz. rendelet) decreed that the Prónay and the Osztenburg battalions had no longer had the right to operate separate intelligence services; battalion members who worked on intelligence matters had to report directly to the Army's newly-renamed Information Service. The power of the Service became more circumscribed, too: it could no longer prosecute currency smugglers and speculators, and had to coordinate its intelligence operations against Communists closely with civilian authorities.[69] A separate decree by the District Military Command ordered the two battalions to refrain from arresting "politically dangerous individuals and those engaged in illegal economic activities." The document made reference to the militia practice to arrest and keep in prison individuals without due recourse to the courts of law. These activities, the order reads, added extra ammunition, both at home and abroad, to enemy propaganda about the White Terror. The military authorities gave the militias credit for their past achievements; they also warned them, however, to leave intelligence gathering and arrest to the appropriate authorities.[70]

The fact that the order had to be repeated with minor changes several times suggests that the two militia units had no intention of giving up profitable and emotionally satisfying police powers. In November of 1920 the Ministry of Defense issued a new decree; in it, the Ministry admitted that measures taken to limit the intelligence and police functions of the militias had been a failure and that excesses committed by military detectives had remained common. The order stipulated that militia detectives could arrest only renegade soldiers, people who incited against conscription, spies and Communists; and that the arrest could proceed only on the basis of solid evidence. Military detectives were allowed to detain people only for 48 hours; after two days, they were obliged to release or hand them over to civilian authorities. The Ministry also sought to limit the power of officers to patrol streets and ask for identification

cards; only officers with special orders were allowed to carry out police duties. They had no right to confiscate anything from the detainees.[71]

The order by District Military Command in Budapest a few weeks later displayed even greater frustration with the militias. The District Military Command deplored the fact its earlier decrees forbidding political activity among officers "have not been correctly understood." Officers had not stopped spreading rumours, denouncing one another and intriguing against their superiors. Worse, some military units had built up a veritable spy system. These activities reflected a revolutionary mindset and therefore had to come to an end. Officers who were not able to keep their subordinates in line and those who set a negative example for their men had no place in the armed forces of Hungary. To avoid ambiguity about the continued existence of intelligence operations, General Dáni declared that that "I do not tolerate the existence of a spy system (spiclirendszer) in the army.[72]

The government sought to trim the power of the militias and effect structural changes in order to end the atrocities. In early April of 1920, the Office of the Supreme Commander ceased to exist and its prerogatives were transferred to the Ministry of the Defense. Whereas the new Minister of Defense, General Károly Soós, had the reputation of being a man of the radical Right, his actions show that, as professional soldier, he opposed the militias. On June 16, 1920, in a parliamentary speech, he announced the reorganization of the militias: the provincial militias were to be integrated into the gendarmerie, while the militias in Budapest would remain under military command. Officers' detachments were to be dissolved with the exception of the Prónay and the Osztenburg battalions, which would remain under military control. In January 1921, the two units were reorganized as the first and second national gendarme reserve battalions and as such they became part of the gendarmerie.[73] Simultaneously the Prónay and the Osztenburg battalions lost their representative function. In mid-February 1921, as an indication of growing distrust towards the militias, Prónay's men were replaced by regular gendarmes to guard the royal residence, Horthy's favourite place, in Gödöllő.[74]

The Ministry of Defense felt the need to address the matter of Prónay Battalion in a separate order. In September 1920, the Ministry of Defense decreed (Hon. Min. f. évi 78687/eln. A. 1920. szám) the immediate dissolution of the officers' squad stationed in Hotel Britannia. The same order put an end to the counter-intelligence operation of the Battal-

ion. To make the battalion more compatible with regular infantry units, the Ministry of Defense sought to reduce the number of officers as well. Each company of the Battalion was allowed to have only ten officers. The percentage of officers was to be reduced by integrating those on assignment permanently into their present units, by transferring non-infantry officers to different battalions and by prohibiting the recruitment of new officers without higher authorization. The Ministry declared that only those who had been the members of the battalion before August 2, 1919 should remain with the Prónay battalion. This implied a reduction of more than 50 per cent in the number of officers, since the unit had at least 180 officers in September 1920, as compared to 70 in August 1919. The entire battalion, officers included, was to stay in the Ferdinand military base. To improve discipline and morale, the Ministry ordered Prónay's men to attend lectures on military discipline on weekdays.[75] A separate decree radically cut the number of reserve officers in the militia. At the end of 1920, the Ministry of Defense set the date for the discharge of reserve officers by January 15, 1921; then it extended the date to February 15.[76] The decrees of the District Military Command in Budapest reflected the same mindset: in April 1921, the District Military Command ordered officers stationed in the city to attend lectures on proper behaviour towards civilians. The lectures were to be held every Friday morning in the Officers' Casino in Váci Street.[77]

The frequent recurrence and duplication of the same orders at different levels of the military speak volumes about the difficulties the government faced in reining in the militias. In February 1920, the Osztenburg Detachment, by taking one of Horthy's thoughtless remarks literarily, murdered Béla Somogyi, the editor-in-chief of the socialist newspaper, *Népszava* (People's Voice), and his young colleague, Béla Bacsó. This murder angered both domestic and foreign public opinion and led to an ill-conceived, short and ineffective economic blockade of Hungary in the early summer. In mid-June, government was finally forced to take action: it cleansed the Budapest-Kecskemét railway line of the members of the Héjjas Detachment who had been harassing passengers and also rounding up scores of young men in the area "who abused the uniform of the National Army." The campaign meant to satisfy public opinion without insulting the militias. To square the circle, Horthy appointed Prónay to lead the cleansing campaign and determine who among those arrested should be charged. Since the Héjjas Detachment had closely co-operated with Prónay for months, and many of its members,

including Lieutenant Iván Héjjas himself, later entered the Prónay Battalion, the campaign predictably produced meagre results. To make sure that no important militia member would be charged, Horthy, moreover, put an abrupt end to the investigation at the end of July.

These fake measures failed to stem the flood of complaints or reverse the course of events. In August, for the first time, the court imposed heavy sentences on the members of an entire militia group for killing a lawyer and bank manager at the end of July. In November, as a reaction to the murder of a policeman by drunken officers, government troops raided Hotel Britannia, which housed officers of the Prónay Battalion and associated units, and the Ehmann military base: the raid led to the arrest of more than a dozen of officers at Hotel Britannia, while the skirmish with government troops on the base produced five deaths and scores of injuries. As part of the crackdown, the government, fearful of a right-wing coup, imposed a curfew, dissolved a number of radical organizations and arrested their leaders.

The government crackdown in November weakened but did not yet destroy the militias. In the summer of 1921, Iván Héjjas sent an ultimatum to the Minister of the Interior of the previous government, Ödön Bericzky. As the ultimatum provoked a great public outrage and Parliament demanded an investigation. A special prosecutor in the person of Albert Váry was appointed to look into the atrocities committed by Héjjas and his gang. Indeed, within a few weeks, Váry produced a list containing the names of more than 70 people murdered on the basis of racial and religious hatred and greed. He could not make any arrests, however, because Héjjas and his men had left the region for Burgenland to participate in an insurrection aimed at keeping the province under Hungarian rule.

Meanwhile Héjjas' one-time commander, Prónay, also came under fire. In August 1921, in response to newspaper allegations that he had extorted money from a rich Jewish businessman, Lajos Kornhauser, Prónay sent a threatening letter to the President of Parliament, István Rakovszky. He accused him, among other things, of being a traitor and a Czech spy. Prime Minister István Bethlen used the Kornhauser Affair to destroy Prónay. After a humiliating trial, Prónay received a light sentence for having insulted the President of the Parliament, and was deprived of his unit. Deeply hurt, Prónay withdrew from public affairs to his family estate. Unable to give up the limelight, however, in the fall he had joined the nationalist uprising in Burgenland and soon became its self-appointed

leader. Prónay did not support the second royalist coup at the end of October, even though recent political events made him to lean in that direction. His neutrality, however, failed to endear him to the holders of power in Budapest, while his stubbornness to leave the province raised the spectre of entente sanctions. Having run out of options, the Bethlen government was prepared to use military force against Prónay's and Héjjas' units and only their last minute withdrawal from the region saved them from destruction.[78] Still, as a sign of his sympathy for Prónay, Horthy offered the discredited militia leader a minor position in the army. In early November, as an additional favour, he declared full amnesty for the crimes the militias had committed since August 1919.

Predictably, Prónay was not impressed by these goodwill gestures but wanted full rehabilitation and control over control over his troops. The government was, however, no longer in the mood to negotiate: instead of giving back his troops, the Bethlen government, under pressure from the military elite, the civil service, local elite, trade unions and foreign governments, dissolved the last militias in early 1922. Using the reorganization of the army in the aftermath of the Treaty of Trianon, which ordered a drastic reduction in the size of the armed forces, as a pretext, the commander of the National Army, General Pál Nagy prevented militia men from entering the army and the gendarmerie in every turn. Officers with criminal records were eliminated on the spot; reserve officers, despite distinguished war records, were accepted only in exceptional cases. Most importantly, Nagy used the Treaty as an excuse to cleanse the army of politically unreliable elements, which in his interpretation included not only leftist sympathizers and legitimists but also members of the most prominent militias.[79] By 1923, the militias and their supporters in right-radical organizations, such as the ÉME, had found themselves outside the gates of power. Their desire and determination to re-enter that gate, either by themselves or as allies of other political movements, remained one of the most important factors in interwar Hungarian history.

Concluding Remarks: Modernity and Violence

Contemporary liberal and leftist commentators and later historians described the officers who had dominated the Prónay and the Osztenburg Battalions either as feudal remnants or as stooges of capitalists and semi-

feudal landowners eager to restore the pre-war social and political order both in the cities and the countryside. This view is untenable on many grounds: regular officers, despite their feudal decorum, were essentially modern professionals. Reserve officers came from the middle class; they had finished high school, and many had attended university. In their outlook and culture they were more modern and also more European than the majority of the population. The Prónay and, to a lesser extent, the Osztenburg battalions were envisioned by Admiral Horthy and his advisors as elite units, and they were treated as such for more than two years. The members of the detachments wore military uniforms and displayed military decorations; they drew salaries from the state and attended and often played a major role in official ceremonies. Until the end of 1921, paramilitary leaders rubbed shoulders with leading politicians, who sought their advice and were not yet embarrassed to appear with them in public. The Prónay and the Osztenburg battalions were housed in military barracks; the life of soldiers and officers on these military bases followed rigid schedules passed down from the old army. In their free time, the officers frequented the same restaurants, casinos and brothels; they attended the same theatre performances, listened to the same type of music, read, if they read at all, the same type of literature and subscribed to the same nationalist newspapers. The officers of the Prónay and the Osztenburg battalions subscribed to the same nationalist ideology and harboured the same prejudices towards ethnic and religious minorities as the majority of their colleagues and indeed a large part of the elite and the so-called Christian middle class. The Prónay and the Osztenburg detachments may not have been the best units of the newly formed National Army, as they themselves believed and as they were often told by military and political leaders. But they were soldiers, and their behaviour can be best understood in the context of the state of their profession during and after the war.

Violence against defenceless civilians did not make the officers less professional: after all, there was hardly any army and offices corps in modern Europe that did not violate the norms of their professions during foreign and civil wars. The atrocities committed by regular German troops in Belgium and the behaviour of Russian units in East Prussia and Austro-Hungarian soldiers in Italy during the First World War underlined, perhaps the first time, the ambiguous impact of professionalization on military-civilian relations. The complicity of the German army in the murder of civilians in Eastern Europe and the Balkans and their participa-

tion in the Jewish genocide during the Second World War made this problem even more salient. Yet every army, including those of the Western states, committed unspeakable crimes against humanity during the Second World War. As if the problem had not been clear enough, the senseless murder of civilians both by conscripted and professional armies continued during decolonization. The death of tens of thousands of Iraqis and the torture of civilians at Abu Ghuraib prison and in secret CIA facilities all over the globe suggest that neither the nature of the war nor the nature of soldiers and policemen have changed much for the better the last hundred years.

In post-World War One Hungary, the militias' tendency to ignore professional codes of conduct can be attributed to the lost war and the two failed revolutions. The breakdown of state bureaucracy, unprecedented misery, lack of respect for human life and dignity, as well as the general lawlessness that prevailed in the country, created the ideal conditions for the emergence of the militias. The roots of militia violence was anomie produced by socio-economic strains and decline in respect for human life and the rule for law, which transformed regular army units into criminal enterprises. The militias, like the most criminally-minded of all businesses, the mafias, fulfilled a wide variety of functions, some of which benefited at least some segments of the population. Yet the militias, like the mafias, were also too violent and too unpredictable and too much the product of the post-war crisis to become a permanent feature of the political and social landscape. The militias had to disappear from the scene because they violated too many interests and sensitivities. Their belated removal from the scene in 1922 allowed the conservative-liberal regime to survive until 1944.

NOTES

[1] See Gyögy Ránki *et al.*, *Magyarország Története, 1918-1945*, 8/1 (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1978), 395-434; Ervin Hollós and Vera Lajtai, *Horthy Miklós: A fehérek vezére* (Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1985), 259-280; Lóránd Dombrády and Sándor Tóth, *A magyar királyi honvédség, 1919-1945* (Budapest: Zrínyi Katonai Kiadó, 1987), 15-17. Other works include: Dezső Nemes, *Az ellenforradalom története Magyarországon, 1919-1921* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1962); György Borsányi, ed., *Páter Zadravecz titkos naplója* (Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1967); Rudolfné Dósa, *A Move. Egy jellegzetes magyar fasiszta szervezet* (Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1972); Ferenc Pölös-

kei, *Horthy és hatalmi rendszere 1919-1920* (Budapest: Akadémai Kiadó, 1977); and Tibor Zinner, *Az Ébredők fénykora 1919-1923* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1989). The least politically committed book is Ignác Romsics, *A Duna-Tisza köze hatalmi viszonyai 1918-1919-ben* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1982).

[2] See Thomas Sakmyster, *Admirális fehér lovon: Horthy Miklós, 1918-1944* (Budapest: Helikon Kiadó, 2001), 37-93; Ignác Romsics, *Hungary in the Twentieth Century* (Budapest: Osiris, 1999), 110-116; Mária Ormos, *Magyarország a két világháború korában, 1914-1945* (Debrecen: Csokonai Kiadó, 1998), 56-85.

[3] See Hannah Arendt, *On Violence* (New York: Harcourt & Brace & World, 1970).

[4] Kovács tiszthelyettes, körmendi őrs, M. kir. szombathelyi csendőrkerület, Körmend, 1920 julius 27, Hadtörténeti Levéltár (HL), Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 120 doboz.

[5] Béla Bodó, "Paramilitary Violence in Hungary after the First World War," *East European Quarterly*, 38, 2 (June 2004): 129-172.

[6] Robert K. Merton, *Societal Theory and Social Structure* (London, 1968), 185-248. For the application of this theory to peasant culture in Hungary in the interwar period, see Béla Bodó, *Tiszazug: A Social History of a Murder Epidemic* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 2002), 172-179.

[7] Ernő Prost, M. kir. I. vadász zászlóalj. A Zászlóaljparancsnokságnak. Budapest, 1920 junius 17, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 120 doboz.

[8] A m. kir. csendőrség felügyeljének ügyésze. Tárgy: Kmetty Károly főhadnagy és társa elleni ügy. A m. kir. 1. számu országos csendőrtartalék zászlóalj parancsnokságnak. Budapest, 1921 szeptember 13, HL 122 doboz.

[9] Bucsi György rendőr, Budapesti m. kir. államrendőrség. Jelentés. Budapest, 1921 február 16, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 123 doboz.

[10] M. kir csendőrség felügyelőjének ügyésze. A m. kir. 1. országos csendőr tartalékzászlóalj parancsnokságnak. Budapest, 1921 augusztus 31, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 122 doboz.

[11] James Gilligan, *Violence: Our Deadly Epidemic and Its Causes* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1996), 114.

[12] Anton Lehár, *Erinnerungen: Gegenrevolution und Restaurationsversuche in Ungarn 1918-1921* (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1973), 156-157.

[13] Kontz tábornok. A m. kir. csendőrség felügyelője. Határozat. Budapest, 1921 április 8, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 123 doboz.

[14] Dr. Schmitz hadbiróalezredes, ügyész. Határozat. Budapest, 1921 május 6, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 122 doboz.

[15] Ágnes Szabó and Ervin Pamlényi, eds., *A határban a halál kaszál: Fejezetek Prónay Pál feljegyzéseiből* (Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1963), 231.

[16] Déván István hadnagy. Jegyzőkönyv, Budapesti törzsszázad parancsnokság, 1920 junius 9, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 120 doboz.

[17] M. kir. honvédelmi minisztérium 68762 szám/eln.26-1920. M. kir. szegedi vadász zlj. panacsnokságának, Budapest, 1920 junius 28, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 120 doboz.

[18] Szabó főhadnagy, M. kir autópótár parancsnokság, M. kir, Szegedi vadász zlj. parancsnokságnak, Budapest 1920 julius 15, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 120 doboz.

[19] Rákosy ezredes. A magyar királyi csendőrség felügyelője. A magy. kir. 1. számú országos csendőr tartalék zászlóalj parancsnokságnak. Budapest, 1921 május 20; junius 14 és junius 27, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 122 doboz.

[20] Dáni, budapesti katonai körletparancsnok, Szám 9052.főnöki -1920. Szegedi vadászzászlóalj átszervezése, Budapest, 1920 szeptember 18, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 120 doboz.

[21]Márkus ezredes, M. kir. Honvédelmi Minisztérium. A Magyar kir. Szegedi vadászzászlóalj parancsnokságnak. Budapest, 1920 október 27, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 120 doboz.

[22] Olvashatatlan aláírás. Bünügyi Kiadó. Jegyzőkönyv. Budapest, 1920 november 20, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 122 doboz.

[23] A m. kir. csendőrség felügyelője. A m. kir. I. számú országos csendőr-tartalék zászlóalj parancsnokságnak, Budapest, 1921 szeptember 7, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 122 doboz.

[24] Kecskeméti izr. Hitközösség előljárósága. A szegedi 1. vadászászlóalj különitménye tekintetes Parancsnokságának. Kecskemét, 1920 szeptember 30, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947,123 doboz.; Kecskemét város polgármestere. A m. kir, szegedi vzlj. visszamaradó különitmény parancsnokságának. Kecskemét, 1920 október 8, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 123 doboz.

[25] Dr. Schmitz hadbiróalezredes, ügyész. A m. kir. csendőrség felügyelőjének ügyésze. Határozat. Budapest, 1921május 18, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 122 doboz.

[26] Rákosy ezredes. A. kir. csendőrség felügyelője. 947 szám. Eln. Csfu.1921. Bizalmas. A m. kir 1. számú csendőr tartalék paracsnokságnak. Budapest, 1921 november 27, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 122 doboz.

[27] Beer László főpincér. A Magy. Kir. Szegedi I. vadász zlj. nyomozó osztályának. Budapest, 1920 August 1, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 120 doboz.

[28] Kontz hadbiró alezredes. Schefcsik György főhadnagy elleni ügy. Budapest, 1921 április 6, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 122 doboz.

[29] Wittenbarth főhadnagy. Szolgálati jegy, Budapest, 1920 január 5, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 120 doboz.

[30] *Népszava*, November 12, 1920

[31] Molnár Főhadnagy, Szolgálati jegy, Fegyvernek, 1920, junius 11, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 120 doboz.

[32] Dr. Schmitz. A m. kir. csendőrség felügyelőjének ügyésze. Határozat. Budapest, 1922 május 16, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 123 doboz.

[33] Jegyzőkönyv, Magyar kir. Nemzetvédelmi aloszt. Szolnok, 1920 junius 18, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 120 doboz.

[34] Szolnok vármegye m. kir. katonai parancsnokság, védelmi osztály, 1718 szám/kt.1920. Magy. Kir. Budapesti katonai körletparancsnokság ügyészsége, Budapest 1920 junius 20, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 120 doboz.

[35] Dr. Schmitz. Hadb.ezredes. ügyész. Nyomozó és elfogató parancs. Budapest, 1921 szeptember 2, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 123 doboz.

[36] Dr. Schmitz. Hadb.ezredes. ügyész. Nyomozó parancs. Budapest, 1921 szeptember 5, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 123 doboz.

[37] Prónay. Heti jelentés. 1920 junius 1-junius 9. Magyarország Kormanyzójának Katonai Irodájához, Budapest, 1920 junius 9, HL 121 doboz.

[38] Kontz tábornok. Határozat. Budapest, 1921 április 9, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 122 doboz.

[39] *Újlap*, 1920, February 18

[40] Keviczky Hugó szobrászművész. A Szegedi vadász zlj. parancsnokságának, Budapest, 1920 május 25, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 121 doboz.

[41] Lampel M. Miklós. Kihallgatási Jegyzőkönyv. Budapest, 1920 aug. 22; Tarr János. Kihallgatási Jegyzőkönyv. Budapest, 1920 aug. 22., HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 120. doboz.

[42] Orgovány népe. Méltóságos Szeretett Őrnagy Urunk! Orgovány, 1920 szeptember (?), HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 120 doboz.

[43] Prónay. Érdemes Előljáróság. Budapest, 1920 szeptember 15, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 120 doboz.

[44] Prónay, Heti Jelentés, Budapest, 1920 julius 1-8, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 121 doboz.

[45] Illés Gergely. ÉME jegyző. Méltóságos Prónay Pál alezredes úr! Orgovány. Dátum nélkül. HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 123 doboz.

[46] Dr. Jókay Miklós, főszolgabiró és födbirtokos, Devecser, 1920, május 28, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 120 doboz.

[47] The anti-Semitic ditty ran: Erger, Berger, Schlossberger, /Minden zsidó gazember./Akár bankár, akár más,/Kenyere a csalás. In Tim Wilkinson's translation: Ebenezer Grün or Cohen, /Every Jew's a dirty con./Whether banker or greengrocer,/His bread is won by means not kosher." See Romsics, *Hungary in the Twentieth Century*, p. 111.

[48] Bokor László hirlapíró. Mélyen Tisztelt Őrnagy Úram, Szeged, 1920, junius (?),HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 120. doboz.

[49] Fegyverneki magyar keresztény lakossága. M. kir. Szegedi 1. vadász zlj. parancsnokának, Fegyvernek, 1920 julius 17, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 120 doboz.

[50] Ungvári József tanácsos, Ungvári István biró, Vitéz Lajos rendőr. M. kir. szegedi vadász zlj. Jegyzőkönyv. Fegyvernek, 1920. Julius 24, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 120. doboz.

[51] Dr. Gimpel János főorvos. M. kir. Szegedi vadász zlj. Orvosi látlelet. Budapest, 1920 julius 28, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 120. doboz.

[52] Hammer (?) Árpád. Magyar katonai állomás parancsnokság Szolnok. Feljelentés kihágási ügyben. Szolnok, 1920 október 31, HL, 122 doboz.

[53] Dr. Schmitz. A m. kir. csendőrség felügyelőjének ügyésze. A magyar királyi 1. számú országos csendőrtartalék zlj. parancsnokságnak. Budapest, 1921 szeptember 27, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 122 doboz.

[54] Dr. Schmitz. A m. kir. csendőrség felügyelőjének ügyésze. Határozat. Budapest, 1921 junius 8, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 123 doboz.

[55] József Pogány, *A fehér terror Magyarországon* (Vienna: Arbeiter Buchhandlung, 1920), 93-94.

[56] Kürti Csaba. A Magyar kir. Honvédelmi Minisztérium Elnöki C. III. Alosztályának, Budapest, 1920 julius 16, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 120 doboz.

[57] Dr. Vilmos Rácz. Beadvány. A magyar kir. szegedi I. vadász zlj. parancsnokságnak. Budapest, 1920, julius 20, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 121 doboz.

[58] Pásky János hadnagy. M. kir. Délpestvármegyei kat. parancsnokság. A m. kir. Kat. állomás parancsnokságának, Kecskemét, 1920 augusztus 31, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 120 doboz.

[59] Prónay. Heti jelentés. 1920 julius 1- 8, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 121 doboz.

[60] Adatok Rubin vk. Ezredesről. Aláirás Lékány és Prónay. Budapest 1920 junius (?), HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 121 doboz.

[61] Ö. Gyenes István hdj. M. kir. Szegedi vadászzlj. Jegyzőkönyv. Budapest, 1920 november 14, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 120 doboz.

[62] See Tom Lorman, "István Bethlen and the 1922 Elections in Hungary," *SEER*, 80, 4 (October 2002): 624-655; Ignác Romsics, *Bethlen István* (Budapest: Osiris, 2005), 174-184; 206-209; Balázs Ablonczy, *Teleki Pál* (Budapest: Osiris, 2005), 169-182.

[63] Dezső Sulyok, *A magyar tragédia*, New Brunswick, 1954, 254-258.

[64] Miklós Horthy, *Emlékirataim* (Budapest: Europa Könyvkiadó, 1990), 124, 130-132, 163.

[65] Szabó and Pamlényi, *A határban a halál kaszál*, p. 252; 237-238.

[66] Horthy utasítása a körletparacsnokságoknak a "vörösvédelmi" kémszolgálat országos kiépítéséről, November 4, 1919, HL.MNHF. Bp. kat. körlet.psg.-1919-187.eln. In Dezső Nemes, *Iratok az ellenforradalom történetéhez. Az ellenforradalom hatalomrajutása és rémuralma Magyaroroszágon, 1919-1921* (Budapest: Szikra, 1953), 211-212.

[67] Soós hadügyminiszter minisztertanácsi előterjesztése a kommunista ellenes kém-és terrorszervezetek egységesítéséről, May 3, 1920, in Nemes, *Iratok az ellenforradalom történetéhez*, p. 357.

[68] Say alezredes bizalmas jelentése a tiszti különítmények és a védelmi szervek működésének módosításáról, June 17, 1920, In Nemes, *Iratok az ellenforradalom történetéhez*, 368-369.

[69] M. kir. budapesti gyalog hadosztály parancsnokság 4038 sz/kat. 1920. Katonai nyomozók működésének beszüntetése. A M. kir. Szegedi vadász zlj. parancsnokságának, Budapest, 1920. junius 17. HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 120 doboz.

[70] M. kir. budapesti gyalog hadosztály parancsnokság 4040 sz/kat. 1920. Gyanús polgári egyének letartóztatása. A M. kir. Szegedi vadász zlj. parancsnokságának, Budapest, 1920. junius 17. HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 120 doboz.

[71] Dáni, Budapesti körletparancsnok. Szám: 12372/főnöki 1920. Katonai nyomozók eljárására szigorú utasítások. Budapest, 1920 november 1, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 120 doboz.

[72] Dáni tábornok. Budapesti katonai körletparacsnok. 13070/eln. 1902. szám. Budapest, 1920 november, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 120 doboz.

[73] Lóránd Dombrády and Sándor Tóth, *A magyar királyi honvédség, 1919-1945* (Budapest: Zrínyi Katonai Kiadó, 1987), 15-16.

[74] Láng ezredes. Magyarország kormanyzóságának katonai irodája. 641. szám. K.I. 1921. Gödöllőn levő szegedi v. zlj. legénységének felváltása. Budapest, 1921 február 16, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 122 doboz.

[75] Dáni, budapesti katonai körletparancsnok, Szám 9052.főnöki -1920. Szegedi vadászzászlóalj átszervezése, Budapest, 1920 szeptember 18, HL, Horthy-kori csapatanyag, Szegedi vadászzászlóalj (Prónay), Kt. 2439-2947, 120 doboz.

[76] Dáni tábornok. Magyar kir. budapesti kat. körlet paracsnokság. 850/II szám/ eln.-1921. Tartalékos tisztek leszerelése. Budapest, 1921 január 17, HL, 122 doboz.

[77] Budapesti városi parancsnokság. Fegyelmező gyűlések.... Budapest, 1921 április 10, HL 122 doboz.

[78] Dombrády and Tóth, *A magyar királyi honvédség, 1919-1945*, p. 49.

[79] *Ibid.*, pp. 31-33.

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Gyula Gömbös and Hungarian Jews, 1918–1936

Thomas Sakmyster

In the history of fascist or radical right-wing movements in twentieth century Europe, Gyula Gömbös played a distinctive role. He was the chief spokesman for and dynamic leader of the extremist right-wing movement that developed spontaneously in Hungary in the aftermath of World War I and the failed revolutions of 1918–1919. In 1919, before the concept had fully crystallized in the mind of Adolf Hitler, Gömbös was calling himself a "national socialist." In a remarkable parliamentary speech in 1921, before Mussolini's march on Rome, Gömbös predicted that the "axis of European power will lead from Rome to Berlin."[1] In 1925 he organized and presided over an international anti-semitic congress in Budapest, the only one of its kind in the interwar period. Finally, in 1932 he became the second radical right-wing leader (Mussolini being the first) to come to power. Several months later, when Hitler became Chancellor of Germany, Gyula Gömbös was the first foreign leader to pay him an official visit. Throughout his career, which spanned the years from 1918 to his death in 1936, Gömbös attempted to effect significant political, social, and economic changes, which, had he been completely successful, would have re-defined the concept of the Hungarian nation. Gömbös championed the concept of "race protection," which he and his followers proclaimed to be a necessary campaign to protect Christian Hungary from the alleged rapacity and destructiveness of Hungarian Jews. Yet Gömbös's anti-Semitism was at times ambiguous, and his policies as Prime Minister between 1932 and 1936 were remarkably pragmatic.

Born in 1886, Gyula Gömbös came from a German-Hungarian family of the lower middle class.[2] Raised as a Lutheran, he developed a wary and suspicious attitude toward the Catholic Church, the aristocratic landowners (who were mostly Catholics), and the Habsburg Empire. Fluent in German (his mother, in fact, did not speak Hungarian), he embarked on a career as an officer in the Austro-Hungarian Army. His

rise in the ranks was not a rapid one, no doubt in part because he barely concealed his strong Magyar nationalism, his distaste for the Habsburg dynasty, and his preference for the establishment of an independent republic of Hungary.[3]

At the end of the Great War, Gömbös was an obscure army captain who, by pre-war standards, did not possess the proper credentials to play a leading role in political affairs. Yet he soon emerged as a champion of what became known as the "Szeged idea": a proto-fascist movement characterized by extreme nationalism, virulent anti-Semitism, hostility to all left-wing ideologies, and a willingness to mobilize the masses to achieve certain reforms in society and the economy. When in the spring of 1919 Gömbös arrived in the southern Hungarian city of Szeged to join the counter-revolutionary government that was forming there, he became the chief propagator of the idea that the "Jews and Freemasons had caused the disintegration of the state" and their "enormous world power" had to be smashed.[4] Gömbös's subsequent rise to political prominence was greatly facilitated by his close collaboration with Admiral Miklós Horthy, who led the National Army organized at Szeged and later, after the collapse of Béla Kun's Soviet Republic in the summer of 1919, was elected Regent of the counter-revolutionary regime. Gömbös was among the first to realize that, his strong public statements notwithstanding, Admiral Horthy did in fact have secret political ambitions. Gömbös encouraged Horthy along these lines and developed a successful propaganda campaign that promoted him as the "man on horseback" who would rescue the Hungarian nation.[5]

In the immediate post-war period Gömbös was tolerated by the traditional political elite not only because he was the protégé of Horthy, but because he demonstrated considerable talent for political organization. He played a key role in the establishment of the new Hungarian army, and efficiently carried out the task of "organizing" the first elections that established the government party as the dominant political force in Hungary. Before long, however, the more traditional right-wingers became alarmed at the radical nature of the program Gömbös was propounding, which seemed to involve a fundamental reshaping of Hungarian society.

For most of its history leading up to World War I, the "political nation" in Hungary consisted largely of the landed nobility or those who modeled themselves after that class. The great mass of peasants (whether Magyar or other ethnic groups) and, by the late nineteenth century, the growing industrial proletariat, were excluded from any meaningful

participation in the national community. Although during the last half of the nineteenth century the political elite embarked on a project to modernize the country and to combat Pan-Slavism and the threat from the emerging nationalist movements among Hungary's ethnic minorities, they were reluctant to mobilize the Magyar masses to support a nationalist program.

As a way out of this dilemma the nobility found it useful to facilitate the growth of an economic elite that would be entrusted with the task of modernizing the country by stimulating trade and creating an industrial infra-structure. This economic elite, a new middle class consisting largely of Jews, was granted extensive civil liberties and full access to the universities and professions, but for the most part was excluded from the spheres of government and administration. Most Hungarian Jews were willing to accept this "assimilationist contract."[7] Indeed, the extent to which Jews, who represented about 5% of the pre-World War I population, came to dominate the economic and professional life of Hungary is remarkable. By the early twentieth century about 85% of the leading bankers were Jews, 45% of the journalists, 60% of medical doctors, and there were similar high percentages in the other professions.[8] Many of these Jews were so eager to assimilate into Hungarian society that they became, as one Hungarian writer put it, "more Magyar than the Magyars themselves."[9] The symbiotic relationship between Hungary's political and economic elites thus led, in the decades before World War I, to a prevailing definition of the Hungarian nation that implicitly embraced the Jewish community and that provided sterile ground for the growth of political anti-Semitism.[10] This relatively favourable situation for Jews and Hungary's liberal immigration laws proved quite attractive to Jews from surrounding countries, especially the Russian Empire. Hungary became, in the words of one historian, the "America of mobile East European Jewry."[11]

If, borrowing from Benedict Anderson, we can speak of nations as "imagined communities,"[12] Gyula Gömbös might be said to have set himself the task of "re-imagining" the Hungarian nation. When in 1919 he declared himself to be a national socialist, he strongly implied that, though he rejected international socialism and communism and what he later termed the "dream world of Jacobin egalitarianism,"[13] he intended to mobilize peasant farmers and industrial workers and make a place for them in the national community. Thus, he began to speak and write disparagingly about two pillars of pre-war Hungary: aristocratic landown-

ers and capitalists. The former, he declared, were afflicted with "parasitic idleness," although he conceded that the great estates were "canters of culture" for the Magyar nation.[14] In the early 1920's Gömbös made various land reform proposals that he justified by the necessity for "race protection." He demanded that those lands that had fallen into "foreign hands" (a code phrase for Jewish ownership) be returned to the Magyar peasant, the true progenitor of the Hungarian nation.[15] Had the legislation proposed by Gömbös been enacted, it would have created a large, new class of smallholding farmers and greatly diminished the political and economic power not just of the Jews but of the Christian nobility. In later years, however, Gömbös's interest in land reform greatly diminished.[16] In part this reflected his growing realization that the landowning nobility still retained enormous influence in governing circles, especially over Regent Horthy, who long remained an opponent of significant land reform. There was a psychological factor at work as well: Gömbös, like many previous Hungarian politicians of modest birth, eventually found it expedient to emulate the very nobles that he had denigrated. Thus, in the late 1920's he suddenly discovered (or more likely invented) a noble pedigree in his ancestry, and began using a noble title.[17]

Gömbös proved much more consistent and zealous in his attacks on capitalists. He insisted, however, that his opposition to capitalism must not be equated with that of the Communists, for he made a distinction between "rapacious" and "creative" capitalists.[18] The "rapacious" capitalists were the Jews, who dominated banking and industry in Hungary and whose activities, Gömbös asserted, "embittered the lower classes" and curtailed "the development of the nation like an octopus."[19] A central element in the program he developed in the early 1920's was thus the elimination of Jewish influence in Hungarian economic life and society, and the creation of a large, and presumably creative and vigorous, Magyar Christian middle class. Gömbös used various terms to describe his program: national socialism, Christian nationalism, race protection, but his guiding principle remained a fierce anti-Semitism.

For the most part Gyula Gömbös made no original contributions to the development of modern anti-semitic thought. Rather he borrowed the ideas of others and applied them to an analysis of Hungarian society. Of particular influence on Gömbös were the racist theories of Houston Stewart Chamberlain, the Anglo-German writer whose book *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* Gömbös regarded as his "bible of racism." From it he gained the conviction that race was the key to understanding

the course of history and the rise and fall of nations.[20] Employing statistics and interpretations gleaned from Chamberlain's work, and relying on his own experiences during World War I, Gömbös published in September, 1918 a pamphlet entitled *Die Juden in Ungarn*.[21] In it he asserted that the Jews were a disruptive, anti-national element that was leading Hungary toward defeat and revolution. The events of the following two years, particularly the disproportionately high representation of Jews in the leadership of Béla Kun's regime, seemed to many Hungarians to confirm Gömbös as an astute political observer and prophet. He thus rose rapidly to leadership positions in those radical associations (such as the League of the Awakening Magyars) that sought to make the Jews a scapegoat for all of Hungary's problems. From 1919 to 1922 in frequent speeches and articles in newspapers and in the radical right-wing journal *Szozat*, Gömbös established himself as the acknowledged expert on the "Jewish question" and the champion of Christian Magyars. He constantly emphasized a view that represented the touchstone for adherents of the Szeged movement: the "Jewish question" was not a religious but an economic and, above all, a racial one.

Gömbös used a variety of statistics in his attempt to prove that the Jews were a corroding social and political element in any country where they gained a foothold.[22] The Central Powers had lost the war, he insisted, because the percentage of Jews in those countries was significantly greater than that in the Entente countries. By his calculations the ratio of Jews to Christians in the Allied countries was 1:227, in contrast to the more unfavourable ratio of 1:56 in the countries of the Central Powers.[23] According to statistics compiled by Gömbös, during the war Christian Hungarian losses in combat were 2.8% of the populations, while Jewish losses in combat were 1.1%. Since Hungary was the European country with the highest ratio of Jews to Christians, it was no wonder, he declared, that of the Hungarian officers who as prisoners of war in Russia were converted to Communism, 95% were Jews. And, Gömbös constantly emphasized, it was precisely in Hungary that the worst revolutionary turbulence occurred after the war. It was not surprising that the Jews were "vastly over-represented" in the leadership of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, since by their nature Jews were hostile to national ideals and goals and attracted to international movements of all kinds, including socialism and freemasonry. Thus, Jews continually strived for the establishment of a world order, "which for them means hegemony but for us represents slavery."[24]

What Gömbös most decried, of course, was the dominant influence of Jews in Hungary's economy, professions, and newspapers. Unless drastic action was taken, he warned, the "successors of the state-founding people led by Árpád" would within 50 or 100 years become slaves in their own country.[25] Not surprisingly, Gömbös was a strong supporter of the anti-Jewish law, known as the numerus clausus, that was passed by the Hungarian National Assembly in 1920.[26] This established a racial quota for admission to Hungarian universities, limiting Jews in each class to 6%. Gömbös supported this legislation, arguing that the "Jewish problem" became acute in any country that did not impose restrictions on the activities of the Jews. However, he regarded the numerus clausus as only a first step. On the one hand, he preferred that the quota be set instead at 5%, which was the percentage of Jews in Hungary's pre-war population; on the other hand, he suggested that what was really needed was the imposition of a quota that directly and immediately reduced the number of Jews in banking, journalism, art, culture, and even sporting life. Furthermore, he insisted that the concept of a quota should not be applied to the military officer corps, for in his opinion no Jews should be permitted to be officers.[27]

In general, despite his vituperative rhetoric,[28] Gömbös rejected violent tactics, insisting that it was senseless to "repeatedly slap around the Jews." Moreover, unlike some of his radical colleagues, Gömbös sometimes, albeit grudgingly, admitted that there were some patriotic Jews who had fought for their country in World War I. He also conceded that Jews who had arrived in Hungary before 1848 had stronger roots in the country and had some claim to citizenship.[29] Often Gömbös tried to emphasize a more positive interpretation of "race protection": it meant not so much an attack on the Jews, but rather the promotion of the economic and cultural interests of the Magyar "race."[30] Still, it was clear that any attempt to implement his program would involve a massive expropriation of Jewish property and the enforced unemployment and probable impoverishment of large numbers of middle class Jews. Anticipating these consequences, Gömbös suggested in 1921 that all further Jewish immigration into the country be prohibited and that arrangements be made with Zionist organizations for the resettlement of what he called "surplus Hungarian Jews," who would number several hundred thousands.[31] The departure of a large number of Jews would have the added advantage of making room for the return from North America of Christian Magyars who had emigrated in large numbers in the decades before World War I.

The radical remaking of the Hungarian national community proposed by Gömbös received little support from Hungary's traditional political elite. To be sure, Admiral Horthy was a self-professed anti-Semite who agreed with the proposition that the Jews were too powerful in Hungary and that Christian Hungarians should be encouraged to enter middle-class professions. But both he and Count István Bethlen, the true creators of Hungary's interwar regime, rejected extremist measures (such as expropriations of property) and argued that the reduction of Jewish influence would have to be a very gradual process. Horthy even placed part of the blame for the situation on Christian Magyars, who, he asserted, lacked entrepreneurial skills and shunned careers in industry and techonology.[32] Both Horthy and Bethlen acknowledged that Jews had played, and continued to play, important roles in the modernization of Hungary and tacitly supported a renewal of the pre-war relationship between the Jewish community and the regime. As a result, by the late 1920's the numerus clausus law had been watered down, and the representation of Jews in the economy and the professions had not changed significantly from that of the pre-war period.

Foreseeing such a development, and frustrated by the refusal of the regime to take vigorous action against the Jews, Gyula Gömbös broke away from the government party in 1922 and formed the "Party of Race Protectors." As the leader of this party during the 1920's Gömbös declared on many occasions that the minimum program of his party was the reduction of the Jewish role in society to 5% in any area of activity. Such action must be taken, he warned in 1925, because the Jews would not be satisfied until they had destroyed historical Hungary.[33] Privately he spoke in even more radical terms. At the International Anti-Semitic Congress that he organized and presided over in Budapest in 1925, Gömbös called for the total "removal of Jews" from Hungary and resettlement in some other land, but not Palestine.[34]

Such extremist views found little support in Hungary in the 1920's, as economic conditions stabilized and the memories of the Soviet Republic faded. The "Party of Race Protectors" had little success in the political process: in the 1926 elections of Parliament Gömbös and his followers gained only 1.5% of the vote. Frustrated by this lack of success, Gömbös finally concluded that he could fulfil his political ambitions only by toning down his radical rhetoric, regaining the confidence of Regent Horthy, and rejoining the government party.[35] This strategy soon paid significant dividends. The world economic crisis hit Hungary particularly

severely, forcing Count Bethlen to resign and prompting Horthy to seek a "strong hand" to prevent revolutionary outbreaks. Horthy thus offered the post of prime minister to Gömbös, but only on certain conditions, the most important of which was that he would not introduce any anti-Jewish legislation.[36]

Eager above all to gain power, Gömbös not only complied with all of the Regent's requests, but also, in a stroke of breathtaking opportunism, initiated secret negotiations with leaders of the Jewish community. In exchange for Jewish support for his governmental program, Gömbös promised that he would abandon his attacks on the Jews, respect Jewish "material interests," and provide strong support for the development of Hungarian industry and rearmament.[37] Given Gömbös's reputation as one of Europe's most notorious anti-Semites, it would seem unlikely that any Jewish leaders would have regarded such an offer as sincere. Yet an agreement was made along these lines with leaders of the Neolog community of Hungarian Jews, and in his inaugural speech to Parliament Gömbös made a statement that startled all political observers in Hungary:

> To the Jews I declare openly and frankly that I have changed my views. That part of Jewry that acknowledges that it shares a common fate with our People I wish to regard as brethren, just as I do my Magyar brethren.... I saw Jewish heroes during the war... and I know that they fought courageously. I know prominent Jews who pray for the Magyar fate, and I know that they will be the first to condemn that part of Jewry which could not or would not assimilate with the national community.[38]

Remarkably, Gyula Gömbös was true to his word. During his four year tenure as Prime Minister no anti-Jewish legislation was introduced, despite the fact that during this period Hungary gravitated to the Nazi German orbit and Gömbös spoke openly of his admiration for Benito Mussolini and his preference for Italian-style corporatism. Even while very strong restrictions were being placed on the Jews in Germany (such as the Nuremberg Laws), no attempt was made by the Hungarian government to diminish the influence of the Jews, save for a futile attempt to impose a kind of numerus clausus in the legal profession.[39] Gömbös even made several friendly gestures to Hungary's Jews. He permitted the two major Jewish communities, the Neolog and the Orthodox, to hold national congresses and sent warm and sympathetic greetings to each.[40] Moreover, he consulted frequently with prominent Jewish industrialists like Ferenc

Chorin, and he was the first Hungarian Prime Minister to attend a meeting of and speak before the major Hungarian association of industrial managers and financiers, a large number of whom were Jews.[41] And when in 1935 he put forward a plan that would have outlawed strikes and restructured labour laws along the lines of Fascist corporatism, the proposed changes would not necessarily have had a negative impact on Hungary's Jewish business elite. In fact, in 1936, when Gömbös died suddenly of a liver disease, the percentage of Jews in the economy and the professions was little changed from the early 1920's, when he had declared that the racial situation in Hungary was intolerable.

This overview of the career of Gyula Gömbös provides a number of insights into the nature of radical right-wing movements and the difficulties that extremists like Gömbös encountered in their attempt to remake the national community. Confronted by such authoritarian conservatives as Admiral Horthy and Count Bethlen, who resisted a radical solution to the "Jewish problem," Gömbös displayed a remarkable opportunism. One can only speculate whether, had he lived through World War II, Gömbös would have reverted to his earlier, virulent anti-Semitism. There is fragmentary evidence that shortly before his death he had given secret assurances to the Germans that he indeed planned in the near future to impose a totalitarian system in Hungary.[42] In any case, Gömbös did leave as his legacy a solid corps of radical right-wing government officials and parliamentary delegates who admired Nazi Germany and were imbued with the "Szeged idea."[43] These " Gömbös orphans" were responsible for the enactment of the anti-Jewish laws of 1938-1941 that fulfilled the program that Gömbös had proposed in the 1920's. It was they, also, who offered their support, or stood by indifferently, when in 1944 the Germans deported 2/3 of Hungary's Jews to the gas chambers of Auschwitz. Thus, the reshaping of the national community by the removal of Hungary's "surplus Jews," which Gömbös had proposed in the 1920's, was achieved in 1945, though he could hardly have welcomed the aftermath of that horrible event: defeat in a catastrophic war and domination of Hungary by the Soviet Union.

NOTES

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[1] Thomas L. Sakmyster, *Hungary, the Great Powers, and the Danubian Crisis, 1936-1939* (Athens: Univ. of Georgia, 1980), 47.

[2] The only scholarly work to treat Gömbös's career as a whole is Jenő Gergely, *Gömbös Gyula. Politikai pályakép* [Gyula Gömbös. A political biography] (Budapest: Vince, 2001). A hagiographical work written in the 1930's is still useful for Gömbös's family life and education: József Révay, *Gömbös Gyula élete és politikája* [The life and politics of Gyula Gömbös] (Budapest: Franklin Társulat, 1934), 11-67.

[3] Gömbös later described himself as "the most intransigent Magyar in the [Austro-Hungarian] general staff." *Nemzetgyülés Naplója* [Proceedings of the National Assembly], 1920-1926, IV, 513 (hereafter cited as NN).

[4] Gergely, p. 66.

[5] On Gömbös's relationship with Horthy, see Thomas Sakmyster, *Hungary's Admiral on Horseback: Miklós Horthy, 1918-1944* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1994), 23-24.

[6] See the perceptive remarks in Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 141-142. Also useful is Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 1992), 74-75.

[7] Victor Karady, "Antisemitism in Twentieth Century Hungary: A Socio-Economic Historical Overview," *Patterns of Prejudice*, 27, no. 1 (1993), 75-76. See also Vera Ránki, *The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion: Jews and Nationalism in Hungary* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1999), 27-51.

[8] Raphael Pataki, *The Jews of Hungary. History, Culture, Psychology* (Detriot: Wayne St. U. P., 1996), 437-38.

[9] Paul Ignotus, *Hungary* (New York: Praeger, 1972), 93.

[10] A party based on anti-Semitic principles did arise in the 1880's, but it never gained a significant presence in the Parliament and by the turn of the century it had largely faded from the scene. See Andrew Handler, *An Early Blueprint for Zionism. Győző Istóczy's Political Anti-Semitism* (New York: East European Monographs, 1989).

[11] Karady, p. 76.

[12] Benedict R. Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

[13] *Országgyűlés Naplója* (Proceedings of the Parliament), 1933, XV, 513.

[14] (Mrs.) Rudolph Dósa, *A MOVE. Egy jellegzetes magyar fasiszta szervezet, 1918-1944* [The MOVE. A typical Hungarian fascist organization, 1918-1944] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1972), 127.

[15] József Vonyó, *Gömbös Gyula és a jobboldali radikalizmus. Tanulmányok* [Gyula Gömbös and right-radicalism. Studies] (Budapest: Pannónia, 2001), 36; Gergely, pp. 128, 138.

[16] One historian has asserted that Gömbös and his colleagues paid "lip service to a very limited agrarian reform" and their friendly overtures to the workers were "forgotten and contradicted whenever it was expedient." Nicholas M. Nagy-Talavera, *The Green Shirts and the Others. A History of Fascism in Hungary and Rumania* (Stanford: Hoover Institute, 1970), 76.

[17] This led one contemporary writer later to describe Gömbös as a member of the "pseudo-gentry." Ignotus, p. 157.

[18] Gömbös may have borrowed this idea from Gottfried Feder, a German anti-Semite.

[19] Révay, p. 265.

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 101, 255.

[21] This key work, of which apparently not a single copy has survived, is mentioned by Gömbös in a book he wrote shortly after World War I: *Egy magyar vezérkari tiszt birálo feljegyzései a forradalomról és ellenforradalomról* [The critical comments of a Hungarian member of the General Staff about the revolution and the counter-revolution] (Budapest, 1920), 8-9. One historian now suggests that the study probably remained in manuscript form and was never published. Gergely, pp. 43-44.

[22] The following is based on Gömbös's speeches in the Hungarian National Assembly (cited as NN) and in the journal *Szózat*.

[23] NN, 1920, V, 377-79. See also Gergely, pp. 99-100.

[24] Jenő Révay, *Zsidósors Magyarországon* [Jewish fate in Hungary] (Budapest: Téka, 1948), 18.

[25] Speech of September 17, 1920, NN, 1920-1922, V, 372; Gergely, pp. 130-31.

[26] For the numerus clausus, see Nathaniel Katzburg, *Hungary and the Jews. Policy and Legislation, 1920-1943* (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan U.P., 1981), 60-64; and Randolph L, Braham, *The Politics of Genocide. The Holocaust in Hungary* (New York: Columbia U.P.), I, 46.

[27] Gergely, p. 88.

[28] For example, in a speech in 1922 he declared that violence was acceptable as long as it served the interests not of a narrow clique, but of "the entire nation." Andrew C. Janos, *The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary, 1825-1945* (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1982), 257.

[29] Révay, *Gömbös Gyula*, pp. 212-13.

[30] Vonyó, p. 42.

[31] Lévai, *Gömbös Gyula*, p. 18; Dósa, p. 125.

[32] Sakmyster, *Hungary's Admiral*, p. 397.

[33] Vonyó, p. 38.

[34] A reliable Austrian report on the secret proceedings of the Congress is found in the Neues Politisches Archiv (Vienna), K915/16143/146-7. Delegates from twelve countries came to the Congress, including Alfred Rosenberg from Germany and Professor A. C. Cuza of Romania. See Nagy-Talavera, p. 72.

[35] Mária M. Kovács, *Liberal Professions and Illiberal Politics. Hungary from the Habsburgs to the Holocaust* (New York: Oxford, 1994), 82-83; Gergely, pp. 189-90.

[36] Sakmyster, *Hungary's Admiral*, pp. 170-71. Gömbös had signaled his willingness to moderate his position on the "Jewish question" in a parliamentary speech in 1930. Janos, p. 260.

[37] C. A. Macartney, *October Fifteenth. A History of Modern Hungary, 1929-1945* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh U.P., 1961), I, 117-18. Details on the negotiations are found in Macartney Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford University, MS 3297, Box 18.

[38] NN, 1931-1935, II, 53.

[39] Kovács, p. 84.

[40] Braham, p. 51.

[41] See the letter of Ferenc Chorin to Elemér Balogh, Nov. 21, 1961, in Macartney Papers, *loc. cit.* MS 3310, Box 31.

[42] Sakmyster, *Hungary's Admiral*, pp. 182-83.

[43] Kovács, p. 84; Janos, pp. 291-92.

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The Wartime History of the National Bank of Hungary Through Hungarian-American Eyes

Marguerite D. Allen

Special Agent William I. DeHuszar of the United States Army Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) arrested the Arrow Cross president of the Hungarian National Bank, László Temesváry, on May 10, 1945, in the village of Spital am Pyrhn, Austria.[1] Just seven months earlier, Temesváry's personal friend, Hungary's new leader Ferenc Szálasi, had given him control over the entire treasury of the Bank including Hungary's gold reserves. Ten days after his appointment, the Bank's Board of Directors was dissolved. Temesváry replaced the pre-October 15 bank leadership with directors more to his liking, setting off a series of promotions and demotions based chiefly on political ideology.[2]

Who was László Temesváry? He served the extreme far right as a journalist and knew nothing about banking.[3] He owned and edited *Nép* (People), a "rabid and inciting" "anti-Semitic weekly" that advocated Arrow Cross political and ideological views and published Arrow Cross bulletins on its back page.[4] A People's Court judge found Temesváry guilty of war crimes and crimes against people. These included spreading hatred against Jewish people, as in his book *Mi lesz velünk?* (What's Going to Happen to Us?) and *A fasizmus pénzügyi politikája* (The Financial Politics of Fascism). The judge found that his work as a journalist encouraged young people to turn "against a segment of the population — even babies and old people — to rob them, treat them sadistically while deporting them, and to exterminate them." The People's Courts sentenced Temesváry to "death by bullet," later commuted by the National Council of the People's Courts to "a life sentence of forced labour." His sentence was upheld as late as 1985.[5]

Readers of post-1989 bank histories that deal specifically with the period of Szálasi's rule will find nothing about Temesváry's arrest or

subsequent war crimes trial, even though the records of Temesváry's trial have been available at the Budapest City Archives since 1988-89. Nor will they find reference to the boxes of stolen Jewish valuables Temesváry stored in the Bank that are documented in the trial papers.[6]

While researchers can find Special Agent DeHuszar's official reports in the U.S. Army files at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in College Park, Maryland, nowhere has it been documented that the American who arrested László Temesváry was a former Hungarian refugee. Special Agent William I. DeHuszar was my father. After his death I discovered a private diary recording his experiences from March 30 through July 17, 1945, 7 while he served as a CIC Special Agent.[8] This previously unknown document not only presents new information about this chapter of Bank history, but also offers a Hungarian-American perspective on events and raises pertinent questions about larger issues of continuing importance.

Although he was raised as a Lutheran in Budapest, on May 5, 1939, fascist legislation defined my father as Jewish. He had graduated from the Verbőczy *Reálgimnázium* and served in the Hungarian army (the *Honvéd*). Unwilling to leave family, friends, and Budapest, the twenty--two-year-old stayed on in Hungary even after his younger brother's flight to the United States as a scholarship student at the University of Chicago. He waited until the last minute. On the day before the Second Racial Law took effect, he left Hungary.[9] From Budapest he travelled with his mother to Vienna and then to Berlin. There he "negotiated" his departure with Adolf Eichmann, who was already functioning as the head of the Reich Central Office for Jewish Emigration in Berlin.[10] Five years later, he returned to Europe as an American assigned to military intelligence in Patton's Third Army. As it turned out, he served his former country just as well as his new one.[11]

The Immediate Historical Background

What circumstances led to American involvement with the National Bank of Hungary in May 1945? With the Soviet Red Army advancing rapidly from the East in the fall of 1944, the Hungarian National Bank began its final relocation westward out of Hungary in early November. Lengthy negotiations at the border with the Germans followed. Finally, in late January 1945, two trains carrying the nation's gold reserves and 600 bank

employees including families made their way into Upper Austria.[12] Among the bank's holdings, in addition to the gold reserves, were the most valuable volumes of the National Széchényi Library, gold treasures from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and the gold reserves of the Pesti Magyar Kereskedelmi Bank (Hungarian Commercial Bank of Pest).[13]

By the end of January 1945, the bank had settled into its new home in the ancient Benedictine monastery of Spital. There the bank remained safe until the end of April when Russian, German, Hungarian, and American forces converged. The Russians had advanced to within seventy miles. The surrounding countryside was filled by German and Hungarian troops, with some 800 horses, who were in the process of surrendering to the Allies. In addition, top-level Nazis on the run sought refuge there in secluded, inaccessible mountain retreats — their so-called "*Alpenfestung*" or "National Redoubt."[14] Finally, like the cavalry coming over the hill, Patton's Third Army crossed into Austria from the West. In the midst of this chaos, top Hungarian Arrow Crossers desperately tried to maintain control of the bank.[15]

On May 2, bank leaders made their first attempt to contact American officials to request protection. On May 6, a bank representative managed to hand deliver the bank's urgent request for help to Lt. Col. Ball of the U.S. Army in Kirchdorf. The next day American tanks arrived and surrounded the monastery, forcing the Germans in the vicinity to flee.[16] On May 8, Special Agent DeHuszar arrived in Spital with orders to investigate the bank situation, obtain an inventory of its holdings, and verify their existence.[17]

DeHuszar's Diary and Official Reports

My interest in the National Bank of Hungary began unexpectedly about three years ago when I discovered my father's wartime diary. He had locked it in a file cabinet that had gone into storage shortly after his death in 1990. In his entries from May 8 to May 14, 1945, he described his work as the lead investigator of the Hungarian National Bank case. It was an important assignment among many for the twenty-seven-year-old. He later tracked down, interrogated, and/or arrested such war criminals as Hungarian Cabinet Ministers Gábor Vajna and László Budinsky, *Volksbund* leader Franz Basch, and two of the instigators of the Újvidék massacre, Márton Zöldi and General Ferenc Feketehalmi-Czeydner. All of

these men were executed in 1946, either at the end of a rope or in front of a firing squad.[18]

He also drove Gestapo chief Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Eichmann's boss, from his mountain retreat where Americans had captured him to CIC headquarters in Vocklabrück on May 12.[19] "If I would be an opportunist," my father writes on June 23,

> I could run for office in Hungary. It would make a good story. I really cleaned Hungary. Arrested Temesváry, Fazekas of Nat'l Bank, Basily Goldschmidt of the *Volksgruppe*, Zöldi the War Criminal, Vajna the Min of Int & Budinsky the Min of Justice.... Had Feketehalmi-Czeydner too but left him there because of his old age.[20]

To satisfy my curiosity, I visited the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland to learn more. There I found my father's story confirmed in his and others' official reports. Still questions remained.

As my interests and research broadened, I met Monika Pacziga while attending a Hungarian commemoration at the University of Kansas, where she was studying. Subsequently, she translated for me documents from Temesváry's trial that can be found at the Budapest City Archives. Ms. Pacziga, now a graduate student at the Central European University, also translated Hungarian accounts written more than forty-five years after the events took place.[21]

Emil Fazekas and Stolen Jewish Valuables

What new elements besides Temesváry's arrest do DeHuszar's new found diary and contemporary official records at archives in the United States and Hungary add to what we know from recent Hungarian accounts? First, the arrest of Emil Fazekas. Officially, DeHuszar reports on May 14, 1945, that

> EMIL FAZEKAS is a member of the [Arrow Cross] Party since 1936. Assigned to recruit members. Collected dues and increased membership. In Oct '44, when the Hung Nazis took over, he suddenly became personnel manager, though he was not qualified. This promotion was the reward for his "Under-

> ground" activities. EF believes in the Hung Nazi principles and defends the action of its leader, Ferenc Szálasi.[22]

(To his private diary, DeHuszar confides, "Temesváry is a fanatic anti--Semite & a stoop & so is Fazekas.") Temesváry also left Fazekas "in charge of" the bank during his absences.[23]

About the arrest of Temesváry and Fazekas, DeHuszar writes:

> It was a strange feeling to go to both of them & tell them "Pack up, you have 20 minutes." Fazekas was white like the snow and deadly scared. Temesváry told me where Szálasi was (he believed in him). Later after I suggested that he take me to him he said that the radio announced that Sz. was captured 3 days ago. I asked the others but they did not hear it. Talked to his two chauffeurs who drove him to Sz 10 days ago & one of them told me that he heard it at noon from T. which means that T. told him at noon what to say.[24]

DeHuszar's diary also reveals that Temesváry and Fazekas escaped the POW camp a few days after their arrest. DeHuszar "went [back] to Spital," where he arrested them a second time on May 14:

> Temesváry and Fazekas got out of PW & went to Spital. A Hungarian General [had] secured them permission to go. Had to drive 100 miles to get them back. Arrange our own detention camp & we have now a H[ungarian] gendarme detail. Temesv[áry] complained that he was in a concentration camp for 3 days, upon which I offered to show him one.[25]

Unlike Temesváry, who was fifty years old at the time of his trial, Fazekas, in his early thirties, did not stand trial. There is no file on him in the People's Courts materials, nor among the prosecution materials in the Budapest City Archives. Instead, he apparently was sent to a POW camp, where he successfully completed a de-Nazification program and was given a job.[26]

In contrast, Temesváry's arrest was openly discussed at bank meetings in October 1945 and recorded in bank minutes. Mrs Temesváry testified to bank directors and later at her husband's trial that he was arrested in Spital and taken away, that a few days later he returned to Spital and was arrested again.[27] Among the charges brought against him

by the People's Courts were using bank money to support the Arrow Cross and accepting two Arrow Cross boxes containing stolen Jewish valuables that he stored in the bank. At his trial in 1946, Temesváry admitted that he had stored the two boxes of stolen Jewish property in the bank and that they had been part of the valuables transported out of Hungary to Spital. He testified that they were not, however, included in the inventory later given to the Americans.[28]

In his 2002 book *The Gold Train*, Ronald Zweig quotes from a document that shows how stolen Jewish valuables came to be stored in the bank. The document records a transaction that took place December 5, 1944, in Budapest. It concerns valuables presumably stolen the previous day from Jewish apartments whose owners had been sent to the Budapest ghetto. It reads:

> The committee decided to give the $300 and the twenty pieces of jewellery with precious stones and one silver cigar box to the President of the National Bank, Brother (Testvér or Comrade) László Temesváry, in order for him to deposit them in the National Bank, while the rest of the silver goods will be transported to the cellar of the National Bank in three boxes and one basket.[29]

On April 28, 1945, Temesváry asked for and received the Arrow Cross boxes "n. 7" and "n. 9," saying that Szálasi had entrusted him with the handling of this "Jewish treasure."[30] The third Arrow Cross box and one basket mentioned in the above document are not clearly identifiable in the bank's inventory. However, in the 1945 inventory given to the Americans and the 1947 inventory of remaining items to be returned to Hungary — the gold reserves had been returned in August 1946 — there appears a box containing all of the loose items mentioned above together with additional pieces of jewellery: "one silver cigar case [containing] $300, and 42 pieces jewellery."[31]

Mrs. Temesváry told the bank directors, and later testified to the People's Court judge, that her husband made one easy-to-carry package out of the boxes and twice tried to bring these valuables to the "gold train" nearby or to "the Germans." Temesváry testified that he tried to give them to Szálasi. After her husband's arrest, Mrs. Temesváry said she tried to return the valuables to the bank.[32]

American Documents and István Cottely's Account

There is one eye witness account, by István Cottely of Buenos Aires, written originally in Spanish more than forty years after the events in Spital took place. It was published in 1992 in a Hungarian translation by Katalin Pálffy as *A Magyar aranytartalélek a második világháború viharában* (The Hungarian Treasures During the Second World War). An unpublished German translation of the account by Dr. Lothar Schwarz also exists. Notably, the German account differs from the Hungarian in several, significant details. Cottely's account appears to be the first published post-1989 account and all subsequent histories cite it, making the article an important historical source document.[33]

In his autobiographical remarks Cottely writes that he was born in Pozsony (today's Bratislava) in 1905. When this city became part of Czechoslovakia in 1918, he was forced to learn Slovak in addition to Hungarian and German. Because Czech universities conducted classes in Slovak, Cottely chose to continue his education in Vienna. There he studied economics and in 1927 obtained the doctor of law degree. After fulfilling his Czechoslovakian military service in 1931–1932, he married an Italian. As a young lawyer working in his father's office, he became engaged in politics. Specifically, he founded a Christian-Social organization for Hungarian youth. Shortly thereafter, he was arrested for irredentist activities and jailed for a year. Upon his release, he moved to Hungary, which he considered his true home. There he found a job with the National Bank of Hungary.[34]

According to Cottely, in 1942, the bank sent him to work in the Bank of Italy's department of economic research "in order to become familiar with Italian "financial politics" (pénzpolitikájával) in the Hungarian translation or "Italian politics" (um die von diesen Land adoptierte Politik kennenzulernen) in the German.[35] After the war, he was unable to obtain a travel visa from the Allies, or from Italy, where his wife's family was living. As a result, he had to travel without one to Rome, where the Vatican had a relief agency for Hungarian refugees. Still unable to obtain a visa, a permanent job, or permanent residency, after several months in Rome, he applied to immigrate to Brazil, Canada, and Argentina. Shortly thereafter, Argentina responded favourably. He and his family arrived in Buenos Aires in May 1948.[36]

DeHuszar's 1945 and Cottely's 1992 accounts provide an interesting contrast. According to American documents, on May 8, Special Agent

DeHuszar asked for and received from General Manager Cottely a copy of the bank's inventory, after which he verified the existence of the valuables.[37] The twenty-seven-year-old CIC Special Agent interviewed the forty-year-old general manager again on the afternoon of May 9. DeHuszar records in his diary that during this second encounter he "caught him [Cottely] in a lie...." Afterwards, he interviewed former Business Manager Károly Frank. On May 10, Special Agent DeHuszar spent his "forenoon [in Spital] talking to directors." That afternoon he arrested Temesváry and Fazekas, and, four days later, arrested them again.

Finally, both DeHuszar and Cottely took part in the critical May 13 negotiations between the Hungarian National Bank and the U.S. Military Government. Cottely represented the bank; four American officers, the U.S. Military Government; while DeHuszar translated inventory and assisted in negotiations. DeHuszar writes: "13 May SPITAL: Negotiations between MG & H.N. Bank. Cottely behaved excellently and gained the respect of all four officers. They will definitely report favorably on the bank & try to help them. I translate inventory and help at negotiations."[38]

Nevertheless, in his account Cottely does not mention Special Agent DeHuszar by name or function. In his account, DeHuszar never requested an inventory; instead Major Perera did (on May 13). Further, DeHuszar never interviewed Cottely, never talked to bank directors, never arrested Temesváry and Fazekas, and never took part in the negotiations.

On May 12, according to Cottely, General George Patton arrived and personally shook hands with him.[39] However, Patton did not mention the bank, or anything related to the bank, in his diary on, before, or after the supposed date of the purported encounter. Instead, "on May 12, 1945, General Patton met in Linz with the Commanding General of the 4th Russian Guards Army" for an Honours Guard ceremony followed by lunch at the officers' club, consisting mainly of whiskey.[40] None of the published Hungarian accounts back up Cottely's assertion, nor do U.S. Army documents. It appears that forty years after DeHuszar first "caught him in a lie," he may have caught him in another.

In fact, the most important event to occur on that day was the selection by bank leaders of Gyula Torzsay-Biber to replace Cottely as General Manager and the reinstallation of October 14, 1944, directors.[41] This change in leadership was a direct result of DeHuszar's arrest of Temesváry and Fazekas.

Other Americans receive Cottely's praise. Chief Finance Officer Major Perara, the head of the negotiating committee, as well as Major F. M. Roesti, and Lieutenant J. S. Terry are singled out as "lower ranking officers" who behaved "much more politely to the Hungarians" than the unfriendly Americans who had arrived earlier.

Yet, perhaps Cottely does refer to DeHuszar indirectly when he writes that the Americans who arrived on May 7 treated the Hungarians as "a former enemy" (conflating the arrival of American tanks and military personnel with DeHuszar's arrival the next day). They were "fair but unfriendly," Cottely writes. They would not shake hands with him.[42]

In other words, perhaps Cottely found DeHuszar fair but unfriendly. Perhaps DeHuszar would not shake hands with him. Considering that Hungary declared war on the United States and considering the genocide DeHuszar had seen first hand as the Third Army swept through Germany, knowing many of his own family members had been left at risk in Hungary for death or deportation, I think this quite likely. One month earlier, on April 10 in Gotha, Germany, DeHuszar wrote:

> Went out to Ohrdruf where there was a camp for foreign workers. Saw some twenty men machine-gunned & still laying [sic] in their blood. The Germans herded them into a pile just before we came. Some bodies arranged in a pile ready to be burned. Gruesome & terrible sight. Some were alive in the barracks but suffered from malnutrition. It should be compulsory to see it — so we all know what we are fighting for.[43]

Earlier, in Neukirchen, on April 1, he notes:

> On [sic] the evening in the town we saw plenty of women. They were Hungarian Jewesses picked up from Budapest etc. & sent here to work. Summer 1944 they picked up all Jewish women (Nürnberg law Jews) and sent them on cattle trains to Alsweig [sic] where they had a gas-extermination camp. The old ones were killed the rest of them were undressed & were told to walk up before SS men.... The good looking ones were sent to bordells [sic] for the SS & Wehrmacht.... the others sent here to work in a gas factory that was dangerous to health. They were beaten & mistreated, had little to eat.... They make a horrible sight.

He continues :

> What I saw & heard was sufficient to feel like slaping [sic] every German on the face, woman or man, alike and have no remorse for what I am doing. They have it too good — they should taste half of what they gone through.
>
> I don't have [to] believe or disbelieve the atrocity stories, I saw hundreds of the thousand women — and what about those I couldn't see anymore.[44]

What does DeHuszar say about Cottely in his final May 14 "Report on the Board of Directors..."?: "ISTVÁN COTTELY joined the party Mar[ch] '45 under pressure. He is not a Nazi at all. He is the Director of the Statistical and Educational Department and the only one from the Board of Directors who speaks English."[45] The "at all" in "He is not a Nazi at all" suggests that earlier DeHuszar suspected he was.

Károly Frank

Another fact mentioned only in DeHuszar's diary illuminates his investigation and gives us a glimpse of the inner workings of the bank. On his first day at Spital, DeHuszar asked Cottely for data missing from the inventory list. Cottely called "Dr. Frank" to get the information. When Frank brought it, DeHuszar recognized him: "Not until I look at him do I realize who he was... a little bit bent but very much the same polite [man] bringing me all the figures I demanded. He, however, did not recognize me. What a coincidence."

A former neighbour and highly respected family acquaintance, Károly Frank had been with the bank for thirty-five years and was at one time its general manager, but had been demoted after October 15 to assistant director. DeHuszar asked both men to appear at his office the next afternoon.[45]

On May 9, DeHuszar spoke with Cottely first. After he caught Cottely "in a lie," he talked to Frank. DeHuszar reminded him of the ping pong games he and his brother used to play in Frank's basement with his son Zoli. Then Frank remembered that DeHuszar's father had been an editor (*szerkesztő*) and that DeHuszar left with his mother in 1939. Frank, who was very happy to see DeHuszar, told him that his family's home

had been sold, and DeHuszar promised to see if he can locate Zoli and his brother.

Frank revealed, among other things, that he, former General Manager László Jankovics, and bank attorney Gyula Torzsay-Biber were the only directors who refused to join the Arrow-Cross party.[46] DeHuszar reports:

> FRANK, DR. KÁROLY is with bank for past 35 years and is now assistant director. He was the business manager until October 1944, but lost his position because he refused to join the Party. Since he was a 'Liberal', FAZEKAS wanted to fire him. JANKOVICS, however, stood up beside him threatening [with] resignation if Frank was dismissed. This saved FRANK's job, who is considered the 'Best Head' in the entire organization.[47]

As a result of this meeting, other bank employees (including Cottely) might well have learned that the Special Agent was a former Hungarian refugee. DeHuszar writes in his diary that Frank told him about a discussion he'd had with his colleagues before the interview:

> He [Frank] didn't know why I wanted him too [along with Cottely] since he was not a leading man anymore. They talked about it & one of them remarked: 'You probably impressed him.' (Ha ők tudták volna.).... He was one of the few who in spite of everything did not join the party. But they had to keep him because only he knew what the score was. Some directors only joined in March. He & two others refused. (Jankov[ics]... was pensioned [off] because of that.)[48]

It is even likely that upon his return to the bank, Frank's colleagues would have asked him why the American wanted to talk to him and that Frank replied that he'd known him before the war. Certainly, DeHuszar's conversation (in Hungarian) with bank directors on the forenoon of May 10 could have suggested his former refugee status.

In his diary entry for May 10, DeHuszar writes that he arrested the two Arrow Cross men "with clear conscience and great pleasure. In addition to clear facts that would have been sufficient to arrest them my action was supported by the conviction that these men have no right to rule those who have still held out against the pressure."

And he concludes: "There is justice! Frank was always decent and now he is the one whose word will count as far as I am concerned."[49]

Torzsay-Biber, the most senior member of the leadership, became General manager on May 12, replacing Cottely.[50] Torzsay-Biber had been with the bank for twenty years, was "known in international banking circles and... considered a man of great integrity."[51] However, in September Torzsay-Biber left his leadership position and was arrested for refusing to cooperate with the "red bank" in Budapest. Károly Frank was then selected to head a committee of nine to run the bank in Spital.[52]

On at least two other occasions Károly Frank influenced events. Temesváry had forced Jankovics to "retire" on April 3 and appointed Cottely in his place. In a telephone conversation on April 10, Gábor Vajna (whom Cottely refers to as "the Interior Minister" rather than by name) gave Cottely the order to move the bank further west.[53] On April 25, Temesváry learned that Arrow Cross bank employees had petitioned Szálasi directly, and he rushed off to consult Szálasi himself. The next day Temesváry announced to the staff that, on Szálasi's orders, the bank would be moved south to Carinthia. According to Cottely, after Temesváry's announcement, bank employees met at the home of Károly Frank and decided to sabotage any attempt to move the bank.[54]

It could well be this meeting that led to the ruse — mentioned only in contemporary American newspapers — that helped to preserve the gold reserves for Hungary. The *Chicago Daily News* for May 21, 1945, reported these details at the end of its front page story, "Chicagoan Finds Hungary Gold in Alps Crag":

> Supreme Headquarters said Nazi Gestapo agents tried to hijack the treasure shortly before the arrival of 80th division doughboys. The Gestapo had the active co-operation of the Hungarian bank president . . . . But a patriot Hungarian stalled on the job and deliberately mislaid keys and key records and generally sabotaged the German attempt at plunder.[55]

Second, the October bank minutes reveal that earlier Frank had wanted to tell the Americans about the two boxes with Jewish valuables (that were not on the inventory list), but that Cottely and Torzsay-Biber thought it "superfluous" to do so. After Torzsay-Biber's removal from power and Cottely's transfer to work on the bank's records with the Americans in Frankfurt am Main, Dr. Frank began an investigation into the boxes.[56]

On October 11, 1945, Frank called a meeting of those bank employees still in Spital who had attended the April 28 meeting, at which Cottely gave Temesváry the two Arrow Cross boxes. They documented that the boxes had been given to Temesváry in the presence of "Chief Executive Officer (*vezérigazgató*)" István Cottely. The attendees, with Mrs. Temesváry, also documented that the bank had been unable to take back the valuables and that bank officials had advised her to take them to an appropriate German bank (*devizabank*).

Frank called another meeting for October 18 to discuss what became of the Arrow Cross boxes. At this meeting Mrs. Temesváry stated that at first Cottely agreed to take the jewellery; however, she would not sign an affidavit to this effect. Finally, on October 20, an inventory of the remaining valuables was made at the apartment of Tibor Mészárovits, a delegate (*megbízott*) from the Hungarian Prime Minister's Office. A sampling of the kinds of valuables remaining includes: 299 gold rings of various sizes, many watches, coins, necklaces, bracelets, earrings, diamond pins, cigarette cases, medallions, etc.[57]

Differences in the two Translations of Cottely's Account

The German translation of Cottely's memoir differs significantly in several key places from the Hungarian. These need further examination. In the Hungarian version, the date on which Temesváry retired (i.e. fired) László Jankovics is May 3, 1945, rather than April 3, as in the German translation.[58] The time difference matters. By March 30, the Russians had almost reached Sopron along Hungary's western border. By April 4, they had completed their occupation of Hungary; and by April 13, they had captured Vienna. In the meantime, the Americans, under Patton, were fast approaching from the West. Temesváry must have known at the beginning of April that the time had come for Arrow Crossers (and Nazis) to grab the gold and escape. For this delicate task, Temesváry needed help from someone more cooperative than General Manager László Jankovics, who wouldn't even join the Arrow Cross. In fact, he replaced Jankovics with Cottely.

Special Agent DeHuszar's diary also supports the earlier date as well as a desire to scapegoat Jankovics. On May 9, DeHuszar writes, "Some directors only joined in March. He [Károly Frank] & two others refused. (Jankovics *vezérigazgató* was pensioned because of that.)"

DeHuszar also records that during his discussion with bank directors on May 10, "Fazekas accuses Jankovics of being a drunk & a party member. Then when Jankovics [is] called he [Fazekas] begs him to admit that. The contrary is true."[59] According to Catherine Ladányi, wife of bank director Frigyes Ladányi, it was General Manager László Jankovics who had refused to let the trains leave Hungary in January, 1945, before the agreement with the Germans stated that the bank employees would not be separated from the gold reserves.

Changing the date of Jankovics's retirement to May 3 could mislead the reader into thinking unfairly that Jankovics was still in charge during the period when Cottely was telephoning with Gábor Vajna (April 10), giving Temesváry the boxes of Jewish property (April 28), and receiving instructions from Gauleiter August Eigruber (April 30). In fact, under Cottely's leadership, bank employees felt compelled to send a petition to Szálasi themselves on April 24, protesting orders to move the bank. Temesváry then rushed off to Szálasi and returned with supposedly authentic affidavits, written on scraps of paper, indicating the renewed powers Szálasi had given him and the penalties should anyone dare disobey his commands.[60]

The accurate date, April 3, clarifies Cottely's meteoric rise from bank employee to chief executive officer (*vezérigazgató*). In mid-October 1944, Temesváry had promoted Cottely from his position as an employee to that of director of the Statistical and Economics Department. By January 1, 1945, Cottely had responsibility for organizing the trains and overseeing the move from the Hungarian border into the Reich. On April 3, Temesváry made him the top bank officer (replacing Jankovics). Under the Arrow Cross regime, it took Cottely little more than five months to advance from bank employee to general manager, or to use his own words, "the man most responsible for the fate of the bank and its employees."[61]

Of course, the date change in the Hungarian translation might simply be a typographical error. However, Cottely told Catherine Ladányi he knew about "this mistake." He further stated that he had not tried to correct it because he thought it had been "too late" to change. Nonetheless, he sent the published article "to diplomats, politicians... to everyone."[62]

Moreover, there are other curious, but consistent alterations in the Hungarian translation. First, it omits the meeting Cottely says took place at Frank's house April 26, the meeting, at which bank employees decided

to sabotage any attempt to separate them from the gold they were protecting. Was this another sign that some bank employees had lost faith in Cottely's ability (or desire?) to save the gold for Hungary? This group of bank employees, Cottely writes, also demanded that Cottely include them in future management meetings.[63] Two days later, Cottely handed over to Temesváry the Arrow Cross boxes filled with portable, fungible assets.[64]

Another omission in the Hungarian translation occurs in the 6 May 1945 letter Cottely reproduces from Herr Schüsselmann, who had demanded an immediate transfer of the bank's gold. This omission noted the presence in the bank of Reichbanksdirektor Dr. Leopold Scheffler, who had the responsibility of supporting the bank through trade with Hungary, as specified in the agreement signed at the border back in January.[65] The sentence reminds the reader of the continuing cooperation between officials of the two governments, which in the matter of trade favoured Germany over Hungary.[66]

Finally, the German translation records one reason Cottely wrote his recollections: "to portray the true story" (die wahre Geschichte darzulegen).[67]

Questions

In the end we are left with questions:

1. Were the items turned over to Temesváry during the Arrow Cross meeting in Budapest on December 4, 1944, the only stolen Jewish valuables that were stored in the bank? Were the boxes containing silver (mentioned in the Arrow Cross memorandum) the same as the two Temesváry took on April 28? If the two boxes Cottely returned to Temesváry were two of the three given to him in Budapest, what happened to the third box and basket?

2. Were there particular reasons why, after 47 years, Cottely omitted the Special Agent and his arrests of Temesváry and Fazekas from his "true story"? Whatever Cottely's reasons for eliminating DeHuszar from the narrative, there is sufficient documentary evidence to indicate that Cottely is, at times, an unreliable narrator.

3. Perhaps Cottely's omits Temesváry's arrest because this event radically changed Cottely's position at the bank. After Temesváry's arrest, Torzsay-Biber became general manager, and the October 14 leadership was reinstalled. Cottely would have had no leadership responsibilities

until he travelled to Frankfurt in July to work on the bank records. Here a new question arises: How did his previous working relationships affect his work on bank records?

4. What is the explanation for the differences between the Hungarian and German translations? The fact that I stumbled upon these differences by chance is a reminder that the reader with access only to the Hungarian translation would never know that it had been edited.

It is my hope that the new evidence presented here from American and Hungarian archival documents will spur further research into the events at Spital and that new studies will benefit from the light shed on Cottely's account and its Hungarian translation. Since, as Randolph Braham reminds us, "history is a formidable weapon,"[68] and since few of the participants in the events in Spital are still among us, it is especially important to use all available documents in our efforts to leave an accurate record for future generations.

Conclusion

It is ironic, to say the least, that the first American military intelligence agent to contact the National Bank of Hungary's executive board in response to the urgent plea for help was a former Hungarian who had been driven from his home, family, and friends. And it is absolutely fitting that the Special Agent who lost most of his extended family in the Holocaust arrested the Arrow Cross propagandist who had contributed to the hate campaign against Hungarian Jews and the theft of their property.

My father's encounter with a family friend, former Business Manager Károly Frank led to the arrests of Temesváry and Fazekas and enabled him to help the bank put its best foot forward with the Americans. Later, Frank's investigation of the two Arrow Cross boxes restored bank accountability regarding this matter. In the end, of all Europeans, only the Hungarians had their gold reserves and national valuables returned to them intact after the war.

"There is justice!" my father wrote on the day he made the arrests. On May 15, the day after he had arrested Temesváry and Fazekas for the second time and ensured that they could not escape again, Special Agent DeHuszar "went to Mühlbach via Gmunden and picked up Gábor Vajna."[69] He would devote the rest of his military service to pursuing Nazi war criminals.

In one of his last entries, my father writes: "Col Ball at supper with us & he told the Capt that the Hungarians told him that they hate to see the 80th Div[ision] go because I was in it & would leave with them."[70]

NOTES

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[1] William Ivan DeHuszar, "Wartime Diary: May 10" (handwritten manuscript, 1945); Col. Ralph E. Pearson, Enroute to the Redoubt: A Soldier's Report as a Regiment Goes to War vol. 3, p. 212. (Chicago: Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 57-13365).

[2] János Botos, *A Magyar Nemzeti Bank története* [A History of the National Bank of Hungary] vol. 2 (Budapest: Presscon Kiadó, 1999), 270.

[3] DeHuszar, "Report on the Board of Directors and Personnel of the National Bank of Hungary 14 May 1945," National Archives & Records Administration (hereafter NA) RG260/OMGUS FINAD.

[4] Rudolph Braham, *The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary* vol. 1 (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1994), 165; In an e-mail letter, László Varga related the following information: "Temesváry most likely began his career in the pro-Fascist student organization Mefhosz which organized violent anti--Semitic disorders. He gave an interview to the official Arrow Cross paper *Függetlenség* (Independence) that appeared October 29, 1944, and wrote three books promoting fascist values: *A dolgozó nemzet Útja* (The Way of the Working Nation) in 1938, *Mi lesz velünk?* (What's Going to Happen to Us?), and *A fasizmus pénzügyi politikája* (The Financial Politics of Fascism) in 1940."

[5] Temesváry escaped the prison in Vác during the 1956 Hungarian Uprising. Investigators pursued him in 1958 and again in 1985, but never found him. In 1985, an attempt to annul his conviction on the grounds that he was probably no longer alive, was denied and his sentence upheld. See Temesváry's file in the Budapest Municipal Archives (Budapest Főváros Levéltára, hereafter BFL) People's court paper (Népbírósági iratok, hereafter Nb) Nb. 4.832/1945.

[6] According to a November 11, 2005, e-mail from László Karsai, during and after the collapse of the communism (1988-1989), the majority of trial records were transferred to the Budapest City Archives, where they have been available to researchers.

[7] The diary consists of fifty-five pages snapped into a black three-ring notebook. The notes are primarily in English with comments in Hungarian and German.

[8] The CIC was designed in 1942 as a secret branch of Army intelligence that operated independently of other Army intelligence formations. Its elite members were considered to be of officer calibre. Following on the heels of the victorious American troops, CIC agents worked in teams, rounding up stay-behind Nazis and investigating suspect civilians and enemy personnel. Some well-known agents include former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, writer J.D. Salinger, and composer Leroy Anderson. See "CIC Records: A Valuable Tool for Researchers," Center for the Study of Intelligence Bulletin 11 (Summer 2000), 11-15; Ib Melchior, *Case by Case: a U.S. Army Counterintelligence Agent in World War II* (Novato, Ca.: Presidio, 1993) and Ian Sayers, *America's Secret Army: The Untold Story of the Counter Intelligence Corps* (np: Franklin Watts, 1989).

[9] William I. DeHuszar's 1939 pocket calendar shows his day of departure. I found the calendar with my father's diary.

[10] The Trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem: Judgment Part 8, Paragraphs 64-65. http://www.nizkor.org.

[11] From his Normandy landing in August of '44 until his arrival in Wiesbaden, Germany, in March '45, he served as a photo interpreter, for which he was awarded a Bronze Star. When photo interpretation was no longer needed, he transferred to the CIC where he achieved the highest rank, Special Agent, because of his ability to speak German, French, and Hungarian fluently. As a Master Sergeant, he had full investigative powers.

[12] Aranyvonat http://www.mnb.hu/Resource.aspx? ResourceID=mnbfile&resourcename=aranyvonat_0523, 5. As stated in the introductory letter by then bank President Zsigmond Járai, Aranyvonat, is a record of the 2003 commemoration that honoured bank employees for their loyalty to their country. Its chronology of events reflects the purpose of the occasion. It is curious, nonetheless, that the loyal accomplishments of László Jankovics are not mentioned. Also, by excluding all events that took place in April, the bank leaves the reader without a true sense of the enormous obstacles its employees had to overcome to preserve the gold.

[13] Gábor Kádár and Zoltán Vági, *Self-Financing Genocide: The Gold Train, the Becher Case and the Wealth of Hungarian Jews* (NY: CEU Press, 2004), 144.

[14] István Cottely, "A Magyar aranytartalék a második világháború viharában" [The Hungarian Treasures during the Second World War] trans. Katalin Pálffy, *Valóság* (1992) 11:89-90; Hans.Kawarik ed. *Dorf im Gebirge: Spital im Pyrhn 1190-1990* (Linz: Gemeinde Spital/Pyrhn, 1990), 409; Col. Ralph

E. Pearson, *Enroute to the Redoubt*, vol. 1: 2, 78. [15] Cottely, "Die Goldreserven einer Nationalbank in den Wirren des Zweiten Weltkrieges," trans. Dr. Lothar Schwarz (Photocopy of typed original, Information Bureau in Spital am Phyrn, Austria, n.d.), 22; Geoffrey Bocca, Time (February 1964) as quoted in Robert Eliot Matteson, *Part II: The War Years: 1940-1946* (Hayward, Wisconsin: The Country Print Shop, 1980), 58-61.

[16] Cottely, "A Magyar aranytartalék," 93.

[17] DeHuszar, Diary: May 8.

[18] Braham, Genocide, 1317-1323, 1340-1341.

[19] DeHuszar, Diary: May 12.

[20] DeHuszar, Diary: June 23; on May 29, he writes the following about General Feketehalmi-Czeydner: "Go down to the lake for Feketehalmi-Czeydner. I can't bring him in because he has his larynx cut out due to cancer and talks & breaths [sic] through a tube. It's horrible to listen to. However I get hold of his papers which I turn over to [1st Lt. Imre] Németh." Count György Apponyi, who had been a prisoner in Mauthausen concentration camp with Károly Rassay, gave DeHuszar the background information concerning the Újvidék massacre. See DeHuszar, Diary: May 22 and DeHuszar's notebook. The notebook is pocket size with white covers and is in poor condition. Notes are written in English, Hungarian, and German.

[21] See notes 2, 12, 14, and 15. These three documents in particular deal specifically with events at Spital: Cottely's eyewitness account (1992); Botos's "official" 1999 bank history; and a record of the National Bank of Hungary's 2003 commemoration in Spital, posted as Aranyvonat on the Internet. Kádár and Vági, authors of *Self-Financing Genocide*, briefly describe the Hungarian National Bank train in order to distinguish it from the subject of their book, the gold train, as does Ronald Zweig in his book, *The Gold Train: The Destruction of the Jews and the Looting of Hungary* (New York: Morrow, 2002).

[22] DeHuszar "Report on the Board"; Diary, May 10.

[23] DeHuszar, Diary: May 10; Botos, *A Magyar Nemzeti Bank*, 280.

[24] DeHuszar, Diary: May 10.

[25] DeHuszar, Diary: May 14

[26] Catherine Ladányi in a telephone conversation with the author, February 21, 2006: Catherine Ladányi, wife of bank Director Frigyes Ladányi, learned this when, on the train to Spital in 1946, she unexpectedly encountered Fazekas. He was returning to Spital to pick up his family; László Varga to Monika Pacziga on 25 Aug 2004: Perhaps not surprisingly, surviving bankers claim they cannot recall Fazekas.)

[27] BFL, "October 11 and 18, 1945 Bank minutes," Nb. 4.832/1945.

[28] BFL, "Temesváry's Trial"; "Temesváry's Hearing"; "October 18 Bank Minutes" Nb. 4.832/1945.

[29] Zweig, Gold Train, 74-75. It is worth noting that among the valuables stored in the bank was "one package belonging to Minister-President Ferenc Szálasi containing 120 pieces of tableware, two bank books, and personal papers."

[30] BFL, "Temesváry Hearing"; "October 18 Bank Minutes" Nb. 4.832/-1945. The Arrow Cross boxes were not the only stolen Jewish valuables that traveled with the bank. Kádár and Vági point out that beginning in mid-April 1944, two HNB branches accepted "securities, precious metal and cash" that Jews had been ordered to surrender to them. Kádár, *Genocide*, 80-81.

[31] DeHuszar, "Inventory of the Hungarian National Bank (Budapest, Hungary) at Spital am Pyhrn, Austria, G-2 Periodic Report: 9 May 1945"; "Narrative Summary" with "Valuables turned over to U.S. Army at Spital am Pyhrn Austria by the Board of the National Bank of Hungary (Shipment 20)"; "Hungarian Property, 6 May 1947," NA RG260/OMGUS FINAD. Boxes 429, 430. There were, however, two boxes in the inventory marked "n. 8." These boxes contained Czech currency.

[32] BFL, "Temesváry's Trial";"Temesváry's Hearing"; "October 18 Bank Minutes" Nb. 4.832/1945.

[33] See notes 14 and 15.

[34] Cottely, "A Magyar aranytartalék," 82-83; "Die Goldreserven" 3-6.

[35] Cottely, "A Magyar aranytartalék," 85; Cottely, "Die Goldreserven," 7. Curiously, this job description is reminiscent of Temesváry's 1940 book title, *A fasizmus pénzügyi politikája* (The Financial Politics of Fascism).

[36] Cottely, "A Magyar aranytartalék," 95-97; "Die Goldreserven," 37-41.

[37] DeHuszar, Diary: May 8; DeHuszar, "Inventory."

[38] DeHuszar, Diary: May 8-13.

[39] Cottely, "A Magyar aranytartalék," 84.

[40] According to an email message (March 24, 2005) from Ernest J. Emrich, Reference Specialist at the Library of Congress who consulted Patton's personal diary, on May 12, 1945, "there was an Honor Guard, and they decorated the General and twelve other members of his party with different types of Legion of Merit. After the ceremony they went to the officers' club of the 65th Division and had lunch which consisted mostly of whiskey." Mr. Emrich looked at the days preceding and following May 12, 1945, but found no reference to the bank in Spital or Mr. Cottely.

[41] Aranyvonat, 5.

[42] Cottely, "A Magyar aranytartalék," 93; Because DeHuszar wrote in his final report (quoted below) that Cottely was the only director who spoke English, it can be assumed that Special Agent DeHuszar addressed Cottely in English, at least initially. Perhaps Cottely took offense later at what was probably a standard military intelligence strategy. According to Catherine Ladányi, Dr. Cottely was not the only director who could speak English.

[43] DeHuszar, Diary: April 10; Patton wrote a memorandum after visiting the Ohrdruf camp. It begins, "Colonel Coldman and I, together with a party which included General Eisenhower, General Bradley, and General Weyland, drove to Ohrdruf from the XX Corps Headquarters and visited a prison camp for slave labor who had been employed in a munitions factory in the vicinity. This was one of the most appalling sights I have seen." Ladislas Farago, *Patton: Ordeal and Triumph* (New York: Dell Publishers, 1963), 773.

[44] DeHuszar, Diary: April 1.

[45] DeHuszar, Diary: May 8.

[46] DeHuszar, Diary: May 9.

[47] DeHuszar, "Report on the Board"; Catherine Ladányi in a telephone conversation on February 21, 2006, assured the author that other bank directors could speak English. Of course, because DeHuszar could speak Hungarian, the question of whether or not only Cottely spoke English would not have been tested. On another occasion, Cottely insisted on being the only contact with an important "outsider," and that was with Herr Schüsselmann, who demanded that the Hungarians turn over the gold immediately. See below.

[48] DeHuszar, Diary: May 9.

[49] DeHuszar, Diary: May 10.

[50] Botos, *A Magyar Nemzeti Bank története*, 304.

[51] DeHuszar "Report on the Board."

[52] Botos, *A Magyar Nemzeti Bank története*, 304.

[53] Cottely, "Die Goldreserven," 20.

[54] *Ibid.*, 22-23.

[55] "Chicagoan Finds Hungary Gold in Alps Crag," *Chicago Daily News* Monday, May 21, 1945. *The Chicago Tribune*, *The Memphis Commercial Appeal*, *Chicago Herald American*, and *The Stars and Stripes* all carried articles with the same or similar information. See also Pearson, *Enroute to the Redoubt*, vol. 3, 212.

[56] BFL, "October 11, 18, and 20, 1945, Bank minutes," Nb. 4.832/1945. 52.

[57] *Ibid.*

[58] Cottely, "Die Goldreserven," 19; Cottely, "A Magyar aranytartalék," 93.

[59] DeHuszar, Diary: May 10.

[60] Cottely, "Die Goldreserven," 20-23; Catherine Ladányi in a telephone conversations on February 21 and March 8, 2006, told the author that these affidavits were written on a scrap of paper and that bank directors questioned their authenticity.

[61] Cottely, "Die Goldreserven," 19: (my translation) "Auf diese Weise wurde ich an erster Stelle für das Schicksal der Bank und seiner Angestellten verantwörtlich."

[62] Catherine Ladányi in a telephone conversation on March 8, 2006.

[63] Cottely, "Die Goldreserven," 20-23.

[64] BFL, "October 11, 18, and 20, 1945, Bank minutes," Nb. 4.832/1945. 52

[65] Cottely, "A Magyar aranytartalék," 86-87; Cottely, "Die Goldreserven," 15. Both translations delete the last lines, indicating that the agreement was copied to Dr. Scheffler. Thanks to Catherine Ladányi, I have a copy of the original German documents that were included in an unpublished memoir. I was unable to obtain Ladányi's memoir itself, however, in time for the completion of this article.

[66] The missing sentence reads: "Seitens der Deutschen Reichsregierung befindet sich bei der Ungarischen Nationalsbank als Betreuer, Reichsbankdirecktor Dr. Leopold Scheffler, der zur Zeit Verhandlungen mit dem Bevollmächtigen für die Wirtschaft in Ungarn führt."

[67] Cottely, "Die Goldreserven," 1. "Es war mein Wunsch die wahre Geschichte darzulegen und in meinen Erinnerungen das Verhalten würdig für Funktionäre der ungarischen Nationalbank aufzufrischen." This sentence appears only in the German translation.

[68] Rudolph Braham, "Hungary and the Holocaust: The Nationalist Drive to Whitewash the Past," in *The Treatment of the Holocaust in Hungary and Romania during the Post-Communist Era*, ed. Rudolph Braham (New York: Columbia UP, 2004).

[69] DeHuszar, Diary, May 15.

[70] DeHuszar, Diary, July 2.

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Sport Policy in Canada and Hungary: Lessons of Inclusion and Exclusion

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The level of academic and policy debate around issues of multiculturalism, integration and related concepts and approaches has grown enormously in recent years. In the European context it has been fostered 1) by the need to deal with issues related to the post-colonial period when the end of empire signalled a new relationship with migrant populations from the former colonies, and 2) by the aftermath of the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe and wars in the Middle East that led to displacement of large number of people. Although transnational agreements have reflected a need for a broader response to the recent large-scale migration, considerable varieties in national policies still remain.

Across the Atlantic Ocean, Canada represents to the world a culturally pluralistic society. Canadian political policies project the sentiment that racial and ethnic groups in Canadian society are useful and even desirable. The Canadian government has traditionally supported the policy of multiculturalism that originated in the early 1970s.[1]

Throughout the modern era, society has romanticized the belief that sport is "the great equalizer." This notion implies that an ultimate common goal of competitive rivalry and victory exists within a sporting context and, as a result, concerns about race or ethnic differences supposedly diminish when weighed in comparison to the desire to win. On the contrary, sport can operate both as a component that may reinforce the separation between classes and ethic groups, and also as an element that may create and reinforce temporary links between participants from different social and cultural backgrounds.

This study analyses the emergence of sport as a sector of public policy interest in two countries: Canada and Hungary. Central to the paper is the manifestation of "equal opportunity in sport" as a key policy concern in both countries. While the emergence of the concept "equality in sport – equality through sport" is the focus here, the increased sporting activities at regional and sub-regional level in Canada and Hungary

require some attention. The paper draws from data gathered on two particular areas of sport policy representing equal opportunities in sport: sport for minority groups and sport for people with disabilities. The study relies on primary sources such as the published texts of various government initiatives, directives and reports; secondary sources including books, conference papers and unpublished theses; as well as on interviews with academics who have been involved in empirical investigations of equal opportunity in Canadian or Hungarian sport.

Canada

Although Canada's culture and economy are greatly influenced by the United States, the country's historical roots are largely European. Canada's style of governance can best be described as a liberal democracy — within a federalist system of power sharing. Even though sport has been named as one of the important elements in Canadian history to build a nation divided geographically, religiously, and ethnically, for a long time Canadian governments have not had direct policy interests in sport. The shift towards increased federal government involvement in sport and away from what can be termed as a "voluntarist" approach became pronounced in September 1961 with the introduction of Bill 131 "An Act to Encourage Fitness and Amateur Sport." Since this initiative, Canadian sport policy must be contextualized in light of the broader political tensions surrounding the separatist tendencies in Quebec, ideological predominance of the Liberal Party in promoting cultural pluralism, and the growing influence of American capital in all aspects of Canadian life.

In 1996, a Census Canada survey showed that 12.5 million Canadians — 44% of the population — reported origins other than British, French or Canadian. Half a million people — around 2% of the total population — reported only Aboriginal origin.[2] From another perspective, Canadian society can be also described as a complex network of relations among different ethnic groups that have unequal economic, political, and social positions or capacities. These relations can be characterized in the following ethnic polarities:

- Natives vs. non-Natives
- French vs. English
- Colonizing (English, French) vs. other immigrant groups

The Canadian Multicultural Act[3] is a supplementary document to the Constitution. Multiculturalism as a government policy perspective has influenced sport policy as well.

With respect to certain ethnic issues in sport, Christine M. O'Bonsawin, a sports historian at the University of Western Ontario, suggests that

> The political, social, and cultural context, in which Native athletes participated in Canadian sport throughout the 1970s and 1980s, assists in understanding their position in the Canadian mainstream sport system. The political context of Native participation relates specifically to federal policies addressing the government's role in both Native affairs and the development and implementation of federal sport policies.[4]

Significant policies of the federal government included the 1969 Trudeau-Chretien "White Paper on Indians." This Paper was partly the result of ongoing Aboriginal disapproval of government policies during the 1960s regarding the appalling living conditions in Aboriginal communities, and partly of the government's desire to place the Aboriginal question into a wider context of multicultural/bilingual Canadian policies. Concurrently the Canadian government's desire to promote sport specifically at the elite level, led to the formation of an Aboriginal sport policy and to increased participation of Aboriginal athletes in different sports. After the inception of the Canada Games in 1967, government officials realized that Native people of the North did not have opportunity to participate in the event. This was caused mainly by the fact that Aboriginal people were not exposed to mainstream sports.

The initiative to organize a competition similar to the Canada Games but primarily for the people of Canadian North came from native leaders and northern politicians. The initiative met the broader political interest of the federal government for establishing a prominent Canadian presence in the Arctic. The Arctic Winter Games featured not only some of the more popular mainstream sports but also Native games such as the high kick, the whip contest, and Eskimo dance. Even though the Games emerged within the context of Native sport policy and in reality served wider political goals of the federal government, they became eminent in Aboriginal sport policy for decades. As Donald Macintosh, Tom Bedecki, Tom Bedecki and C. E. S. Franks pointed out in this regard: "For whatever reason, the Arctic Winter Games became a reality in Yellow-

knife in [the] 1970s.... Eight hundred athletes, representing the Northwest Territories, the Yukon, and Alaska competed in this first Arctic Games."[5]

Another initiative in sport policy definitely followed the prospective of the White Paper, encouraging Aboriginal athletes' participation in mainstream sports. The most relevant program of Aboriginal sport policy was the TEST — Territorial Experimental Ski Training initiative. The government's concern was to motivate Indian and Eskimo youth to achieve academically and socially within the broader scope of competitive Canadian society. As O'Bonsawin concluded in her analysis of TEST, this project had been established explicitly to assimilate Aboriginals.[6] Aboriginal sport leaders wished to assimilate, but in a way federal officials did not expect. Rather than assimilate into the mainstream sport system, they insisted on maintaining an all-Native sport system, where successful Aboriginal athletes would emerge and compete against the best Euro-Canadians in provincial and national championships.

Throughout the 1980s, Aboriginal leaders sought to have their sport activities acknowledged as legitimate national sport events. They tried to argue that this type of organization should have an equal access to government funding with other national sport organizations. In their understanding, this would achieve an equal opportunity for Aboriginal participants. These ideas led to the formation of the concept of the North American Indigenous Games, an all-Native multi-sport competition and cultural festival, as a branch to the World Indigenous Nations Games. As Janice Forsyth of the University of Manitoba pointed out, the 1980s "were a period of transition for Aboriginal Sport in Canada. The rise of the all-Native sport system, and the initiative to develop a national sport coordinating body as part of the National Indian Brotherhood clearly demonstrated that Aboriginal people believed they had a right to self-determination."[7] Self-determination ran counter to the federal policies targeting Aboriginals for assimilation.

The 1970s can be described as a decade for the incorporation of sport for disabled people into a broader concept of federal sport policy. In 1976, as a result of the efforts of Dr. Robert F. Jackson, a Toronto Orthopedic Surgeon, Toronto hosted the so-called "Torontolympiad," which later became known as the 5th Paralympic Games. Historically, in the domestic context, these Games can be referred to as the 3rd Canadian Games for Athletes with Disabilities. Although the timing of the Games was excellent and followed the Montreal Olympics, the Canadian government withdrew its financial support after the organizers decided to allow

an integrated South African team to compete. But using the initiative and the general idea to sustain the Games as an important tool of integration for people with disabilities into the wider Canadian society, the federal government targeted funds to a newly established coordinating committee after the successful accomplishment of the Torontolympiad.[8] This coordinating committee was the founding organization of the recently formed Canadian Paralympic Committee.

At the end of the 1970s, the federal government integrated athletes with disabilities into the Athlete Assistance Program. They were carded using the criteria similar to the other athletes. In 1984, nine wheelchair and five blind athletes received direct funding. During that decade, a growing number of member organizations required more sophisticated and increased coordination of activities.[9] The Paralympic Committee focused on the matters of promotion, rules and coaching integration, participation in international competitions and administration involving more than one disability group. In the "Year of the Disabled" in 1981 the Canadian government provided $200,000 to assist with the programs of the organization. As a result of lobbying efforts, the International Paralympic Committee approved the creation of a Commission for Inclusion of Athletes with a Disability into major international competitions. This organization was chaired by Rick Hansen and located in the National Sport Centre in Ottawa. In 1996 the Canadian Paralympic Committee — after an unsuccessful participation at Atlanta Paralympic Games — reviewed its mandate. The report identified declining Canadian performance and significant organizational challenges as the most serious concerns for the organization. The federal government adjusted the Athlete Assistance Program to include more athletes with disabilities. In the beginning of the 1990s there were 16 carded athletes with disabilities. Until 2001, the Canadian Paralympic Committee membership base consisted of 22 national sport organizations. The growing membership needed new vision and a new business plan to guide the limited resources, while ensuring the priorities and objectives of the organization were met. This new vision replaced the "event based" concept of the earlier strategy and it became a "movement" based organization on behalf of the community of athletes with disabilities. Whatever changes the organization needed to secure the necessary funds, it sent its athletes to all of the Winter and Summer Olympic Games. The athletes even achieved higher ranking results at the Paralympic Games than the National Team of the regular Olympic competition.

But the story of Canadian disabled sport and its inclusion in policy discourse speaks for itself. It follows the general tendency of the sport policy prospective focusing exclusively on elite development. The sport system supports the elite athletes even with disabilities to achieve the highest possible results in the mainstream policy terrain, specifically at the Olympic/Paralympic Games.

Hungary

The organization and development of sport in Hungary followed a different path. Historically, sport administration in Hungary had developed in tight connection with the educational system. Prussian-style military discipline used to be considered essential at all levels of the county's schools. Physical education played a very important role in this.

Following the establishment of communist rule in Hungary in the late 1940s, both education and sport became organized on a strictly centralized, totalitarian pattern. After the demise of communism in 1989 the Hungarian sport system began its democratic life in a highly turbulent atmosphere. Although the Government faced severe economic, political, and social problems, it managed to focus on the challenges faced by the sport community. On the 1st of January, 1999 it established the Ministry of Youth and Sport. The Ministry considered a priority the promotion of an active lifestyle for people all ages, both sexes, including citizens with disabilities. In 2002, a "White Paper on the Recent Situation on Sport in Hungary" was undertaken upon the request of the Ministry. The Paper's suggestions and recommendations served as the basis for Hungary's subsequent sport strategy.

"The National Sport Strategy" (NSS)[10] is a political document, that surveys the current situation of the Hungarian sport system. It outlines the long-term goals of the sport community and conceptualizes the operational plans for achieving these goals. The sport policy as health, educational, youth, social and regional policies, became an integral part of the National Development Plan (NDP).[11] The National Development Plan emphasizes that without a mentally and physically healthy population it would be impossible to improve the competitiveness and the quality of life in the country. It acknowledges that the goals of the sport community have to be taken into consideration in the country's long-term socio-economical planning process. The creation of the National Sport Strategy

as part of the National Development Plan of Hungary is a moment of historical importance.

Hungary has a highly homogenous population, where members of ethnic minorities comprise only about 3% of the citizenry. Officially, the Roma ethnic community represents 1.95% of the total population, while other minority groups represent nationalities from different East European countries, as well as Germans and Greeks.[12]

Emphasizing the social importance of sport in promoting equal opportunities, the NSS pays particular attention to society's disadvantaged groups. Analyzing the structure of the document, chapters like "The Role of Sport in Social Cohesion" and "Sport for People with Disabilities" are placed at the very beginning of the document, far ahead of chapters such as "Elite Sport Development" or "Connection between Business and Sport."[13]

Promoting equal opportunities for under-represented social groups, the Ministry of Sport launched the "Moonlight" program in 2001. It is a organized sport competition that takes place in the evenings, targeting the disadvantaged youth of urban communities who otherwise would be spending their time on the streets. In the table-tennis competition, for example, the participation amounted to 8000 individuals. Unfortunately there is no official data provided on the ethnic background of the participants.

The Roma population has been targeted in the formal educational policies, policies that should have included the physical education curriculum. In the period between 2001–2004, over $100 million was provided through the European Union's educational programs for Roma projects in Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics, but sport currently is not included as a form of activity promoted in existing educational programmes. The so-called non-formal educational programming of sport has never targeted the Roma population on its own.

In 1995, in order to seek some administrative help, the President of the Roma Soccer Federation, which had been established in 1992, contacted the Hungarian Soccer Federation expressing the Romas' desire and willingness to be included into the mainstream sport developments of Hungarian soccer. After long negotiations, in 1997 the Hungarian Soccer federation established a Roma Committee, incorporating the leaders of the Roma Soccer Federation into its own representatives.[14] The Ministry of Sport, the Ministry of Interior, and the Hungarian Soccer Federation organized the Hungarian Anti-Racism Day first in 2003. The event

included matches involving the national Roma and Slovene minorities' teams at the senior and junior levels. The insignificant percentage of other ethic groups in relation to the total Hungarian majority probably explains the non-existence of any specific policies that target other ethnic minorities of the country. In both the formal and non-formal educational policies, the only existing measures are those showing the general level of integration for minority groups.

Until the 1970s, the situation of people with disabilities in Hungarian sport can be best characterized as "*persona non grata.*" There were no opportunities for them to participate in organized sporting activities, there were no clubs, and facilities for them to use. The first sport clubs, or affiliations for people with disabilities came about in sports like table tennis, archery, sitting-volleyball and, later on, in swimming, bowling, and indoor soccer.[15] Hungarian disabled athletes officially have been able to participate in international competitions only since 1984. Before that, the National Committee of Sport and Physical Education for People with Disabilities approached the National Office for Sport and Physical Education several times for their support to become a member of international organizations and that way secure the right of participation for their athletes, but the Office rejected these pleas without any explanation.

The 1990s brought new opportunities for disabled athletes. Sport clubs organized activities and established national championships in a variety of sports for disabled people. In 1991, Budapest hosted the third Congress of the International Paralympic Committee. Although this was a promising start towards a new and existing sport policy for disabled people, the results quickly became frustrating. While sport organizations, clubs, and affiliations mushroomed, so did misunderstandings and discord among them. Perhaps the explanation for this can be found in the difference of organizational structures between the disabled and mainstream sport organizations: the former formulated their associations on the basis of the type of disability while the latter were organized by disciplines. Unfortunately these problems resulted in a seven year delay in the establishment of the Hungarian Paralympic Committee and its sub-organizations in each sport discipline.

In 1999 the newly established Ministry and the Paralympic subcommittees together launched the first national sport program targeting people with disabilities. The program proudly announced that its primary focus would be on the recreational activities of disabled people — as an integral part of the general sport policy — while fostering and encourag-

ing the participation of disabled elite athletes in Paralympic Games and other international competitions. To achieve these two main goals, the Ministry divided funding for disabled sport into two sections: one to support elite athletes on the basis of a "carded system" similar to one in Canada; the other towards reconstruction of facilities that in most cases did not have any kind of wheelchair access for people with disabilities — either athletes or spectators. Taking into consideration the discourse of the National Sport Strategy, this initiative should have been emphasized in operational planning and consequently in funding, because this aspect of the program should have focussed on general recreation, in other words, on the inclusion of people with disabilities. In fact, an examination of the distribution of funds provided for the Ministry's two goals makes it evident that while the elite development received $11 million between 1999-2005 from the state budget the amount allocated for the program's second section was just $2 million.[16]

Conclusions

Social exclusion as a concept entered political discourse in the 1980s. The term was adopted partly to deal with the reluctance of governments to use the word "poverty" and became central in the programming targeted at the most disadvantaged members of society in general. Within this context, a range of different actions have been identified that can promote intercultural understanding and mutual respect between different communities and groups, including legislation but also cultural and educational programs. Sport is one of such areas of policy activities. It has been recognized on the national and international levels as a "social phenomenon." Sport in policy discourse offers a "common language and platform for social democracy," "it creates conditions for political democracy and is instrumental for development of democratic citizenship," "it contributes to the fight against prejudice," "it plays its part to limit social exclusion of minorities." However such claims about using sport are rarely made with the support of evidence or detailed analysis of how such goals can be accomplished.[17]

Nevertheless, many aspects of social exclusion share one common feature: the lack of opportunities for some people to participate, that is a lack of social connectedness or social capital. Thus, offering opportunities to people to participate in sport can assist in this respect. As Coalter

pointed out,[18] it is necessary to consider the various features of sport, as individual, team, competitive, recreational; and the aims of provision to find a way of targeting outcomes so that they are appropriate to the different needs of various groups.

This study examined the inconsistencies between sport policy discourses and sport practices regarding equality in sport in Canada and Hungary. The similarities between sport policies and practices of the two countries are the inclusiveness in discourse rather than in practice; the focus exclusively on high performance sport, the result of which is the fact that the only established measurement of a successful sport policy is the numbers of Olympic/Paralympic medals won.

But there are some important differences between the two countries' sport policies, and these are in line with their general orientation towards citizenship. Ian Henry outlined four different models of nationality and citizenship that are illustrative of the range of national approaches to sport and diversity. These are the Anglo-Saxon pluralist; the German ethno-nationalist; the French republican and the Polish post-Communist models.[19] Canada can be characterized as having a relatively heterogeneous population with evidence of multicultural or intercultural policy approaches, while Hungary is perceived as relatively homogenous population employing assimilationist approaches to policies. In spite of this seemingly heterogeneous approach, there is evidence to suggest that Canadian sport policies have been assimilationist as well, even though Canada claims to be a liberal pluralist state that promotes individual freedom of its members, intercultural exchange and separate but equal development for ethnic groups. In Hungary, the social organization and questions of citizenship were constructed under very different circumstances and under the communist regime: the importance of immigration, ethnicity, and national minorities were minimized. Even though Hungary still is in the process of working out its new approach to citizenship, the significance of national minorities has been recognized. Government and non-government agencies have been established to provide services to ethnic minorities and disadvantaged communities. But the policies are associated with an emphasis on cohesion rather than diversity, and with a unitary notion of national culture. The sport programming and practice still remains assimilationist, which seek to incorporate groups into existing national culture.

Since 1989, Canada and Hungary have cooperated on more than 150 projects worth over $30 million, funded by the Canadian International

Development Agency (CIDA). Some of these projects were accomplished in strengthening civil society and education, but not one particularly in sport. The promotion of sport exchange focusing on young people of under-represented groups and with the intention to measure the number of participants and their attitude towards cultural differences could grow into new connections and into an existing "good practice" benefiting both countries, and especially will give Hungarians the opportunity to learn — for good or bad — from the Canadian experience.

NOTES

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[1] Prime Minister P.E. Trudeau was seeking ways in which he could counter two strong negative forces in the country: Quebec separatism and American economic and cultural domination. He mentioned sport in connection with culture first in 1968. As a result of his vision on the role of sport in promoting national unity, the first Canada Games was held in Quebec City in 1967 under the slogan "Unity of Sports." Following this new perspective the federal government did not renew the cost-sharing agreement with the provinces. Troubled by provincial-federal jurisdiction, it created arm-length organizations designed to improve Canada's international sport performances. In the period between 1970s and 1990s these organizations received $62 million from the federal budget. A Fitness and Amateur Sport Directorate with a deputy minister was established and Iona Campagnolo, the veteran Liberal politician, became the first Minister of State in sport. Canadian federal government involvement in sport is systematically analyzed in following books: Donald Macintosh and David Whitson, *The Game Planners: Transforming Canada's Sport System* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990); and Donald Macintosh, Tom Bedecki, and C. E. S. Franks, *Sport and Politics in Canada* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987).

[2] *Multicultural Canada: Demographic Overview 1998* (Ottawa: Ministry of Canadian Heritage, 1998).

[3] *Canadian Multicultural Act 1985.*

[4] Christine O'Bonsawin, "*Failed Test: Aboriginal Sport Policy and the Olympian Firth Sisters,*" unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Western Ontario, School of Kinesiology, London, Ontario, Canada, 2001.

[5] Macintosh, Bedecki, and Franks, *Sport and Politics in Canada*, p. 67.

[6] O'Bonsawin, *Failed Test*, p. 106.

[7] Janice Forsyth, "*From Assimilation to Self-Determination: The Emergence of J. Wilton Littlechild's North American Indigenous Games, 1763-1997,*" unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Western Ontario, School of Kinesiology, London, Ontario, Canada, 2001, p. 85.

[8] For details see the homepage of the Canadian Paralympic Committee: http://paralympic.ca/english/aboutus/whoweare/history2.asp

[9] Macintosh, Bedecki, and Franks, *Sport and Politics in Canada*, pp. 135-37.

[10] See the homepage of the Nemzeti Sporthivatal [hereafter NSP] (Hungarian Sports Office): http://nsh.hu/strategia

[11] See the homepage of the Nemzeti Fejlesztési Hivatal (Hungarian National Development Office): http://www.nft.hu

[12] European Commission/Directorate General X, *Studies on Education and Sport; Sport and Multiculturalism — Final Report* (Report by PMP in partnership with Institute of Sport and Leisure Policy Loughborough University, August 2004).

[13] Homepage of the NSP: http://nsh.hu/strategia

[14] European Commission/Directorate General X, *Studies on Education and Sport...*, Section 2 "Approaches to sport policy and multiculturalism" (Report in partnership with the Institute of Sport and Leisure Policy, Loughborough University, August 2004), p. 29.

[15] *A fogyatékos sport története Magyarországon* [History of disabled sport in Hungary], unpublished report, prepared by the Hungarian National Sport Office (NSH), April 2005.

[16] Data provided by Anna Molnár, Deputy Head of the Department for Strategic Developments of the NSH (Nemzeti Sporthivatal Stratégiai Innovációs Főosztály), during a personal interview on 22 April 2005.

[17] European Commission/Directorate General X, *Studies on Education and Sport...*, Appendix E: Report on Project Conference "Sport and Multicultural Dialogue" (Paris, 26-27 April, 2004), pp. 7-8.

[18] Fred Coalter: "What is the evidence to support claims for the social inclusion effects of sport?" A paper delivered in April 2004, in Paris in a workshop entitled "Using sport for social inclusion." The workshop was organized and supported by the European Commission.

[19] European Commission/Directorate General X, *Studies on Education and Sport...*, section 2: Approaches to sports policy and multiculturalism, pp. 24-26.

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In Memoriam

Thomas Spira
(1923-2005)

The readers of our journal will be saddened by the news of the passing of a trusted and experienced member of our editorial board, Thomas Spira, who died last September. An indefatigable worker and editor, Dr. Spira has been a role model and adviser to me on most matters of journal production and manuscript editing from the very first days of our journal.

Thomas Spira was born December 28, 1923, in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia, the capital city (Pozsony) of the Kingdom of Hungary from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. He and his family left East Central Europe during the late 1930s to escape the increasingly anti-democratic and anti-Semitic political atmosphere there. He arrived in the United States just before the outbreak of World War II. Having experienced the mainly negative effects of nationalism in his childhood, he devoted a lifetime to its study. He received his B.A. from the City College of New York and his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from McGill University in Montreal. He next joined the faculty of the Department of History at the University of Prince Edward Island in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island. There, in 1973, he launched the *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* a journal he continued to edit for the rest of his life. The *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* published a great many articles of significance over the years and helped to give Thomas Spira's university a world-wide profile.

Tom, as he was known to his friends and colleagues, also published many articles and wrote or edited many volumes. The latter included *The Rise of the Global Village; The German-Hungarian-Swabian Triangle, 1936-1939; The Road to Discord; Ideologies;* and, most recently, *Nationalism and Ethnicity Terminologies: An Encyclopedic Dictionary and Research Guide*. After his retirement from teaching, he remained active as a scholar and editor and was in the process of

completing the *Political Science Handbook of Terminologies: An Encyclopedic Dictionary and Research Guide*.*

His contribution to our journal, beyond the giving of advice regarding editing and publishing, were two articles: "The Radicalization of Hungary's Swabian Minority after 1935," XI, 1 (Spring, 1984): 9-22; and "The Reaction of Hungary's German Minorities to Oscar Jaszi's Plan for an 'Eastern Switzerland,'" XVIII, 1-2 (1991): 27-42.

Tom personally and thoroughly edited all the manuscripts slated for publication in his journal. His work-load must have been tremendous. Not surprisingly, no successor stepped forward to take over the task of editing the *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*. The journal ceased publication.

Nándor Dreisziger

* See the obituary of Thomas Spira by Henry Srebrnik, the most recent Associate Editor of *CRSN*, in the last volume of that journal (vol. 32, 2005), p. vii.

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OUR CONTRIBUTORS

GEORGE BISZTRAY received his post-secondary education in Hungary, Scandinavia and the United States. After teaching at universities in Minnesota, Illinois and Alberta, in 1978 he became the incumbent of the Chair of Hungarian Language and Literature at the University of Toronto. He is the principal founder of the Hungarian Studies Association of Canada that has been promoting Hungarian studies in Canada since the 1980s mainly through its annual conferences, held usually under the aegis of the Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences. He has been associated with out journal in various capacities for three decades; for twenty-four years he had been co-editor. Dr. Bisztray is the author of *Hungarian-Canadian Literature* (U. of T. Press, 1987) and of many other works, including articles in the *HSR* — going back to 1976.

ZOLTÁN FEJŐS is the Director of Hungary's Museum of Ethnography. His researches and publications have focused on such themes as the Hungarian communities of the United States, visual anthropology, material culture studies and museum affairs in Hungary. He is the author of the ground-breaking monograph: *A chikagói magyarok két nemzedéke, 1890–1940: Az etnikai örökség megőrzése és változása* [Two Generations of the Hungarians of Chicago, 18901940: The Preservation and Transformation of the Ethnic Heritage] (Teleki László Institute, 1993). He has published in *Acta Ethnographica Hungarica, Hungarian Quarterly, Cahiers d'études hongroises* as well as numerous Hungarian-language journals and museum catalogues.

BÉLA BODÓ teaches European history at Grand Valley State University in Grand Rapids MI. Previously he had taught at the University of South Florida, in Tampa, at Oklahoma State University in Stillwater, and the University of Windsor in Windsor, Ontario. He studied at the University of Toronto and at Toronto's York University, where he earned his M. A. and Ph. D. degrees. He is the author of *Tiszazug: A Social History of a Murder Epidemic,* published in Columbia University Press' East European

Monographs series. His articles have appeared in the *Journal of Family Studies, Yad Vashem Studies, Bulletin of the History of Medicine, East European Quarterly* and *The Historian.* His article in this volume is part of a forthcoming monograph.

Before his retirement from teaching KENNETH McROBBIE had taught cultural and intellectual history at the University of Manitoba and the University of British Columbia. Since 1959 he has been translating poetry and writing on cultural matters pertaining to Hungary, a country he has visited many times. His publications include *The Selected Poems of Ferenc Juhász* (Oxford, 1970) and (with Tony Connor) *The Selected Poems of László Nagy* (Oxford, 1973). He has edited selected papers from international conferences of the Karl Polanyi Institute (Concordia University): *Humanity, Society and Commitment* (Black Rose, 1994) and (with Kari Polanyi Levitt) *Karl Polanyi in Vienna* (Black Rose, 1999). When he was Editor of *Mosaic: a journal for the comparative study of literature and ideas* (University of Manitoba), he produced a special issue on *The Eastern European Imagination in Literature* (Summer 1973). He is working on a biography of Ilona Duczynska, and an edition of her writings and correspondence.

DANY DESCHÊNES teaches history and political science at the Université de Sherbrooke, in Sherbrooke, Quebec. He earned his master's degree at the Université du Quebec à Chicoutimi where his supervisor was Professor Paul Pilisi. He completed his doctorate last year at the Université Laval in Quebec City. Before coming to Sherbrooke, he had taught courses (or correspondence courses) at U.Q. à Chicoutimi, at Laval, and at the Collège militaire royale du Canada. He now teaches international relations, comparative politics and the history of Danubian Europe and the Balkans. He has published in various scholarly media including the journals *Paix et sécurité internationales* and *Études internationales.*

Before his retirement in 2005, THOMAS SAKMYSTER held the Walter Langsam Professorship in Modern European History at the University of Cincinnati. His research specialty is 20th century Hungarian history. He is the author of *Hungary, the Great powers, and the Danubian Crisis, 1936-*

1939 (University of Georgia Press, 1980), *Hungary's Admiral on Horseback: Miklós Horthy, 1920-1944* (East European Monographs/Columbia University Press, 1994) as well as numerous articles, including three in our journal. His current research project is a study of Hungarian Communist emigres active in the world communist movement in the interwar period. One of his studies related to this theme is forthcoming in the journal *Századok* (Centuries).

MARGUERITE DeHUSZAR ALLEN received her doctoral degree in Comparative Studies in Literature from the University of Chicago, where she was a Mrs. Giles Whiting Dissertation fellow. She also won an NEH travel grant to conduct research at the Thomas Mann Archives in Zürich. She began her career as a teacher and scholar, publishing articles in major scholarly journals and a book about Thomas Mann and the Faust Legend. She taught German at Princeton University and European literature at Loyola University of Chicago. She is currently affiliated with the Center for International and Comparative Studies at Northwestern University. A memoir about her Hungarian uncle appeared in the *Chicago Review* (Fall-Winter 1999).

EMESE IVAN earned her International MBA from Krannert Graduate School of Business of Purdue University (West Lafayette, Indiana) in 2000. Currently she is a Ph.D. candidate and Sessional Instructor at the University of Western Ontario in London, Ontario. Her dissertation focuses on developments in Hungarian sports policy since 1990 with special emphasis on the transition from state socialism to a pluralistic society, as well as the impact of globalization on the Hungarian sport system. Emese Ivan is an active member of such scholarly organizations as the American-Hungarian Educators' Association, the Hungarian Studies Assoc. of Canada and the Hungarian Studies Association (USA) and often gives papers at their conferences. Her research and teaching interests include comparative sport policy, sport and law, and the business of sport.